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A b stract
This is an  in terpretiv ist study  based  on a  general inductive approach  of 
dilem m as th a t com prom ise the optim al discharge of corporate 
governance in state-ow ned com panies in Trinidad and  Tobago. This 
qualitative study  investigates and  analyses the views and  insigh ts of ten  
(10) C hairm en of state-ow ned enterprises; it considers sim ilarities and  
variances of th inking  and  estab lishes p a tte rn s  or m odes based  on their 
perception and  cognition of corporate governance, risk  m anagem ent 
and  accountability . The s ta tem en ts  of cognition are those th a t 
recognize how corporate governance ought to be adm inistered; those of 
perception reveal how corporate governance is d ischarged on a  day-to- 
day basis in the state-ow ned com panies.
The research  vindicates the initial h u n ch  and  anecdotal evidence; it 
estab lishes the existence, n a tu re  and  chief cause of the dilem m as, the 
in tractab le , chronic problem s th a t have defined the practice of 
corporate governance from the inception of state-ow ned com panies in 
Trinidad and  Tobago. The texts offer rich insigh ts into the practice and  
u n d ers tan d in g  of corporate governance while the research  m ethodology 
teases ou t from the fabric of the interview lite ra tu re  key w ords and  
ph rases , placing these  words and  p h rases  in m atrices, decoding the 
m atrices, and  discovering th ree  key and  un ique  p a tte rn s . It reveals the  
struggle chairm en have experienced and  still experience a s  they  try  to 
discharge their corporate responsibility.
The research  environm ent is one w here there  is u rg en t need b u t too 
little genuine suppo rt for m eaningful change; the d istortion  of corporate 
governance is aided and  abetted  by a  cu ltu re  of seem ing indifference 
and  apathy . The investigation reveals the  ex tent to w hich politics (the 
pericentric pattern) dom ineers and  h inders the a tta in m en t of proper 
corporate governance. It sim ultaneously  dem onstra tes th a t there  is an  
u n d ers tan d in g  of w hat is required to effect proper governance and  it 
su rfaces the chief dilem m a w hich re ta rd s  the a tta in m en t of corporate  
governance. It exam ines the im portance of governance a s  a crucible in 
which ethical m atu rity  is m easu red  and  tested  and  inform s th ink ing  
th a t is desirous of in stitu ting  fundam enta l change in a  p rac tical and  
straightforw ard m anner.
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CHAPTER ONE -  INTRODUCTION
P urpose  S ta te m e n t
This purpose sta tem en t se ts the scene for the  thesis. My work 
experience over the las t sixteen years in the a reas  of auditing, 
consu lting  and  corporate investigations h as spu rred  my in te res t in the 
a rea  of corporate governance. These experiences have been the prim ary 
driver in my w anting to have an  unequivocal u n d e rs tan d in g  of why, 
over the years, state-ow ned com panies in Trinidad and  Tobago were 
constan tly  featured  negatively in the m edia spotlight. Their appearance  
in the m edia h as  a lm ost always been associated  w ith reports  of 
corruption, ignorance, alleged m alfeasance, m isfeasance, nepotism  and  
o ther egregious acts. Those accused  or in charge of these  com panies 
have always offered a  defence, refuting the  reports th a t strongly suggest 
th a t there is a  chronic problem  of corporate m isgovernance. This is a 
topic th a t h a s  a t least two salien t dim ensions: one, it is of private 
in te rest to me; th is ought not to be d ism issed  too sim ply or facilely a s  it 
is the initial s tim u lus th a t rationalizes the exercise, giving it a  personal 
significance. B ut as im portan t as th is  personal adven tu re  is, its 
im plications by far tran scen d  any sense of pure  personal in terest. Its 
research  discoveries and  tangible recom m endations possess the 
potential to im pact specifically on state-ow ned entities, generally on the  
econom ic (and political) health  of the countiy . It is, a t once, then , 
personal and  academ ic.
For me there is an  irresistible urge to know how these  state-ow ned 
corporations viewed and  understood  the practice of corporate  
governance, especially the C hairm an as servant leader of the  Board. 
One m ight ask: why dilem m as? An incontrovertible fact is th a t  sta te - 
owned com panies operate in alm ost all industries in T rinidad an d  
Tobago. These state-ow ned entities are the recipients of governm ent
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subsid ies, g ran ts, and  cen tral treasu ry  funding. S tan d ard s and  Poor 
(2007) in the ir economic analysis indicate th a t the governm ent also 
g uaran tees a  significant portion of governm ent-ow ned en terprise  debt. 
These corporations therefore are involved in decision m aking th a t 
involves the patrim ony of the nationals: public money. I am  in terested , 
therefore, in developing an  u n d ers tan d in g  of how the C hairm en of these  
state-ow ned com panies u n d e rs tan d  and  perceive the  phenom enon of 
corporate governance; m oreso, accountability  and  risk  m anagem ent a s  
these  are prim ary and  fundam enta l a reas, which if no t understood  an d  
m anaged effectively, render all o ther aspec ts  of governance use less. 
Most of the tex ts w hich I have researched , ad d ress  corporate 
governance in the private sector and  m oreso in the financial sector. 
However, while global and  au thorita tive bodies such  as the CIPFA, 
IFAC, IADB and  the OECD add ress corporate governance in the public 
sector, there  is a  d earth  of published  an d  researched  m aterial on the  
practice of governance in th is  sector. It is only w ithin the la s t decade, 
as IFAC (2001) po in ts out, th a t m uch  debate on corporate governance 
h as  occurred. Echoing sim ilar sen tim en ts are K aufm an et al (1999) who 
in a World B ank paper conclude th a t em pirical evidence indicate  th a t 
governance m atters  and  influences be tter developm ent outcom es 
th rough  a strong causa l relationship . Nonetheless, a s  C adbury  (1999) 
contends, the fundam enta ls of corporate  governance; accountability , 
tran sp aren cy  and  risk  m anagem ent are the sam e w hether we are in  the 
private sector or the public sector.
This u n d ers tan d in g  I am  seeking, therefore, is in the context of w ha t 
au thorita tive  bodies and  w riters consider im portan t and  ind ispensab le  
to the sensible and  proper conduct of an  o rgan isation ’s corporate  
governance: the OECD’s (1999) principles of corporate governance on 
risk  m anagem ent and  tran sparency  and  accountability; C adbury  (1992) 
on system s and  processes to direct a  com pany tow ards accountability ; 
Carver and  Oliver (2002) on accountability , risk  m anagem en t and  
responsibility; the World B ank (2005) on the balance of econom ic an d
social goals; Adam s and  Young (2007) on the productive and  strategic 
dialogue betw een shareho lder and  governors; Carver and  Oliver (2002) 
on the practice of ow nership one level down not m anagem en t one level 
up; C haran  (2005) on charac teristics of progressive Boards, risk  and  
accountability; Ozkan and  G ungor Tanc (2012) on accountability  to deal 
w ith in stances of incom petence or d ishonesty  an d  H asan  (2005) on 
d irec to rs’ qualities of p rudence, acting in good faith, transparency , 
accountability  and  risk  m anagem ent. The research  methodology, 
in trepetiv ist in na tu re , and  form ulated to derive an  u n d e rs tan d in g  from 
ten  individuals occupying the position of C hairm an, relied on key 
interview questions to uncover w hat I consider the  cognition and  
perception of these C hairm en. Lending credibility to th is  app roach  are 
the views offered by Z ahra  and  Pearce (1989) and  Ju d g e  (1989) who 
posit th a t researchers are unaw are  of the B oards role sim ply because  of 
the  scarcity  of u sab le  d a ta  regarding w hat B oards actually  do in the 
Boardroom . The analysis of cognition, therefore, focuses on the  m an n er 
in w hich and  the exten t to which the C hairm en u n d e rs ta n d  w hat 
corporate governance is and  how it ought to function. Conversely, 
analysis of perception reveals the m anner in w hich the interview ees 
u n d e rs tan d  how o thers perceive the phenom enon, to w hat ex ten t it 
exists and  how it is p rac tised  in state-ow ned com panies. The a rray  of 
analysed  responses cam e from questions designed, in the  m ain , to 
cap tu re  an  u n d ers tan d in g  of w hat corporate governance m eans to the 
partic ipan ts, of im pedim ents th a t prevent the a tta in m en t of p roper 
corporate governance, and  of the perception of how corporate  
governance is d ischarged and  of how they  u n d e rs tan d  and  perceive the  
role of risk  m anagem ent and  accountability.
Building upon  the concept of the circle and  placing corporate  
governance a t its centre, th ree  p a tte rn s  were derived from the  research : 
a  centrifugal p a tte rn  rep resen ting  the C hairm en’s view of its practice; a  
centripetal p a tte rn  th a t rep resen ts  w hat I refer to a s  the  C h a irm en s’ 
cognition of corporate governance, and  a pericentric p a tte rn  w hich
explains the  chasm  betw een the  cognition and  perception. These 
p a tte rn s  convey in a relatively sim ple m anner how dilem m as persist, 
the chasm  betw een u n d ers tan d in g  and  perception an d  w hat h as  caused  
the chasm . The derivation of these  p a tte rn s  is fully explained later.
U nderstand ing  the c ircum stances u n d e r which dilem m as pers ist 
provides a  su itab le  foundation for the basic and  fundam en ta l 
recom m endations th a t can  significantly enhance the perform ance of 
corporate governors. The u ltim ate  contribu tion  is three-fold; a  
theoretical con tribu tion  th rough  the derivation of the p a tte rn s  w hich 
offers a  clear u n d e rs tan d in g  of how the practice of corporate  governance 
is perceived in the state-ow ned com panies and  the dilem m as th a t  for so 
long have characterized  corporate governance; a  m ethodological 
contribu tion  w hich utilizes a  credible research  m ethodology to move 
p a s t the anecdotal d a ta  on the phenom enon; a  p ractical b u sin ess  
contribu tion  showing those recom m endations th a t are fundam entally  
necessary  to achieve a  positive outcom e
The com pletion of the research  h as brough t me a  sense of personal 
satisfaction.
T he DBA J o u r n e y
One of the first tex ts I read  w hen I com m enced the  DBA a t Sheffield 
B usiness School w as w ritten by R ickards and  C lark (2006). In read ing  
the in troduction  I w as inspired by the  concept of w hat they referred to 
a s  the “m ap .” The approach  in the ir book relied on a  p rocess they  
described as . . . going on a m ental excursion or safari w ith  help and  
support from  experienced guides who will be supplying som e m aps fo r  
the journey” (Rickards and  Clark, 2006, p. 3).
This m etaphor of the m ap stayed w ith me both th ro u g h o u t th e ir book 
as well as in the formative and  concluding stages of the  sh ap in g  an d
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developm ent of my thesis  topic. As my thesis topic m etam orphosed  
from the idea to the actual, I saw the w isdom  in following their lead and  
using  their m etaphor. The journey  is an  apposite  analogy to apply to 
the m anner in w hich I s tru c tu re  my thesis, moving across the 
landscape of the discharge of corporate governance in the public sector 
in Trinidad and  Tobago.
Such a title a s  “Dilem m as in Corporate Governance in State-ow ned 
E n terprises in T rinidad and  Tobago” m ust, it seem s to me, have th ree  
a reas of prim ary focus: dilem m as, corporate governance, an d  the  public 
sector. These th ree  foci therefore d ictate the s tru c tu ra l com ponents of 
th is  academ ic exercise, though  they do no t necessarily  indicate their 
sequence. Using the analogy betw een pu tting  together th is  thes is  and  
m aking a journey  helps me to know w here each  ch ap ter goes. A 
chap ter of corporate governance ought to come first: an  analytic review 
of the m ajor sta tem en ts  on corporate governance is m andatory , an  
induction  to my narrative. It provides the reader an d  me w ith all th a t is 
required to u n d e rs tan d  the true  n a tu re  of the phenom enon so th a t we 
can  carry  w ith u s  its essen tia l com ponents as we jou rney  across the  
landscape of the sub ject u n d er investigation.
As I more closely survey and  familiarize m yself w ith the  landscape  and  
the terra in , I have to determ ine w hat is the  m ost appropria te  and  
effective m eans of tran spo rt. I look a t the unevenness of the  land  and  
notice th a t there  are  a  few gullies and  stream s th a t I m u s t cross. I 
reach  the first s tream  and  say to myself: This is w here and  why I choose 
my methodology, the  m eans th a t best rationalizes the  way I choose to 
continue my journey; to u n d e rs ta n d  the corporate  governance 
landscape.
After travelling for som e time, I recognize the terra in  and  acknowledge 
th a t it is familiar; it is the landscape of my country. In the  d istance, I 
see the outline of strange shapes; a s  they come closer, I know  th a t  I
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m u st seek to discover w hat forces have created these  outgrow ths on 
th is  fam iliar landscape; these are called sta te  en terp rises. I decide I 
m u st create for m yself a  historical context to help me u n d e rs ta n d  the 
history  and  evolution of these  com panies.
Not knowing anyth ing  ab o u t them , I en te r one, th en  ano ther, un til I 
look inside ten. I see tell-tale signs th a t  all is no t well: I see cobwebs 
everywhere, term ite-riddled p lanks in the flooring, graffiti on the  walls, 
and  broken windows. I decide th a t I m u st linger here for a s  long as it 
takes to investigate w hat is wrong and  why it w ent wrong. Men an d  
wom en in charge agree to tell me their stories; I am  fascinated  and  
alarm ed by the sam eness of these  personal narratives, I have discovered 
w hat m ight be called “dilem m as.”
I walk away from the gullies and  I seek safer, level ground; a s  I walk, I 
m ull over all th a t tran sp ired  in those outgrow ths. I begin to u n d e rs ta n d  
their value to the health  of the landscape. I deduce th a t if these  chronic 
problem s are allowed to continue, there  will be w idespread ill-health . I 
envision a  m oribund  landscape, w ith only a  few, sm all, ve rdan t pa tches. 
I th in k  of ways and  strategies of re tu rn in g  the landscape  to its form er 
health . I begin to form ulate my recom m endations. This p a rticu la r 
jou rney  h a s  come to end; I know there  are o ther practical jo u rn ey s I will 
have to m ake.
T h e s is  S tru c tu re
This thesis con ta ins six discrete b u t rela ted  chap ters; each ch ap te r h a s  
an  integrity th a t perm its it to s tan d  on its own, yet each p o ssesses the 
requisite connectivity to dovetail w ith the  o thers to p resen t a n  a rg u m en t 
th a t is adequately  docum ented, m eaningfully developed, and  
successfully  concluded. While som e m ay challenge the s tru c tu re  of the 
thesis, the o rganisation  is easily rationalized; the existing s tru c tu re  best 
conveys the overall cogency of the thesis.
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The in troduction  essentially  provides a  rationale  for th is academ ic 
undertak ing . It is in effect the exposition of the academ ic narrative: it 
estab lishes the sub ject m atte r and  provides inform ation necessary  to 
begin the  jou rney  across the  corporate-governance terra in . It recoun ts  
how I w as able to arrive a t the chosen topic, and  argues why the  topic is 
an  im portan t one, worthy of research  and  investigation. The research  is 
qualitative and  res ts  on an  in terpretiv ist fram ew ork while the  
m ethodology is based  on the G eneral Inductive A pproach as described 
by Thom as (2006) and  focuses on a  partic ipan t pool of ten  individuals, 
each occupying the position of non-executive C hairm an  in a  sta te - 
owned com pany. The research  h as revealed the existence of dilem m as 
and  h as  m et its research  objectives. Three un ique  an d  key p a tte rn s  
emerge; d ilem m as are described offering rich inform ation as to how the 
prac titioners of corporate governance perceive and  u n d e rs ta n d  
corporate governance w ithin the com panies they chair.
My experience in the consulting  profession and  specifically in the  a re a  
of risk  m anagem ent, in ternal auditing, and  corporate investigations 
over the las t fifteen years h a s  afforded me insigh ts into m any 
operational a reas  of corporate governance of state-ow ned com panies. 
Not surprisingly, over time and  upon  reflection, I began to m ake 
a ssum ptions ab o u t the discharge of corporate governance. As my 
experience in th is  a rea  increased, my a ssu m p tio n s grew, and  becam e 
less am orphous; these  took hold of my m ind, and  insidiously  began to 
dom inate my consciousness. I found m yself th ink ing  m ore an d  m ore 
abou t th is  pa rticu la r phenom enon, governance, and  w ondering why 
there were so m any problem s hovering over governance issues. 
Newspaper reports, radio and  television program m es, and  conversations 
w ithin and  outside my professional fratern ity  served only to confirm  my 
suspicions and  assum ptions. As so often is the case w ith w ould-be 
academ ics, I began to form ulate em bryonic an d  inform al h u n c h es  ab o u t 
the problem s th a t beset corporate governors. The p e rs is ten t curiosity  to 
know more, to move away from the anecdotal evidence offered th rough
the media and social rapport, to reach inside the mind of the actors, 
those who occupy the position of Chairperson in this corporate 
governance space, brought me to the "tipping point.” I decided that a 
researched understanding of this phenomenon was necessary to 
authoritatively address the issue; to understand from those who hold 
the positions, those who are selected to occupy the chair, those who are 
responsible and accountable for corporate governance in state-owned  
companies. Undertaking this thesis, therefore, allowed controlled rein 
to my assum ptive gleanings.
My enrolment in the DBA programme afforded me the chance to take a 
professional and academic look at the reality of corporate governance in 
state-owned enterprises in Trinidad and Tobago. This thesis discharges 
two primary functions: one, to fulfill partial requirements for the degree; 
two, to test the validity of my assum ptions. The first function is the 
more immediate and urgent; the second function will, in time, subsum e  
the first, as it has potential implications for the optimal discharge of 
corporate governance in the managem ent of state-owned companies; 
these, if taken seriously, m ust redound to the benefit of the country. 
My interest, as alluded to in the Purpose Statem ent is aimed at why 
state-owned companies are constantly featured in the national media, 
associated with allegations of impropriety, nepotism, loss of reputation, 
apparent lack of accountability, and disregard for risk m anagement. 
Understandably, this interest led me to become increasingly curious 
and curioser about the state of corporate governance within state- 
owned companies; I began to ponder whether there were dilem m as in 
the discharge of corporate governance. I thought it m ost instructive to 
investigate the dilemmas that characterize corporate governance in 
state-owned entities; the title of my thesis had taken form: Dilem m as of 
Corporate Governance in the State-Owned Sector of Trinidad and 
Tobago.
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I have adopted  the term  “dilem m as” because it b est describes those 
problem s th a t are chronic and  in tractab le  b u t soluble. Supporting  my 
position is the usefu l definition obtained from the M erriam  W ebster 
d ictionary (2011) w hich s ta te s  th a t a dilem m a is defined as an  
undesirab le  or u n p leasan t choice, a  predicam ent, a  difficult or 
p e rs is ten t problem . This does no t take u s  to the  poin t w here the  
problem  is unsolvable. In th is  context, and  given the  research  
phenom enon, to say th en  w ith R ickards and  C lark (2006) th a t 
dilem m as “do no t perm it a  process of ‘solution finding’” is surely  to 
overstate the case of a  dilem m a, since if it is insoluble, th en  there  is 
little sense in reaching the point of discovery or in a ttem pting  to right 
wrongs. The research  in te res t is therefore to uncover w hether 
C hairm en are faced w ith pred icam ents, p e rs is ten t or difficult problem s 
in d ischarging corporate governance. For me the research  is im portan t 
to go p a s t the  h unch , the anecdotal; to be able to authorita tively  sta te  
and  dem onstra te  why dilem m as m ay exist. This in te res t however, a t its 
putative stage, requires the u se  of an  appropria te  research  
methodology. It is my sincere hope th a t th is investigation will provide 
insigh ts into and  clarify the u n d ers tan d in g  of corporate governance and  
the specific a reas of accountability  and  risk  m anagem ent a s  these  are 
two ind ispensab le  te th ers  to corporate governance.
C hapter Two develops logically and  organically from the in troduction  
w here certain  key words and  p h rases  lay the foundation for the  ensu ing  
d iscussion . Since the sub ject-m atte r of th is  thesis is the n a tu re  of the 
dilem m as in corporate governance in state-ow ned com panies, it is bo th  
n a tu ra l and  im perative to begin a t the  beginning, w ith a  definition and  
analysis of corporate governance. It offers a  th ree-d im ensional p ictu re  
of the phenom enon of corporate governance, tracing  the  evolution of the 
word “governance,” from its first appearance  in the language in 1390, to 
its pa rticu la r u se  in com bination w ith “corporate” som e six cen tu ries  
later. Though c u rren t since the 1970s, and  the focus of n u m ero u s 
books and  articles, it is ha rd  to u n d e rs ta n d  why the p h rase  “corporate
9
governance” h a s  no t found its way into either the  M erriam-W ebster’s  
Unabridged Dictionary (2009) or the Oxford English Dictionary (2009). 
This chap ter d iscusses the origins of corporate governance in the 
six teen th  century , w ith the estab lishm en t of the  first in ternational 
trad ing  and  stock com panies in Europe. Moreover, it estab lishes and  
d iscusses the im portance of the publication of The M odem  Corporation 
and Private Property (Bearle and  M eans 1932), a  w atershed  in the 
lite ra tu re  on corporate governance. So sem inally im portan t are its 
con ten ts to an  u n d ers tan d in g  of corporate governance th a t they  are still 
being debated  in c lassroom s a round  the world. Some fifty years later, 
Fam a and  Je n se n  (1983), broadened the im plications of corporate 
governance by arguing for the  separa tion  of ow nership an d  control, an  
a rgum en t la ter honed and  advanced by E isenhard t (1989) in the 
“agency theory.” This theory posits th a t the  agent, the director, m ay no t 
ac t in the best in te res t of the principal, the  shareholder.
A lthough the word governance first appears in English in 1390 (used by 
Wyclif and  Chaucer) it took seven cen tu ries for it to be associated  w ith 
the business  world; before tha t, its obvious rela tionsh ip  w as w ith 
politics and  personal self control, its usage  being m ostly in the  context 
of in ternational governance, na tional governance and  personal 
governance. A lthough the conditions giving rise to the  corporate- 
governance term  we know today could probably be traced  back  to the  
six teenth  century , the  concept itself and  u se  of the term  corporate  
governance is relatively new. C onsequently, there  is very little lite ra tu re  
existing prior to the 1970s on the application of corporate  governance 
w ithin com panies.
A lthough the lite ra tu re  review on corporate  governance po in ts to 
sim ilarities betw een public-sector and  private-sector com panies, there  
is a  shocking d earth  of lite ra tu re  on corporate  governance prac tices on 
com panies owned by the state. This, of course, bolstered my confidence 
in the viability of the research  project, since I recognized th a t  there
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existed in huge gap in scholarship and that the gap could be filled and 
needed to be filled. While this is true globally, it is especially true of 
Trinidad and Tobago, where the paucity is alarming to the point of 
being suspicious. It is as if the island’s and the region’s corporate world 
has chosen to be deliberately silent on its importance.
However, the importance of corporate governance is, not surprisingly, 
attested to by the publication World Bank’s Caribbean TYade and  
Investm ent Report 2005, which argues that corporate governance holds 
the balance between economic and social goals and the alignment of the 
interests of individuals, corporations, and society. Although there are 
many variations of definitions of corporate governance, they are all 
glued to the very fundamental and key issu es of trust, accountability, 
risk management, openness, integrity, control, and direction. 
Therefore, it is easy to understand that this premise allows the 
derivation of two corollaries; first, corporate governance is the system  or 
process by which companies are directed and controlled by individuals 
charged with responsibility; and secondly, it m ust be based on the 
principle that companies are accountable for their actions: therefore 
accountability and transparency need to be built into the very 
foundation of the governance structure of these state-owned companies.
Chapter Three describes the qualitative research methodology I have 
chosen. The one that resonates best with this study is a general 
inductive approach, an approach that is suitable for the research into 
the phenomenon. The Chapter d iscu sses the interpenetrative 
relationship between belief (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology), and  
establishes the contours of the m ost suitable approach for the research  
phenomenon. The Chapter sets out the purpose of proposed research, 
the general inductive approach methodology, the importance of locating 
and understanding one’s epistemological make-up and the theoretical 
perspective that guide the research. The exploration of the various 
research texts and matters of philosophy has imparted a greater
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understanding of the importance of a theoretical perspective which I 
believe is instrum ental to the selection of a methodology. The Chapter 
shows how clarity and understanding of this theoretical perspective 
were achieved through the contemplation of two research questions, as 
proposed by Crotty (1998): "What methodologies and m ethods will be 
employed?” and “How do we justify the choice and use of 
methodologies?”
Although I have a natural inherent objectivist feel, the need to 
adequately capture the views of the research informants, to get to their 
understanding of what corporate governance m eans and how it is 
practised m eant that an inductive approach, relying on thick  
descriptions would be necessary in the circum stances of the research. 
Therefore, this interpretative research method is employed to extract the 
greatest ore from the vein of the ten interviews of Chairmen of Boards in 
state-owned companies. This inductive approach within an 
interpretative framework inhered better in me as I believed, despite my 
positivistic feel, that statistical m ethods could not adequately or 
reasonably describe or explain how the Board Chairmen understood  
corporate governance and viewed its practice. To meaningfully a ssess  
and understand how the Chairmen treat with corporate governance I 
sought answers to the following interview questions: What is your 
understanding of corporate governance? What are your aim s of 
corporate governance? How is corporate governance perceived in the 
public sector companies? What are the institutions involved in the 
process of corporate governance? What is accountability in the public 
sector? What are the impediments to achieving corporate governance? 
What is risk m anagement within corporate governance? I felt that 
responses to these basic questions m ust provide a rich corpus of data 
for interpretation, data that could be sifted, forensically analysed and 
interpreted to reveal the existence of dilemmas, and, in line with the 
aim s of this investigation to establish the causes or reasons as to why 
they have become dilemmas. Cognizant of the fact that qualitative
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research  m ay appear a  m alediction to stric t positivists, I have 
dem onstra ted  the app ropria teness of ten  interviews ou t of a  population 
of forty th ree  state-ow ned com panies. The in terpretative  approach  as 
an  act of explicating the m eaning is also exam ined and  the  key factors 
of reliability in a  qualitative study  are provided.
A key requirem ent of the general inductive approach  is the m ultiple 
reading and  re-reading of the  interview texts; th is forensic reading of the 
tex ts allowed for the  identification of text charac teristics such  a s  allied 
p h rases  and  key words. These key words and  p h rases  were placed in a  
m atrix  referred to a s  an  in terpretative model m atrix  w hich is 
diagram m ed and  explained fu rther in C hapter Five. This m atrix  
provided an  appropria te  m eans of decoding the interviews; th rough  
u n h u rried  and  m ultiple readings p a tte rn s  began to emerge. Essentially, 
in te rp reta tion  is an  ac t of explicating the m eaning of a  phenom enon and  
is a valid claim  to bo th  the n a tu ra l and  social sciences; however, as 
Rainbow and  Sullivan (1987) em phasize, interpretiv ism  narrow s the 
m eaning to m ake it more specific. N atural science explains the 
phenom enon in term s of causes w hereas h u m an  sciences in te rp re t or 
u n d e rs tan d  the m eaning of social action. In terp reta tion , here, is 
inform ed by the trad itions of verstehende as Schw andt (2001) argues. 
The em ergence of th ree  key p a tte rn s  from w hich dilem m as derive 
endorsed  the usefu lness and  appropria teness of th is  methodology. 
C orroboration from ano ther researcher exam ining the re su lts  derived 
from the interview texts added credibility and  dependability  to the 
coding, analysis, descrip tions and  p a tte rn s . This second reviewer, a 
retired  professor, aw are of the research  evaluation objectives, pe ru sed  
the categories and  descrip tions in the m atrices, these  w ithou t the  raw  
interview texts. Subsequently  to th is the second reviewer w as provided 
with the interview tex ts th a t were initially coded. This resu lted  in  the  
positive acknow ledgem ent of the  categories gleaned from the  tex ts, the 
p a tte rn s  th a t I derived and  the reasonab leness of the  in te rp re ta tio n s 
th a t I had  provided based  on the in form ants texts. This sub -p rocess
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within the methodology is indispensable to the dependability of the 
qualitative research undertaken. The Chapter provides a clear rationale 
for the choice of the general inductive approach as proposed by Thomas 
(2006), to research the phenom enon of corporate governance in state- 
owned companies. The methodology when applied to the texts 
expressing the views of the Chairmen on the understanding and 
perception of corporate governance reveals the indubitable existence of 
dilemmas, provides valuable insights for others through the revelation 
of key patterns and allows for foundational recommendations for 
improvement. The research value is thus increased.
Chapter Four follows from a chapter on corporate governance and 
another on research methodology; it is short but vitally essential to the 
argument of the thesis. Because this study focuses on dilemmas in 
corporate governance in state-owned companies of the island, it m ust 
offer the reader, especially the foreign reader, necessary insights into 
the nature of Trinidadian society and into the m ake-up of the 
Trinidadian psyche. It illustrates the uniqueness of the island’s culture, 
a product of genocide, colonial conquest, of African slavery, and, m ost 
latterly, of Indian indenture. To be unaware of the ethnic interweave is 
to m iss the complexity of the society that has given the world steelpan  
(the only percussion instrum ent created in the 20th century), calypso, 
soca, chutney, and West Indian carnival, and has produced such  
cricket immortals as Baron Learie Constantine, Sonny Ramadhin, and  
Brian Lara, such literary giants as V.S. Naipaul and Sam uel Selvon, has  
added to international cuisine callaloo, doubles, and roti, and boasts of 
having the largest natural deposit of pitch found anywhere (La Brea, 
Trinidad), the world’s hottest pepper (the Moruga scorpion), and the 
sw eetest cocoa beans of the very highest quality.
Although, the country can unarguably boast of achievem ents, it is 
equally infamous in the Caribbean and more recently in the USA for 
corruption. The major political parties, typically divided into ethnic
camps, go to "voter market” with campaigns based on anti-corruption 
mantras, good governance lines; quizzically, upon accession to power, 
these soon become allegations leveled against those who mooted the 
anti-corruption sentim ents. It is as though each major party is at once 
corrupt and anti-corrupt, is at once for good governance but practices 
bad governance. To understand this seem ing contradiction, one does 
not have to look far; a cursory examination of the reasons for the loss of 
power of the m ost dominant political party - the PNM - in 1986, after 35  
years of unbroken power, tells a clear story of allegations of corruption. 
The UNC, in 2002, after wresting power from the PNM twice in 7 years, 
lost also because of allegations of corruption. At the heart of these  
allegations were the state-owned companies, whose Chairmen became 
targets of malice from the population. The fact that there are two 
predominant races in Trinidad and Tobago is as incontrovertible as it is 
complex. The manifestation of the distinct social classes present in the 
country today is rooted in an origin of misery and cruelty; that of 
slavery and indenture ship. To say that the society of Trinidad and  
Tobago has been and continues to be shaped by those who were 
originally brought to the Caribbean as slaves or indentured labourers is  
an understatem ent.
The fifth chapter is the research chapter, the lynchpin of the thesis. It is 
the longest and densest of the chapters; it provides the vindication of 
the pre-research hunches and assum ptions. This is, as it were, the 
crucible in which the initial assum ptions are tested and found 
adequate. It comprises the use of the words and ideas of num erous 
segm ents of texts derived from the interviews of Board Chairmen; this 
interview literature, based on the research methodology and m ethods 
described in Chapter Three, is decoded and divided into matrices, a list 
containing words and phrases linked by synonymity and similarity of 
meaning. These matrices are then repeatedly analysed and interpreted 
allowing key and unique patterns to emerge. The analysis of the 
interview text, of the matrices, and of the emergent patterns forms the
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basis  of th is  chap ter. There are th ree pa tte rns: the  centrifugal, the 
centripetal, and  the pericentric. These take their nam es and  m eaning 
from the u se  of the symbol or the m etaphor of the circle u sed  to 
rep resen t the  totality of corporate governance w ithin the context of the 
p a rtic ip an ts’ responses; these  ep ithets define how these  p a tte rn s  
behave in relation to the  centre of the circle. The centrifugal p a tte rn , for 
exam ple, com prises all the com m ents th a t describe the existence or 
practice of corporate governance as moving away from the centre, the  
point of effective m anagem ent. By way of con trast, the cen tripe tal 
p a tte rn  com prises those sen tim en ts and  perceptions th a t show 
corporate governance moving tow ards the centre b u t no t reach ing  it. 
Unlike the two previous p a tte rn s , the  pericentric p a tte rn  is static; its 
solidity and  enorm ity prevent the a tta in m en t of proper corporate 
governance. Its deep roots and  m ighty girth are n u rtu re d  by the 
interfering will of politicians.
The sixth chap ter is a  n a tu ra l consequence of the  identification, 
description, and  definition of the dilem m as in corporate governance in 
state-ow ned com panies in Trinidad and  Tobago: it is essentially  a  
chap ter of reflections and, m ore crucially, of recom m endations. 
B ecause there  h a s  been little research  done on the dilem m as in 
corporate governance in the is lan d ’s public sector, there  is no t 
surprisingly  no lite ra tu re  of recom m endations for solution of these  
chronic problem s. Though th is thesis  is fundam entally  an  academ ic 
exercise, the so lu tions proffered in th is  chap ter are far from academ ic; 
they are a  resu lt of countless ho u rs  of agonizing though t. While the 
lite ra tu re  on corporate governance, critiqued in C hap ter Three, 
indirectly offers solutions, it canno t take into consideration  the un ique  
cu ltu re  of the island. R ecom m endations m u st ne ither be perem ptory  
nor h igh-handed; they m u st seriously consider the  irreverent w ork 
ethic, the w idespread laisser-allez a ttitude , an d  the  political 
show m anship  th a t define the cu ltu ra l context. B ecause I am  
Trinidadian, have lived and  worked in Trinidad for decades, and
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u n d e rs tan d  the cu ltu re  a s  a  professional, I feel confident th a t I can  offer 
appropria te  recom m endations and  solutions. I envision B oards handled  
more hum anely , ru n  more effectively and  m anaged optimally. The 
recom m endations I offer ultim ately seek to replace the halting, 
lack luste r efforts of m ediocre, lackadaisical C hairm en with the  a ssu red , 
exem plary perform ance of confident, ou tstand ing  leaders. To such  
individuals, tru s t, accountability , and  tran sparency  are w atchw ords for 
an  adm in istra tion  dedicated to serve, perform , and  deliver. W ith the  
right balance of u n d ers tan d in g  and  stringency, of respec t and  
professionalism , of will and  passion , I know th a t these 
recom m endations, offered in hum ility and  w ith hope, can  be 
successfully  im plem ented.
My research  questions pivot a round  the u n d ers tan d in g  and  perception 
of corporate governance, how it is understood  and  how it is p rac tised  
especially addressing  accountability  and  risk  m anagem ent th rough  the 
lens of the C hairm en who provided me with the  interview texts. 
Consequently, C hap ter Two w hich follows explores the origins an d  key 
tene ts  of corporate governance; im portantly , it identifies my views and  
the views of o thers regarding the key elem ents of my resea rch  in terest.
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CHAPTER TW O -  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In tr o d u c tio n
The research  topic is an  analytical exam ination of dilem m as th a t 
emerge from the interviews of chairm en th a t centre  a ro u n d  the 
discharge of corporate governance in state-ow ned com panies in 
Trinidad and  Tobago. The aim  is to u n d e rs tan d  and  locate the  factors 
th a t con tribu te  to or m ilitate against the  in stitu tion  of corporate  
governance, as  described by the C hairm en and  leaders of the B oards of 
state-ow ned com panies. No partic ipan t for obvious reasons w as asked  
to respond  to “dilem m as”; th is  would have been counterproductive, and  
very well m ay have invalidated the interviews. In the  context of the 
research  phenom enon, and  to avoid confusion th a t m ay be caused  by 
the in te rp re ta tions of o thers, I believe it is p ru d en t to clarify w ha t I 
m ean by dilem m a. Defining dilem m as, R ickards and  C lark (2006 p .3), 
in their book “Dilem m as of L eadership” offer an  explanation  of a 
dilem m a as a  problem  th a t is no t solvable. They a sse rt th a t they  “do 
not perm it a process o f ‘solution find ing”; th is is a  definition th a t  does 
not take u s  very far in u n d ers tan d in g  the  n a tu re  and  m eaning  of a 
dilem ma; for them , dilem m as create  conditions th a t drive leaders to a c t 
regardless of the  consequences. This is an  intriguing definition, b u t a 
problem atic one for two fairly obvious reasons: firstly, it does n o t perm it 
an  easy process of solution finding; secondly, leaders ac t w ithou t regard  
to consequences. This strongly suggests th a t leadersh ip  decisions can  
be, in the context of a  dilem m a, taken  ou t of little choice an d  
desperation . Needless to say, th is  can  hard ly  redound  to the  cred it of 
the organisation, except in the m ost fo rtu itous of c ircum stances: 
w hatever good derives, occurs no t because of, b u t in spite of, despera te  
decisions. E hnert (2008) tells u s  th a t  the Greek etym on estab lishes the  
idea of a  double take betw een two notions or options th a t  are equally 
undesirab le. It seem s to me th a t a  dilem m a is a  s itua tion  requ iring  a
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choice between equally undesirable alternatives thus presenting u s with 
a difficult or perplexing situation or problem, but not one that is not 
unsolvable. In essence, then, a dilemma m anifests itself in situations 
where either choice or alternative is painful. Here, Jubb (1999) provides 
u s with an example by way of an ethical dilemma within the act of 
whistleblowing; this may inflict real harm on a fellow worker who may 
have championed one’s career while also marring the whistleblower’s 
reputation in the industry. However, Jubb (1999) contends the trade­
off is that whistleblowing may also ensure that the letter of the law is 
upheld in difficult circum stances. So, by its very nature, a dilemma is 
painful and makes some sort of loss inevitable. Hanson (1991) tells u s  
that scholars who have studied dilemmas in the bu siness world 
frequently note that dilemmas are m ost likely to arise in bu sin esses and 
industries where unethical behavior is tacitly encouraged as a m eans to 
get ahead or satisfy some personal agenda; unethical conduct, in short, 
becomes a strategy and can be seen as a viable one by decision makers. 
Offering another view is Buhm ann (2012) who takes u s further by 
arguing that a dilemma in the professional world is having a situation  
where a loss is unavoidable and where those choosing between two 
unattractive options m ust recognize that some sort of prioritization 
m ust occur. Aligning to the views of Rickards and Clark (2006, 
however, are those of Garmon (2010) who directs u s to the practice of 
law especially the matter of client-attorney privilege or when the 
contours of the law necessitates that an attorney employ a defense that 
he finds objectionable. In such cases, a person may be forced to 
abandon a personal principle or value in favour of doing what the 
profession obliges him to do. In this context then, this is unsolvable. 
Fortunately, corporate governance practices do not oblige the 
practitioner in the same manner.
In the context of the phenom enon under investigation, I propose a 
simpler and far less problematic and contentious definition of its 
application in the organisational setting: a dilemma is an intractable
but soluble problem that negatively impacts on the well-being of an 
organisation. Expectedly, at this embryonic stage of research, these  
putative dilemmas are at best hunches based on personal observation 
and largely derived from my professional work and anecdotal evidence 
on the state of corporate governance on certain public-sector 
companies. The aim, therefore, is to also empirically evidence the 
existence of dilemmas. In its investigation of the corporate governance 
dilemmas that stymie the efficiency of state-owned entities, research  
will necessarily a ssess  the key players’ understanding of their roles in 
this crucial process.
While this chapter begins with a brief look of the origins and the history 
of corporate governance and a ssesses the central critical statem ents of 
a practice which lies at the very heart of the emergence of corporate 
governance it is instructive to note that the literature on corporate 
governance is strongly dominated by the private sector and comprises 
mostly the one-tier Boards of the UK and the US (OECD, 1999). 
Nonetheless, there are a few authoritative bodies promoting governance 
in the public sector. The IFAC (2001) acknowledges that corporate 
governance has bought about m uch debate and change in the private 
sector. They have alm ost always promulgated integrity, accountability 
and control as key codes in corporate governance. IFAC (2001, p .l)  
unam biguously states that the public sector plays a major role in  
society and “....effective governance in the public sector can encourage 
the efficient use of resources, strengthen accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources”. IFAC (2001), while acknowledging that 
frameworks between public sector and private sector board may differ, 
establishes that the focus is nevertheless on the Boards and the 
principles are the same. This is palpable from IFAC’s endorsem ent of 
the applicability of Cadbury (1992) fundamental principles of openness, 
integrity and accountability to private sector as well as public sector 
corporations.
20
D e fin it io n  o f C orporate  G overn an ce
Corporate governance has emerged and evolved as one of the 
approaches to mitigate business ownership and investm ent risks, and 
to ensure corporate compliance with globally acceptable codes of 
practice based upon transparency and accountability of corporate 
m anagement (OECD, 1999). Corporate governance has received 
significant attention in the last 20 years, engaging the time of policy 
makers attempting to ameliorate a system  that has been frequently 
abused (Dallas, 2004). Several definitions of corporate governance have 
been offered: Mons and Minow (Caribbean Trade & Investment Report, 
2005) argue that the primary participants that determine the direction 
and performance of corporations are the shareholders, the 
management, and the board of directors. In a more political 
understanding, the World Bank Report (cited in Caribbean Trade & 
Investment Report, 2005) sees corporate governance as holding a 
balance between economic and social goals and the alignment of the 
interests of individuals, corporations, and society. Dignam and Lowry
(2006) add a further dimension by suggesting that incorporating 
custom s, processes, laws, and policies is necessary in the 
administration and control of a company. Cochran and Wartick (1988) 
contend that corporate governance is an umbrella term concerned with 
concepts, theories and practices of Boards. Mons and Minow (2005) 
also share similar sentim ents. Lewis (2001) tells u s that Boards are 
essential to m ost definitions of corporate governance. Demb and 
Neubauer (1992) establish the importance of accountability by the 
Board. Cadbury (1993) adds that Boards are concerned with control, 
effectiveness and accountability. Williams and Shapiro (1979) argue 
that strong and effective Boards are valuable corporate assets, for them, 
and the importance of corporate accountability is indispensable.
However, it is Cadbury (1992) in an early statem ent who offers the 
briefest, m ost direct, and widest definition: “the system s and process by
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which an organisation is directed and controlled." The striking feature 
of these and other definitions is that they all deal with fundamental and 
key issu es of openness, trust, integrity, control, and direction. From 
this premise derive two corollaries: one, corporate governance is the 
system  or process by which companies are directed and controlled by 
individuals charged with the responsibility; and two, it m ust therefore 
be based on the principle that Boards and Directors are accountable for 
their actions. It is easy to surm ise that corporate governance is a m ulti­
faceted and, therefore, complex subject area. While this complexity in a 
large part is due to the fact that corporate governance is required to 
take into account issu es related to purpose of the organisation, law, 
finance, economics, hum an behaviour of its owners and employees and 
the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders outside the 
corporation. I have, however, narrowed the focus of my research to 
accountability and risk m anagement as two key elem ents within the 
practice of corporate governance in the public sector. Support for this 
narrow focus is found from as far as Australia, where the New South  
Wales Audit Office produced a study; Performance Audit Report (n.d.) 
which examined the practices of corporate governance in government 
owned entities in the state. The Authors of the report begin with the 
importance of accountability and risk managem ent as the chief 
concerns in public sector governance. Further, the study echoes what 
the literature reveals; strategies for dealing with the challenges within  
the field and better practice guides are largely confined to the private 
sector. Within Trinidad and Tobago, the public sector is a significant 
component of the country’s GDP and requires a large part of the public 
spend. Where public money is spent, there m ust be accountability and  
risk management; corporate governance therefore takes on an  
important role; system s of accountability and transparency and risk  
management, therefore, need to be built into the governance structures 
of companies. The existence of factors that hinder or obfuscate the  
system s of risk management and accountability and transparency m ust
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be searched out and understood if the pillars of corporate governance 
are to stand on firm ground.
B a ck g ro u n d  o f C orporate  G overn an ce
The origins of corporate governance in terms of how com panies were 
directed and controlled probably started with the advent of the 
consolidation of capital and the establishm ent of the first international 
trading and stock companies in England and Europe (1550-1700). 
Examples of these seminal companies are the Muscovy Company, The 
Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East 
Indies, and Verenigde Odstindische Companie. Following warnings 
regarding weak management, operations, and controls expressed by 
Adam Smith in 1776, European governments during the 1800s issued  a 
range of binding laws directed to the stock companies and liability 
companies. In the nineteenth century, attempts to advance the practice 
of corporate governance emerged with the state-corporation laws 
expanding the rights of corporate Boards while not requiring the 
majority consent of the shareholders. However, while enhancing  
legislation on procedures for corporate operations, the interests of the 
shareholders were overlooked and their power gradually decreased  
(Wright et al., 2004). Later on, and in the aftermath of the Wall Street 
Crash of 1929, the U.S. produced the first law-regulating procedures 
and the transparency of stocks’ trade in 1933. Scholarly debates in the 
ensuing period led to the publication of a seminal text by Bearle and  
Means (1932): M odem Corporation and Private Property. So
fundamental is this monograph to our understanding of corporate 
governance, that its contents, like those of Eric Williams’s Capitalism  
and Slavery  (1944), are still being debated in classroom s around the 
world. The work of Fama and Jensen (1983), some fifty years later, on 
the separation of ownership and control, leads to this separation  
through agency theory as a m eans of better understanding corporate
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governance. This theory holds that the agent acts on the behalf of the 
shareholder who appoints the agent.
However, the genesis of the current focus on corporate governance 
started with three significant events. The first relates to the series of 
explosive and revealing investigations of significant corporate frauds and 
bankruptcies in 1990-1991 (Polly Peck, BCCI, Maxwell 
Communications, etc.). This was followed by the painful experience of 
the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Pilbeam, 
2001; Stiglitz J., 2000; Rodrik, 2001). These failures provoked m uch  
discussion and study of the issue, generating further theories within 
corporate governance building on the works of Eisenhardt (1989), 
Agency Theory: an A ssessm en t and Review; Hackman (1986), The 
Psychology of Self-Management in Organisations; J. Lorsch and E. 
Maclver Paw ns or Potentates. The initial focus of these theoretical 
studies was directed at managerial accountability of the organisation to 
shareholders (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989); however, in a broader sense, 
given the expression of ethical concerns in corporate operations, 
corporate governance was also recognized as an essential part of a 
wider corporate social responsibility (CSR), (Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 
1991; Key and Popkin, 1998; Lantos, 2001; Lewis, 2001). In 2002, 
renewed focus on the subject area was applied after the revelation of 
corporate m alfeasance and accounting scandals led to the collapse of 
such major and admired US corporations as Enron, Arthur Andersen, 
World Com, Parmalait and HealthSouth. This recent round of corporate 
failures undoubtedly rightly questioned the efficiency and effectiveness 
of corporate governance practices as a rampart against protecting 
shareholders interests.
Corporate governance, however, m ust assum e greater importance 
because of the growth of the number of organisations globally. The last 
three decades have witnessed the apogee of integration and  
globalization of international businesses. This global trade
liberalization has generated several phenomena: it has opened new  
markets and cross-border trading; it has unleashed international capital 
flows in the form of Foreign Direct Investments; it has necessitated the 
enforcement of international financial and banking infrastructure; it 
has encouraged formation of economic unions and free-trade zones, 
industrialization, improved infrastructure and transportation; it has 
increased labour force migration; and it has expanded multinational 
corporations and political interests. These factors, inevitably, had an 
overwhelming effect on economic, social and political life of the 
international community, introducing dramatic changes to the world 
economic map, patterns of strategic management, decision-making, and 
organisational development (Blomstrom, Globerman and Kokko, 2002).
Over the last lustrum, the global international environment has 
witnessed a remarkable shift of economic powers and market 
leadership. Europe and the US had to yield growth leadership to the 
Asian economies of China and India. These two countries along with 
South Korea and Japan have added value to the strength of Asian 
market. In fact, being currently placed fourth among econom ies with 
the highest purchasing power parity, India is forecasted to achieve 6- 
11% GDP growth by 2025 and to be rivalled by the US and China. 
B usiness globalization, due to its scale, has brought more benefits, as 
well as higher risks and challenges to all of the stakeholders in the 
corporate governance dialogue: organisations, employees and
governments as managing, operating and regulating functional 
authorities. It may be argued that the future of globalization lies in the 
ability to find consensus for efficient fulfillment of these functions to 
mitigate risks, realize opportunities and fight threats in the vulnerable 
and dynamic international business environment (WPP Group Report, 
2007). Although the origins of corporate governance lie with joint-stock  
private companies, the process also applies to companies owned by the 
state or governments. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), a unique forum comprising the governments
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of thirty countries working to address economic, social and other 
challenges of globalization, recognizes the need for corporate 
governance of government-owned companies as equally important to 
that in the private sector (OECD Guidelines 2005). In this context, 
corporate governance emerges as the essential approach to mitigate 
business ownership and investm ent risks, and ensure corporate 
compliance with globally acceptable code of practice based upon  
transparency and accountability of corporate m anagem ent (OECD, 
1999).
F o r m a liz a tio n  o f th e  C o n cep t o f C orporate  G ov ern a n ce
Even though the practice of corporate governance could be traced to the 
nineteenth century, the serious work of defining and formalizing the 
concept really began in the early 1990s. Although legal and economic 
scholars have contributed to the ongoing investigation of corporate 
governance, m ost of the recent historiography has been written by non­
historians who were more occupied with determining the origins of 
contemporary corporate governance regimes (Herrigel, 2006). Herrigel 
also points out that corporate governance is a relatively new field of 
inquiry for business historians. This recent history m ost probably 
begins with the recommendations of the now well-known Cadbury 
Report, the first code of corporate governance issued in Great Britain by 
the Cadbury Committee in 1992 via its report on the Financial A spects  
of Corporate Governance. The report correctly emphasized the role of 
businesses in the formation of the national economy and recommended  
increased focused control of corporate financial performance through  
enhanced internal accountability and external auditing. The committee 
proposed the Code of Best Practice as a standard of responsible  
corporate ethics prescribed to all com panies listed on the London Stock  
Exchange, and exercising significant influence upon the national 
economy. Such requirement for accountability to shareholders was 
aimed at increasing the sense of ownership among shareholders,
26
improving the overall transparency and legal compliance of corporate 
financial operations, thus enhancing investm ent safety and generating 
trust to corporate decision making (Cadbury, 1992, pp. 16-20).
This model of corporate governance defined the system  as the way to 
direct and control the corporation. Although Cadbury’s report was 
directed to the financial sector, significantly, it recognized the Board of 
Directors as the major control authority "responsible for the governance 
of their com panies,” assessm ent of managerial strategic decision­
making, ethical organisational behaviour, and feasible and 
comprehensive internal audit. The level of shareholders’ control 
authority was defined to include the Board’s appointment, the selection  
of trustworthy, confident and competent external financial auditors, 
assessm ent of Boards and corporate performance during Annual 
General Meetings, and the right to insist that corporate governance be 
executed in accordance with the Code of Best Practice (Cadbury, 1992, 
pp. 20-53). This Code in particular, implied optimum Board-of- 
Directors’ structure, distribution of responsibilities and powers among 
executive and non-executive directors, criteria and methodology to 
financial reporting and controls (Cadbury, 1992, pp. 58-60). Thus, it is 
easy to grasp its applicability across multiple business sectors.
Although there were other corporate governance statem ents, it was only 
in 1999 that the OECD in its Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes of the World Bank Group presented a corporate-governance 
definition and its basic principles as key pillars of healthy international 
financial strategies and sound legislative policies (OECD, 1999, pp. 2-6). 
Arising out of this recommendation, a model of corporate governance 
was formulated premised on the basic OECD principles developed in 
1999. This incorporated enhanced protection of shareholders’ rights, 
provision of equal treatment of shareholders irrelevant of their location 
and number of owned shares, recognition of the role and legal rights of 
the stakeholders and facilitating information flow, com m unication and
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cooperation among the parties, guarantee of comprehensive and 
unbiased disclosure of significant information referring to corporate 
finance, key persons, and strategic decision-making; and, finally, 
statem ent of the board m em bers’ obligations and responsibilities to the 
shareholders and corporation as a whole (OECD, 2004, pp. 15-26).
The initial goal of corporate governance, therefore, was protection of 
investors’ interests and maximum efficiency of investm ent allocation, 
complying with existing legislation and adopting ethical principles of 
corporate activity. With the transformation of the role and effect of 
corporate governance, its long-term benefit m ust be recognized in the 
facilitation of Foreign Direct Investment consolidation and flow, 
decreased investm ent costs, increased functional performance, building 
value-adding corporate reputation, improving business stability and 
national economic resilience to sudden external shocks, national 
econom ies’ competitiveness, and, eventually, structural enforcement of 
global economy and international socio-economic development (World 
Bank, 1999, pp. 3-6).
E v o lu tio n  o f C orp orate  G ov ern a n ce  M od els
During its evolution, the system  of corporate governance appeared 
mostly in models in North America, Europe and Asia and moreso in 
countries where the capital markets were more pronounced. Consistent 
with the development of the models, Allen (2002) reminds u s that 
corporate governance is used in two distinct ways; the "shareholder 
centric Anglo-Saxon” model and the "stakeholder centric model” utilized 
by Japan, Germany and France. Further, it is possible to divide broadly 
the existing system s into either a liberal or coordinated model. The 
liberal or Anglo-American model em phasizes shareholder interests and 
benefits from long-term sustainable economic growth. The coordinated 
model, applicable mainly in Europe, Asia and Japan, incorporates the 
governing interests of the major stakeholders and community.
28
Basically, system ic differences in international corporate governance 
models are predetermined by the corporate governing structure; for 
example, in the US system , corporate ownership is shared among a 
varied number of shareholders and other stakeholders get minor 
influence and attention in the course of governance. Put another way, 
problems arising from corporate governance in the USA often occur 
when the goals of a large number of different shareholders are at odds 
with the goals of a few powerful corporate directors. The recent 
worldwide economic problems, stemming predominantly from corporate 
governance failures with the USA, have made the world familiar with 
the type of corporate governance used in the USA.
In the European system , ownership is typically divided between a few 
shareholders, which often include government and banking investment. 
In particular, corporate governance in the German system  has distinct 
social features, conditioned by the high bargaining power of labour 
unions and participation of banks’ interest in corporate ownership 
(Mallin, 2010). In Asia, corporate ownership is shared between  
influential families and business groups, which are reluctant to go 
beyond legislative compliance in corporate governance. In Japan’s 
system, characterized by the practice of hierarchical managem ent, 
egalitarian compensation standards, adherence to traditional relations 
and collectivism, corporate governance shows remarkable commitment 
to securing national economic growth, employment, and the promotion 
of innovation and quality (Knowledge and Warton, 2008). In South  
Korea business conglomerates referred to as “Jaebols,” consist of global 
multinational corporations which are supported by the South Korean 
Government. Despite the existence of the two models, the Anglo-Saxon 
governance has been more widely analysed.
There is, however, a relative m easure of diversity in the existing m odels, 
mainly in terms of their focus and identification of control authorities. 
Wisely, the OECD has noted that there is no universal framework or
best standard for corporate governance practice, and that deviations are 
possible, practical, and perhaps necessary to meet specific regional, 
market and business requirements, provided that such individual 
models adhere to the basic principles of corporate governance (OECD, 
2004, pp. 6-7). Several organisations, such as the IoD, CIPFA, OECD 
and IFAC lend their support towards the establishm ent of good 
corporate governance. A brief look at the key ones follows.
The aims of the UK-incorporated Institute of Directors (IoD) formed in 
1903 are to allow: the sharing of experience of their 55 ,000  members, 
and specifically as a body; to "promote the study, research and 
development of the law and practice of corporate governance; to 
publish, dissem inate or otherwise make available the useful results of 
such study or research”, and to act as a representative body in the 
industrial dialogue with the governments and major stakeholders (IoD 
Royal Charter, 2004). The model of corporate governance suggested by 
the IoD has been generated on the basis of in-depth study of the 
evolving codes of practice, which appeared subsequent to the Cadbury 
Report of 1992. Within the IoD’s framework of corporate governance, 
the practice is defined as strategic methodology of business control, 
managerial supervision, adherence to governing legislation, and 
building constructive relations between the shareholders, executives, 
and managers. The IoD, therefore, guards and promotes the existing 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance in the UK. This Code has 
been based upon the Cadbury Report prescriptions to transparent, 
efficient, comprehensive and unbiased financial accountability, 
enriched with suggestions for executive remuneration according to the 
Greenbury Report in 1995 and internal control safeguards as studied in 
the Hampel Report of 1998 and Turnbull Report of 1999. It em phasizes 
the role of the Board of Directors (and non-executive directors in 
particular) as a central control authority, accountable to the 
shareholders, as highlighted in the Higgs Review of 2003, and external 
auditors as the major independent supervisory power as d iscussed  in
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the Financial Reporting Council guidance (IoD Factsheet, 2008, pp. 1- 
4). It is important to note that the research of the IoD has gone further 
to study and consolidate knowledge on the criteria and principles of 
cross-country "best practice guidance to corporate governance” (IoD, 
The Handbook, 2009j.
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is one organisation 
that oversees proper behavior in the accounting community. IFAC is 
comprised of 167 members and associates in 127 countries and 
jurisdictions and represents about 2.5 million accountants. IFAC may 
be reasonably described as an institution that creates an international 
culture working against future m anifestations of ENRON or Worldcom 
outrages by defining adequate levels of diligence and accountability 
within corporations. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is a global body whose focus is upon economic 
and social development. The OECD collects data on m em ber-states and 
discusses national policy with an eye towards fostering prudence, 
professional standards and sound fiscal and financial and regulatory 
policies. The performance of member nations is evaluated by peers with 
formal agreements that govern corporate behaviour and bu sin ess  
transactions established at committee-level by member states. 
Guidelines for proper corporate governance are an important part of 
OECD activities (OECD 2012). As a powerful global institution, the 
OECD is well-positioned to enforce codes of conduct upon governments 
and upon multinationals that m ust adhere to the dictates of member 
states if they wish to conduct their affairs in those jurisdictions as part 
of the fight against corporate malfeasance.
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) is 
perhaps the only professional accountancy body in the world exclusively 
dedicated to public finance; this is a clear indication of the em phasis 
that CIPFA places upon the value of maintaining integrity in public 
governance and accounting. The CIPFA has 14,000 members in the
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public services, in national audit agencies, in major accountancy firms, 
and in various other bodies that need to be managed properly and 
efficiently. The CIPFA dem ands high performance in public services, it 
works with partner governments, with national accountancy bodies, 
and with the international public sector to ensure that sound public 
financial m anagement is achieved and that good governance is a reality 
and not simply a fantasy (CIPFA 2012). Overall, CIPFA’s commitment to 
its extensive training and its demand for high, uniform standards 
reflects the organisation’s strong devotion to corporate governance.
With the variety of existing international corporate governance models 
and different organisations undertaking research and having control 
authority (OECD, the IoD in the UK, the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), Communist Party in China, Asian 
Corporate Governance Association, etc.), there exists diverse opinions 
on the need to standardize an international code of corporate 
governance and set up a central control authority, with the idea that 
principles of corporate governance are self-evolving and best practice 
can be integrated and self-regulated in the global market (Knowledge 
and Warton, 2008; OECD, 2004, pp. 6-7).
C orporate G ov ern a n ce  D e v e lo p m e n t in  th e  P u b lic  S e c to r
As is clear from the preceding review, corporate governance issu es have 
been documented mostly around private companies and m ultinational 
corporations. Although more literature has appeared in the last 20  
years, it has continued to focus mostly on corporate governance in the 
private sector and mostly in developed countries. When contrasted to 
organisations in the public or government sector, there is an  
overwhelming dearth of literature on corporate governance. However, 
as publications from organisations such as the IoD and the OECD 
increased and discussions and debates on corporate governance 
evolved, the benefits of corporate governance became evident, attracting
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the attention of governments, as large investors and owners of state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in their countries. The Cadbury Report 
published in December 1992 identified three significant and 
fundamental principles of corporate governance: openness, integrity, 
and accountability. Notwithstanding the focus of the Cadbury 
Committee on the financial aspects of governance within private 
entities, the findings were applied by the Chartered Institute of Public 
Accountants (CIPFA) in developing the first corporate governance 
framework for the public sector in the UK. The CIPFA concerns itself 
with the emotive issue of public money and is the only UK professional 
accountancy body to specialize in public services.
Additionally, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has  
released for comment a proposed study intended to improve the self- 
governance of public-sector entities: Corporate governance in the Public 
Sector: a Governing Body Perspective (www.the freelibrary.com). The 
recommendation that "Governments use private-sector corporate 
governance concepts and practices to achieve their objectives more 
openly and objectively” are firmly stated; it suggests that the IFAC sees  
no differences between practices for the two. The IFAC has initiated  
this move as part of its pronouncem ents on principles and practices to 
bolster public-sector performance and reporting on a global basis. 
Given that the governance framework needed to dem onstrate the 
practice of the recommended principles is not yet complete, it will be 
interesting to understand the comm ents of support and dissent. It is  
noteworthy that the study focused on the very three fundam ental 
principles of corporate governance as put forward by the Cadbury 
Report: openness, integrity, and accountability. The OECD in its 
Corporate Governance Guidelines (2005) unreservedly points out that 
corporate governance of state-owned com panies is a major challenge for 
many countries, thus prompting the OECD guidelines which has  
become a benchmark, based on an effective legal and regulatory 
framework; the state acting as owner; equitable treatm ent of
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shareholder and stakeholders; transparency and disclosure; 
responsibilities of the Board.
However, the view can be taken that the corporate governance of 
government-owned companies can be even more complex than that of 
private corporations as there m ust be limitations regarding the 
applicability of the principles within the private sector as the 
corporations within both platforms have different operating 
characteristics. Notwithstanding, Mallin (2010) and the OECD (1998) 
agree that the responsibilities of the m anagem ent for these state-owned  
companies are similar to those of private corporations. The OECD 
(2008) further highlights the fact the managem ent responsible for 
corporate governance in these state-owned corporations has a fiduciary 
responsibility to seek and secure the welfare of the major stakeholders. 
The only difference is that the major stakeholder in this case is the 
government.
It is worth noting that in such developing countries as we have in the 
Caribbean, notwithstanding years of privatization, state-owned  
enterprises (SOEs) still constitute a significant part of national 
economies (traditionally in "transportation, electricity, gas and water 
supply, broadcasting, natural resource extraction, telecom m unication” 
industries), and require improved governance practice. Statistics report 
that SOEs hold 20% of international investm ent flow, employ 5% of 
global workforce, and in some countries generate up to 40% of GDP 
(World Bank Approach, 2005, pp. 1-2). In Trinidad, there are a  
significant number of SOEs that contribute to the GDP of the country. 
State-ownership extends into oil and gas extraction and production, 
utilities provision in electricity, water and telecommunication, air, land  
and sea transport, forestry, the procurement and m aintenance of 
vehicles, seafood production, and media. In 2005 the Government 
moved to appoint over ten special-purpose com panies to a ss ist in  
carrying out government’s policy agenda.
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The OECD (2005) points out that state ownership and corporate 
m anagement face many additional and generally greater challenges: 
trade liberalization, advanced operational and financial competition 
from the private sector, technological innovation, international 
competition in global market, and the need to exercise its ownership 
functions, such as the nomination and election of the board, while at 
the same time refraining from “imposing undue political interference in 
the management of the company need,” or, in other words, to benefit 
from investm ent without government intervention into the economy to 
provide special treatment to the SOE (OECD, 2005, pp.3). Further, a 
World Bank study has defined five challenges facing SOEs in the field of 
corporate governance: 1) ambiguous, mixed, ungrounded or even 
conflicting ownership objectives; 2) unprofessional owners, who are 
either incapable or unwilling (or som etim es both) to add value in 
formation of strategic managerial authority in the corporation, i.e. 
employ a skilled CEO, initiate changes in the board or m anagem ent 
structure, file bankruptcy, carry out strategic planning, correctly a ssess  
financial results, avoid bureaucracy; 3) lack of transparency and 
disclosure, often argued as the need to have confidentiality in certain 
projects, leading to low and biased accountability; 4) lack of 
professionalism and authority empowered to the Boards of directors; 5) 
high pressure from the stakeholders, which has to be attended to in 
order to preserve the political interest of the governing individuals 
(World Bank, 2006, pp. 3-34).
Given this, governments as partial or sole enterprise owners, face a 
clash of entrepreneur and state interest, as the former focuses upon  
business financial benefit, while the latter is supposed to develop overall 
favorable business climate in the country and maintain competitive 
market relations by comprehensive macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 
Specifically within the realm of this issue, the OECD and the World 
Bank recommend the delegation of ownership rights to centralized 
ownership entities (such as, state pension funds or other government-
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controlled companies), and further separate ownership and regulatory 
authorities in order to avoid corruptive and interested practices which  
can undermine transparency within the practice of corporate 
governance (OECD, 2005, pp. 12-13).
Further, in the list of essential guidelines, the OECD m entions the need  
to develop and maintain a feasible legal and regulatory background for 
fair competition between private companies and SOEs in order to 
increase general competitiveness of national industries. It also refers to 
executive responsibilities and necessary skills and com petencies of the 
Boards to fulfill these responsibilities efficiently, as well as social 
responsibilities towards major stakeholders. It is notable that som e of 
the principles are similar to the basic corporate governance framework 
suggested to the private sector, such as “equitable treatment of 
shareholders” and “transparency and disclosure” (OECD, 2005, pp. 12- 
18). However, to further understand how corporate governance is 
achieved and practised, it is necessary to examine the role of the parties 
to corporate governance.
R o le s  o f  D ir e c to r s  - E ss e n t ia l C h a r a c te r is t ic s
The control that is referred to in corporate governance (Cadbury 1992), 
can be thought of as being in the hands of two parties: the board of 
directors and the shareholders. Directors are further classified as 
Executives or Non-Executives. Executive Directors are typically full­
time and dedicated to the role of management; Non-Executive Directors, 
however, do not hold full-time positions. Specifically in the public 
sector, directors are brought in for their expertise. In the private sector, 
the early 21st century saw a marked increase in the number of non­
executive directors mainly for impartial views. Directors have a basic  
duty to act in good faith and the law invariably takes the view that 
“good faith m ust not only be done, but m ust manifestly be seen to be 
done” (http:www.enclyopedia/the free dictionary).
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Within the framework of corporate governance, the Board of Directors 
perform the following tasks: identification of strategic goals and 
corporate development and growth (formation, adaptation, tuning of the 
strategic plans), definition of the major source of competitive advantage 
and distinctive com petencies (organisation structure, value chain, 
operational efficiency, cost-efficiency), assessing results and providing 
decision-making on the current business issu es that come before the 
Board for discussion and approval (risk management, alternatives, 
reasonableness tests), definition of the level of uncertainty in the 
external environment (forecasting economy, competitive scenario 
setting, limited uncertainty, complete uncertainty, etc.), providing 
assurances on independent system  of financial accountability and 
reporting, coordinating and ensuring the consolidated interest of all 
shareholders, as well as controlling the activity of organisational 
m anagement within the framework of corporate strategic development 
(Adams and Young, 2007; OECD, 2004, pp. 24-25). These are essential 
tasks entrusted to a group of part-time individuals in the public sector; 
this is inherently difficult given its part-time nature, therefore, every 
check and balance m ust be put in place to ensure the proper or 
requisite governance of these tasks. Having sat on over thirty (30) 
Boards and a previous professional developer at the Institute of 
Directors, Harper (2005) tells u s of the need for Board members to 
clearly understand their duties and their responsibility to seek the 
organisation’s best interests. Adding further is Adams and Young
(2007) who advise that in examining the role of Directors, it is important 
to emphasize that the Board should be engaged in constructive and 
productive strategic dialogue between the shareholders and governors 
as this is essential to the increase in the efficiency of corporate 
governance.
It is also important to define the difference between the M anagement of 
organisation and Corporate Governors. Managerial function implies the 
professional performance of individual specialists in their field of
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business. Management is focused upon business m echanism s to 
ensure organisational performance. Corporate Governors, who 
comprise the Board, are at the head of the corporate hierarchy, acting 
as a buffer between the shareholders and management. The view that 
the Board of Directors acts as “ownership one level down not 
m anagement one level up” is crucial to corporate governance as it 
squarely puts the responsibility for the development and practice in the 
hands of the Board (Carver and Oliver 2002). The overlap of managerial 
and governing functions appears only during development of corporate 
strategy, with the implementation task belonging to m anagem ent and 
the results being reported to the Board of Governors. Based on this 
reporting, the Board performs its main function - making sure that 
financial results or objectives meet shareholder expectations (Hasan, 
2005). In the past, the range of essential characteristics and 
qualifications of Directors spoke to professionalism, skills, and 
experience needed to govern the corporation efficiently.
Today, the necessity for professionalism is still unquestionable; 
however, corporate-governance system s place compliance with 
shareholder interest as a priority among the required Directors' 
qualities, followed by “prudence, acting in good faith, stewardship, duty, 
openness, transparency, and integrity” (Hasan, 2005). Adding further 
stock is a study on the issue of compliance which has revealed that 
Directors tend to group them selves into three large categories: 
traditionalists who perform solely in the interest of owners with the best 
of their effort irrelevant of any other constituents of decision-making; 
rationalizers, who, while adhering to legal responsibility towards 
shareholders, act for long-term corporate benefit, assum ing that adding 
value to the corporate performance is “the best thing for the 
shareholders”; and broad constructionists who strongly believe that 
they are supposed to pay equal duty to “stockholders, employees, 
national economy, and communities in which they operate,” arguing 
that such all-encom passing approach works best for the long-term
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profitability and reputation of the company and its owners (Lorsch and 
Maclver, 1989, pp. 37-49). Despite extensive searching I have not come 
across a similar categorization for Directors in state-owned companies.
Notwithstanding the above sentim ents I agree that an essential quality 
of a Board Director is the ability to “exercise objective independent 
judgm ent” (OECD, 2004, pp. 25). The main indicator of the Board's 
efficiency and objectivity is said to be the presence of Non-executive 
Directors (OECD, 2005). These members are independent of the 
corporation and its top-management, and function to provide 
independent judgment, to increase shareholder trust towards the 
activity and decisions of the Board of Directors, to co-ordinate corporate 
leadership and reputation, to guide strategic decision-m aking, to 
improve transparency, to control remuneration distribution, to 
supervise internal and external audit, and to resolve conflicts. In order 
to perform these functions and responsibilities, independent Directors 
are required to possess significant level of skills, professional 
knowledge, superior experience, good connections in the industry; they 
m ust be capable of exercising strength and independence, while being 
committed to the shareholders (Mellor, 2002; OECD, 2004, pp. 62-69). 
Harper (2005) also m akes the point that the more experience Board 
members can bring to the table the better off the organisation will be. 
The strength of independence is, then, a significant characteristic in 
having a Director discharge his corporate governance duty. The 
research aims, am ongst other things, to uncover the views of the 
Chairmen leading the state enterprises, not ju st regarding 
independence but also their role in risk management.
R e la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  C orporate  G o v ern a n ce  an d  R isk  
M a n a g em en t
Key to an organisation's long-term survival and testim ony to its 
Governors commitment for preservation of the goodwill of the
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organisation is the managem ent of its risks. Kaplan and Mikes (2012) 
declares that risk m anagement largely entails the m anagem ent of risk 
that an organisation can reasonably avoid. Corporate governance is 
intended to address and mitigate two kinds of risks, namely financial 
risks and reputation risks. The Board of Directors is obliged and  
responsible for ensuring that risk mitigation occurs within the company 
in a manner that is continuous, transparent, and accountable. This is 
essential to ensure the stability of the organisation and preserve its 
integrity (OECD, 2009, pp. 10-11). The current global recession  
resulting from financial crisis has proved that notwithstanding 
developments in the field of risk assessm ent and risk m anagem ent 
associated with globalization and liberalization of trade, these risks 
have been generally undermined and neglected by entrepreneurs 
(Schwartz, 2007). For example, the lack of effective risk m anagem ent 
allowed banks to provide credits, unsecured by immediate internal 
coverage and irrelevant of the objective economic needs at different 
cycles of economic development. Poor corporate risk m anagem ent 
allowed enhancing the risk of external economic environment in the 
"forms of coverage (e.g. on and off-balance sheet operations); incentives 
that encourage excessive risk taking in certain products and off-shore 
locations; differential treatment of financial institutions, depending on 
their degree of sophistication, the sector in which they operate, or the 
jurisdiction in which they reside” (OECD, 2009, pp. 9). As with the role 
and independence of the director, the research, in its search for 
dilemmas, aims to uncover the views of the Chairmen on risk 
management, a key component in the corporate governance process.
Reputation risk, or the ability to maintain and develop an attractive 
corporate image in the operating environment, is critical to corporate 
well-being and stability. Non-compliance with ethical and financial 
standards and codes inevitably inflicts in the first place, not official 
penalties, but damage to corporate reputation within the market or 
environment where the company operates. This damage, inevitably,
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results in an estrangem ent from shareholder and a loss in public 
confidence and trust. In a chain-reaction effect, such failure limits 
further operational opportunities and additional funding from outside 
investors. Particularly in the case of the public-sector company, such  
an event also weakens the purpose of the company, lowers the “political 
stock” of the governing party and sullies the reputations of the 
governors or directors and executives within the company and the 
country. Thus the risk of lost reputation contains critical implications 
for the long-term stability and development of the organisation (Tonello, 
2007). Horwood (2001) contributing writer of ALARM, (the largest 
public sector risk m anagement organisation outside of the USA) in his 
introduction tells u s that it is virtually im possible for an organisation to 
achieve effective governance without effective risk management. Like 
the CIPFA, ALARM identifies risk managem ent with improving 
operational and financial management and avoiding bad publicity.
Adding further credibility to support the research interest in this facet is 
the Hempel Committee (1998) which places responsibility for the 
establishm ent of a robust system  of risk m anagement with the Board. 
Hempel subsequently published the Combined Code of 1999 which  
em phasises internal control and risk m anagement as issu es linking 
policies, processes, behaviours of an organisation to facilitate the 
effective discharge of corporate governance in its Code of Practice. 
Horwood (2001) insists that it is the Board that should agree and drive 
risk management policy and issues. Also highlighting the importance of 
this is Gaines-Ross (2008) who points to a study undertaken by Weber 
Shandwick indicating that 63% of a corporation's market value is 
attributable to its reputation. Additionally, they refer to another 
unnam ed study which showed demonstrable benefits of a good 
reputation including recruiting success and greater positive visibility. 
They estimate that for each breakdown in reputation it can take up to 
seven years to re-establish public trust.
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T h e o r ie s  w ith in  C orporate G o v ern a n ce
There are other factors at work that militate against the practice of
corporate governance. These contribute to the complexity of the
subject, given the variety of intermingled relationships involving a wide
range of goals. However, the literature points to the issue of
accountability and integrity of individuals, especially the leadership
group within the organisation as a recurring subject in the field of
corporate governance. The recent worldwide financial problems, created
by the apparent dishonest acts of many chief executive officers and
chief financial officers of major corporations, emphasize the importance
of the subject. The huge US bankruptcies related to alleged frauds
stemming from greed and wanton disregard are egregious examples of
the lack of adherence to good accounting, disclosure, integrity and by
extension corporate governance practices. Trinidad has had its share of
corporate governance scandals m ost notably in the state sector
(University of Trinidad and Tobago, Petroleum Company of Trinidad and
Tobago, National Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago and the
Urban Development Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago, to name a
few). The US organisations involved in these acts include such
companies as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Healthsouth. This corporate
misbehaviour and m ism anagem ent of the late 1990s and early 2001
and the last lustrum  has not been confined to the US; other exam ples of
corporate governance necrosis obtains with Vivendi in France and
Parmalait in Italy; the num erous corporate and financial bankruptcies
in Japan and Korea since the late 1990s demonstrate that these
companies have been similarly culpable. These infarctions have
attracted widespread regulatory reaction, including the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the US and the Turnbull, Myners and Higgs reviews, whose
implementation is self-regulatory, alongside new corporate legislation in
the UK (Coyle, Diane 2003). What motivated the actors involved in the
corporate governance in these companies to undertake the perilous
actions that caused their demise including significant reputational loss
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to their organisations and them selves may never be fully discovered. 
Coffee Jr, (2006) makes an interesting observation that while there is 
fascination by corporate scandals of the past decade, the difficulty lies 
in how to prevent these scandals. He cites among other factors, 
corporate culture, conflicts of interest and declining professional 
standards.
As I alluded to earlier in this chapter, one of the chief reasons 
contributing to the focus being applied on corporate governance has to 
do with the separation of ownership (owners) from the direct daily act of 
managem ent (Managers). The role of the executive m anagers, who 
directly and actively manage operations, has increased as a result of 
this separation of functions. It has also conditioned the formation of 
different groups, participating in such relations, each pursuing its own 
interests (Jensen, 1998; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This gives rise to the 
Principal Agent problem that exists in m ost corporations private or 
public. The principal agent problem occurs when som eone is hired, 
thus becoming an agent, by an entity who needs work done, i.e. the 
principal (Eisenhardt, K., 1989). Problems arise because the principal 
and agent may not have the sam e agenda regarding goal congruence. 
The principal has hired the agent to pursue the principal’s goals. It is 
dishonest, and often illegal, for the agent to pursue their own goals 
especially when it is detrimental to the principal. This concept is  
important for corporate governance because the upper-level 
m anagem ent of a corporation can be seen as the agent, while the 
stakeholders can be conceptualized as the principal. In the case of a 
for-profit corporation, the agents are the chief executive officer and the  
executive staff. The principals are the shareholders and board of 
directors of the corporation. In the case of a government-owned 
company, the agent is the Board; the chief servant the Chairman, while 
the voters through the corporation sole represent the Principal. The 
Principal, Government, then appoints agents; the Directors, the Board, 
the Chairman to protect the voters’ interests.
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A variety of m ethods have been used to help align the goals of the agent 
with the principal in regards to corporate governance. Some of these  
methods include profit sharing, performance incentives, com m issions 
and stock sharing. No matter what the specific method involved, the 
general idea is the same. The principal sets up a situation where the 
agent will benefit when the principals’ interests are met. This is the 
reason many chief executive officers received large num bers of stocks as 
part of their compensation package. Embedded in the Principal/Agent 
problem is the concept of Agency Cost. This is caused by the divergence 
in m anagement-shareholder objectives and information asymmetry. 
Circumstances can arise in an organisation where conflicts of interest 
between Directors and m anagement can cause the pursuit of “selfish  
strategies” thereby imposing agency costs on the company. Another 
concept applicable in the consideration of corporate governance is the 
issue of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is a process by which  
goods are produced, or services rendered, in a manner which maximizes 
the resources used (Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003). A system  is 
considered efficient economically if any changes result in some entity 
being at a disadvantage as a result of the changes. Another 
requirement for economic efficiency is that no more goods or services 
can be produced un less more resources are used. Finally, the system  is 
considered economically efficient if the production of goods, or delivery 
of services, is being done at the m ost minimal cost per unit (Sullivan 
and Sheffrin 2003). In other words, corporate governance can be 
considered economically efficient if nothing further could be gained by 
any significant changes made to the way the corporation or organisation 
is operated.
Another issue of importance within corporate governance is the 
stakeholder theory. This theory comprises a set of values and bu sin ess  
ethics regarding the organisational m anagem ent of corporations 
(Phillips and Freeman 2003). The theory provides a model which  
describes m ethods that management of a corporation can u se to run
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the business in a way which optimally benefits the stakeholders. In 
m ost countries, stakeholder theory is evident in business law. The 
shareholders, or members of a corporation, are its owners. The 
m anagement of the company has a fiduciary relationship with the 
owners and is legally bound to look out for their welfare. In a for-profit 
corporation, this usually consists of increasing profits resulting in 
increased share prices. Other goals may be appropriate for nonprofit 
corporations or other types of organisations. In the more traditional 
input-output models, management was responsible for a company 
making a profit and benefiting suppliers, employees and investors. 
However, newer models which take into account stakeholder theory, 
point out that there are other parties for which m anagement needs to 
be concerned. Some of these parties may include political groups, 
governmental bodies, trade unions, trade associations, comm unities, 
other corporations, possible employees, possible custom ers and even 
the public in general. Therefore, stakeholder theory takes corporate 
m anagement to a higher standard than a traditional input-output 
model of corporate governance.
D e v e lo p m e n t o f C od es -  S im ila r it ie s
In examining the codes that exist and developments in other parts of 
the world, a ubiquitous sam eness occurs for certain governance 
characteristics. Mallin (2010) identifies the development of codes and 
corporate governance strictures in a number of countries that take on 
this sam eness. Regardless of the region where they do exist, the 
common and essential characteristics of good governance involve 
transparency, accountability, risk management, ethical behaviour, 
fairness, and social responsibility as outlined in the King Report South  
Africa (2003). Evidencing this further, in India the Kumar Mangalam  
Burla Committee report identified three key aspects, accountability, 
transparency and equality of treatment of all stakeholders. The 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance in its code of Best Practice
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in 2001, identifies transparency, accountability and fairness. Its 
Security and Exchange Commission in 2002 added accounting and 
auditing and structure and responsibilities of the Board of Directors.
In Australia, as described by Mallin (2010), the Bosch report on 
corporate practice and conduct is described as being similar to Cadbury 
of the UK and addresses Board structure, risk management, financial 
reporting and auditing and conflicts of interest. In 2003, the Australia 
Stock Exchange (ASX) identified ten core principles directed to role and 
responsibilities, structure of the Board, ethical decision making, 
integrity in financial reporting, disclosure of material matters, risk 
management, rights of shareholders and stakeholders. In China, where 
corporate governance is still in its nascent stage, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission has issued a code of corporate governance 
based on the OECD’s principles of corporate governance; an admirable 
act on the part of the Chinese. Closer to this geography, the Koreans 
through its Committee on Corporate Governance in its code of Best 
Practice address shareholders rights, roles of the Board, Audit System s, 
rights of stakeholders and monitoring of management by the market 
(Mallin, 2010).
The Russian code of corporate governance issued by the Federal 
Securities Commission borrows heavily from the OECD principles 
addressing the fundamental, common and necessary areas of audit and  
accounting, risk management, transparency, ethics, and independence 
of directors. Similarly, the code drawn up by the Polish Forum for 
Corporate governance also known as the Gdansk Code, reflects the 
OECD (1998) principles and the Cadbury Code (1992), through the 
application of seven principles aimed at operating in the common  
interests of all shareholders to create value (Mallin, 2010). These 
countries are from areas diverse enough, each at different stages of 
development, yet the resounding push is to seek to practice the best as  
advocated by Cadbury and the OECD. In the Caribbean it is said that
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there is no unified code of corporate governance. A useful question for 
debate is whether a code is needed for the Caribbean or whether each  
country should have its own code. I believe that the nature of a Code 
also needs to be examined, if only to answer the question of what m akes 
the code compelling?
T rin id ad  an d  C orporate  G ov ern a n ce
Over six years ago, the Caribbean Trade & Investment Report (2005) 
reported that Trinidad m ust examine and take into account the global 
events related to corporate governance and their lessons to be learnt. 
While the Caribbean has yet to establish a unified corporate governance 
movement, the first ever Caribbean-wide Corporate Governance Forum  
(CCGF) was held over the period 3-5 September 2003 at the 
Headquarters of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), St. Kitts 
and Nevis. At the conclusion of the 2003 forum, draft 
recommendations for a Caribbean Code of Corporate Governance in 
Securities Markets were issued (Caribbean Trade 8s Investment Report, 
2005). The reasons as to why progress has not been made to have such  
a framework in place are not quite clear and nothing exists in the public 
domain to lend an understanding of its apparent stall in midflight. In 
Trinidad there is no unified corporate governance code. There are laws 
such as the Financial Institutions Act, Companies Act of 1995, the 
institution of the Public Accounts Enterprises Committee, a 
parliamentary body that is supposed to receive the accounts of public or 
state-owned entities and hold the Directors and Officers to account. 
Despite this, issu es related to corporate governance continue to be in 
the news. The issu es have ranged from the somewhat important to the 
very important and som etim es disturbing. Recent controversy 
surrounding the actions of a state-owned entity brings the issu es of 
how corporate governance is practised sharply into focus. It is noted  
that successive Ministers from different political parties with 
responsibility for state-owned companies have commented on the need
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for good corporate governance to be practised in the state-owned  
companies. The following are examples of these frequent calls: the then  
Minister of Trade and Development and Minister in the Ministry of 
Finance, in 2002, at a seminar titled “Governance Structures for the 
efficient functioning of the state sector” acknowledged that the issu es of 
“corporate governance had begun to occupy a pivotal position on the 
agenda for global development.” The Minister during the delivery of his 
paper espoused m ost of the tenets of good corporate governance 
addressing the role of the Board, the role of the Ministers, and 
especially identifying accountability, reporting, and monitoring and 
evaluation of performance as key variables for achieving effective 
corporate governance. (Honourable Kenneth Valley, 2002). Of 
importance is that this call clearly recognizes the need and importance 
of good corporate governance by an authority with responsibility for it. 
Seven years later, the Minister of Trade 8b  Industry and Minister in the 
Ministry of Finance in a speech to seminar participants stated that 
SOEs have a critical role to play in the development of the country. In 
this regard he recognized that the Government needed to apply more 
focus on governance arrangements. The Minister saw no difference in 
the manner of operations of the SOEs as compared to private-sector 
organisations and stressed that SOEs should be working to attain 
“economic efficiency through better allocation of resources; 
transparency and accountability in all operations of the companies; and 
adherence to the rule of law.” The Minister went on to highlight the 
improved governance of SOEs as an “important public policy objective”. 
(Senator the Honourable Mariano Browne, 2009). Driving further at the 
importance of this issue is Dimma (2002) who points to the integral role 
played by the Chairman whom he describes as the leader, not to 
compete with the CEO. He urges that the Chairman m ust create the 
environment that dem onstrates that governing and managing are two 
different things.
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The reading of the literature and the information available suggests that
there is a type of push and pull which occurs with a government-owned
entity. Some of the forces, predominantly the political ones, push the
corporation to integrate its interests with the government. Other forces,
such as profits and performance, encourage the corporation to be more
autonom ous from the government. Assumedly, this situation m ust
present a dilemma for the organisation as it appears that the objectives
of both will be denied congruence as its ownership is through the state
whose face is the politician who wields power over the state-owned
entity, thus the political push can create tensions for the corporation.
What is the root cause of Board failure or corporate governance
m ishaps such as those that are played in the press is of interest to the
researcher. It m ust be known so that it can be acted upon. Given the
preponderance of "bad press” there m ust be an obvious loss of
confidence by the public in the stewards of the state com panies that
continually appear in these reports. An increase in the stock of
transparency and accountability on the governance of the affairs of
these companies is certainly necessary if it is to be said that Trinidad
and Tobago has effective corporate governance in its state-owned
companies. Almost without fail, state companies under successive
governments obtained prime-time news and headlines in governance
scandals. These range from the som etim es m undane to the startling
and invariably revolve on contract awards, bid rigging and nepotism; it
is alm ost as if these companies are the purveyors of corruption. The
effects of corporate governance go beyond the immediate corporation; as
Mallin (2010) correctly points out, there are various stakeholders
adjoined to a company, good governance or bad governance therefore
can cause a sense of pride or undermine the institutions involved. In a
practical manner, Dimma (2002) acknowledges that there is no
guarantee that dishonesty will not find its way into the Boardroom,
however with proper governance, the likelihood of m alfeasance and its
impact can be decreased. Surely, the continuous assau lt on the
country’s reputation by corruption allegations m ust be noxious. Even
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more insidious m ust be the effect on the culture of the people and its 
long-term impact to society.
C o n c lu s io n
The examination of corporate issu es in Trinidad and specifically those 
which create dilemmas for corporate governance are stated by the 
Caribbean Trade & Investment Report (2005) to be of the nature that 
requires that Trinidad "...take into account developments in the rest of 
the world and the lessons to be learnt.” (Caribbean Trade & Investment 
Report, 2005). If this were so, then elem ents of corporate governance 
of state-owned companies can be conceptualized as consisting of 
organisational purpose, ownership, legal characteristics of powers, 
accountability, financing arrangements, board arrangements, 
corporate strategies and management. Further, the Board’s 
constitution and board appointments, membership, rules and 
procedures of the Board will exist as critical elem ents of the corporate 
governance process. All of these factors are important because of the 
ways in which corporate strategies are intertwined with the specific 
characteristics of corporate governance.
The Directors of state-owned companies are responsible for protecting 
and efficiently using public resources at their company’s disposal to 
prevent the disastrous results often experienced with governance 
failures. Avoidance of failure inherently requires a high level of 
accountability from the Chairman, Directors and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the company. However, if the executives are burdened with 
an overly complex and tim e-consum ing governance process of 
accounting for their practices, the company they are leading may lose 
sight of its objectives and its efficiency and effectiveness will suffer. 
Notwithstanding, the public requires and m ust be provided with a high  
level of accountability from the Governors on the use of public funds. 
This, as an example, acknowledges that there is a push and pull of
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dem ands that m ust create problems for the discharge of the respective 
duties in the governance process. Nonetheless, the practice of 
corporate governance m ust be tirelessly pursued if the tenets of 
accountability, transparency, risk management, and ethics are to 
benefit the country. The lisj: of stakeholders of a state-owned company 
is quite long and includes civil servants, politicians, ministers, 
legislature, political parties, competitors, consum ers, shareholders, 
bankers, lenders, the media. It matters significantly that trust, 
integrity, responsibility, and accountability as essential elem ents of 
corporate governance and critical to the long-term benefit of the 
organisation, are practised by the company. While these elem ents are 
ideals its relative attainm ent is directly dependent on the practices of 
corporate governance by the Directors controlling the state-owned 
entity.
In covering the terrain of corporate governance landscape it is clear to 
me that corporate governance practices and principles are applicable to 
state owned companies in Trinidad and Tobago. The literature clearly 
shows that accountability, risk management, Director independence, 
transparency and ethics are hallmark features of good corporate 
governance. Consequently, my research interest pivots upon how the 
key corporate governance player, in the form of the Chairman of the 
Board, perceives, and understands how corporate governance is  
deployed to mitigate risk, enforce accountability and to protect 
shareholders. It is intended to uncover how the participants view their 
understanding and the practice of corporate governance. I am  
reminded that regardless of the countries’ legal, cultural and political 
context, corporate governance codes have been driven by the exigencies 
of transparency, accountability, and increased confidence by the public 
(Mallin, 2010).
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CHAPTER THREE -  RESEARCH METHODS
In tr o d u c tio n
This Chapter describes the theoretical foundations of the research 
methodology that I have selected to examine the phenom enon of 
dilemmas of corporate governance in state-owned companies in 
Trinidad and Tobago. Importantly, it identifies the approach and 
m ethods that I have used for data collection and analysis within the 
research phenomenon. A framework for the collection and analysis of 
data m ust comprise, am ongst other things, elem ents of a research 
design. Research design by necessity ought to reflect contemplations 
about our epistemological stance, that is to say, our knowledge of 
knowledge and ought to establish how we perceive reality or our 
ontology and ought to draw on the relevance of prior experiences, and 
the substantiation of our philosophical outlook. This chapter, therefore, 
sets out to outline the purpose of the proposed research, the selected  
research methodology, some of the main research paradigms, the 
importance of locating epistemologies and their relevance within 
research, the sufficiency of the number of interviews conducted and the 
understanding of theoretical perspectives that guide our research  
methodologies and the m ethods of research. Importantly, it sets out my 
own positions in respect of these issu es and identifies the research  
methodology that I have selected as being appropriate to the 
phenom enon under investigation.
P u rp ose  o f R e se a rc h
Corporate governance is an extremely complex phenomenon and the 
readings of many sources such as contained in Chapter Two and  
evidenced in the bibliography show that its application in the state- 
owned company sector has been little researched. This is surprising
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because it is an indispensable process within the overall functioning of 
any business organisation (Mallin (2010), Cadbury (1992)), as it acts 
primarily in the interests of the owners or shareholders. In the 
introduction, I stated that dilemmas best describe those problems that 
are chronic and intractable but soluble. Particularly useful for me is 
Talley’s (2003) view that dilemmas also exist when there is a 
commitment to two incompatible goals often accompanied by 
frustration and m ysteiy. This resonates exceedingly well with me and 
serves as justification for the title of the research.
Anecdotal evidence of the state of affairs in certain public-sector entities 
in Trinidad and Tobago suggests that there are dilemmas at work in the 
discharge of corporate governance. I believe that these dilemmas are 
worthy of investigation. Consequently, my research interest lies in 
securing a grasp of the informants’ understanding of what is corporate 
governance; how it is practised and how it is understood. I am driven to 
ask if it works, and what the key impediments are to its effective 
working and the importance its key facets: accountability and risk 
management. The underlying purpose of the research, therefore, is to 
understand from the informants’ viewpoint, their lived experiences on 
corporate governance. These informants have occupied or are 
occupying positions of Chair of the Board of state-owned com panies and 
they are experienced and exposed to the specificity of the environment; 
consequently, their views, understanding, and perceptions are crucial to 
surfacing the existence of dilemmas. The objective of the proposed 
research was therefore threefold: 1) it identifies the dilemmas that 
compromise the discharge of corporate governance in state-owned  
companies; 2) it describes and defines these dilemmas, establishing  
their causes; and 3) it presents a pathway for high-level solutions.
The research methodology I have chosen is qualitative in nature and  
rests on an interpretivist theoretical perspective. Further, the research  
methodology is informed in a large part by Thomas’s (2006) general
inductive approach model which is grounded in the texts from the 
interviewees while the research method relies largely on interviews 
based on semi-structured and open-ended questions designed to obtain 
the participants’ understandings and lived experiences of corporate 
governance, accountability, and risk management. The application of 
the general analytical induction methodology on the corpus of 
interviewee data has successfully led to the emergence of useful 
patterns that has allowed an explication of the dilemmas within the 
discharge of corporate governance in state-owned com panies in 
Trinidad and Tobago.
F in d in g  th e  M eth o d o lo g y
I believe that it is important to provide the reader with an explanation of 
how I arrived at this particular research methodology. I m ust admit, 
however, that while the view as to how to carry out the study was not 
immediately clear; the research objectives were clearer; the issu es of 
methodology, ontology and epistemology, Crotty (1998), Gill and  
Johnson (2006), were not conscious considerations. Having a basic 
understanding of the concepts, I confess to an ontology and 
epistemology that is mostly objectivist in nature. While I have 
struggled somewhat to derive an understanding of the epistemological 
and ontological concepts, I have been enlightened by philosophical 
traditions that inform an ontology and epistemology. Conceptually for 
me, epistemology has to do with one’s belief about how an individual 
discovers or comes to know what knowledge is about the world. 
Epistemology, therefore, is what matters as knowledge. Such questions 
are fundamental: Does statistical inference apply as knowledge? Are 
the results of interviews knowledge? Is the observation of people or 
events the basis for claiming knowledge? One’s position on these could 
be said to be one’s epistemological position. Ontology, on the other 
hand, is about thinking of assum ptions of the world and how it is made 
up, it is the essence or the nature of things, the study of being.
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Ontology then considers the kind of knowledge, objective or subjective: 
It asks, Do things exist objectively or subjectively? A position on this is 
said to be one’s ontological position. Ontology, therefore, as I 
understand it, is the study of being, existence and the nature of reality, 
subjective or objective.
I have identified a general inductive approach as my chosen  
methodology, which, to the mainstream positivist might not appear 
intuitive. According to Johnson and Duberley (2000), key to the 
objectivist ontological and epistemological perspective within a positivist 
framework is the reliance on “a theory neutral observational language. 
This m eans that the observer is quite independent of the observed and 
consequently holds an objective view of what is being observed. 
However, in my case, the interest of the research and the manner in 
which responses are required mean that the hum an account of 
corporate governance is crucial to understanding. The need to 
understand the account of corporate governance from the informants, 
who have an internal logic of their own, suggested that interpretation of 
the accounts of the informants m ust be applied in the investigation. 
For me, therefore, there is no standing back and observing; this 
detachm ent of the observer in my opinion cannot get to the 
understanding of the actor’s internal logic. This is bundled into what I 
term an inescapable reliance on the internal logic of hum an beings 
which I accept as an unavoidable feature in hum an existence. Meaning 
or interpretation attaches to phenom enon through being hum an (Gill 
and Johnson, 2006). Simply put, I believe the hum an is disposed to an 
interpretation of things around him. Interpretative approaches to 
research then is m ost appropriate for explaining hum an action and  
social science. I also accept that a researcher is positioned along a 
particular epistemological path dependent on the philosophical 
assum ptions held. Burrel and Morgan (1979) argue that the exclusive 
use of a law-like or nomothetic methodology will accom pany a 
positivistic philosophy. On the other hand, and resonating well with me
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in the context of the research topic is the enablement of understanding  
or verstehen from an epistemology that is interpretative.
According to Johnson and Duberley (2000), researchers like me who 
hold the objectivist ontology and epistemology have available to them  
two approaches to m anagement research; positivism and neo-positivism  
which are both reliant on the previously explained theoiy-neutral 
observational language. However, a bifurcation of the two occurs over 
what is understood to be observable; here, the neo-positivists or neo­
empiricists argue that hum an behaviour in the organisational context 
can only be understood through their interpretations of reality, that is 
to say, access m ust be gained to the participant’s subjectivity. My belief 
that an interpretative framework is necessary for my corporate 
governance research is born from this realization and rests on the fact 
that hum an beings have an internal logic of their own. Further 
clarification of this important research element came from Johnson, 
Beuhring, Cassel and Symon (2006) who, drawing from the work of 
Alvesson and Deetz (2000) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005), suggest an 
incompatibility in the approach of the natural sciences to study the 
social world. For me, the argument here is that inanimate or insensate  
objects do not behave the sam e as hum an beings; hum an beings have 
an internal subjective logic of their own. Quantitative m easures 
normally associated with positivism, therefore, as supported by Guba 
and Lincoln (1994), cannot meaningfully represent the informant’s 
inter-subjectivity from collected data. Interestingly, however, Johnson  
et al (2006 p. 138) quoting Alvesson and Deetz (2000, 60-74), state that 
neo-empiricism allows the "possibility of unbiased and objective 
collection of qualitative data.” So, neo-empiricists are essentially  
qualitative positivists relying on qualitative methods to develop patterns 
in the inter-subjective meaning. Explanation is therefore obtained from 
deploying analytic induction as an example. It is here as pointed out 
that neo-empiricists can operate within an interpretative framework and 
can claim validity for their research (Johnson et al, 2006 p. 138). So, for
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me, the desire to know and to understand has to be through som e sort 
of induction, what the participants see, feel, and know; my aim is to 
develop an understanding through detailed analysis of the qualitative 
material.
U n d ersta n d in g  and  A rriv in g  at a  T h e o r e t ic a l P e r sp e c tiv e
Before I get into describing the research methodology I adopted, it is 
perhaps appropriate to first introduce some important aspects that also 
helped to identify and confirm its selection, specifically, epistemology 
and theoretical perspectives. I believe that very few researchers 
approach their research by first stating their ontological belief, their 
epistemological stance, and their theoretical perspective. In my case I 
was quite aware of what I wanted to research and knew that it would 
have to be done through questioning, through interviews. However, 
Crotty (1998) addresses this issue of ontological belief in a 
straightforward manner in positing that any research proposal m ust 
begin with answering two questions first: what methodologies and 
m ethods will be employed? And how do we justify the choice and u se  of 
methodologies? Clearly, these questions when asked do not conjure 
conscious thoughts of ontology and epistemology at first pass.
Upon closer examination of the second question, I unavoidably had to 
contemplate assum ptions of what my view of reality is. This view w as at 
first confusing as I remember in class, on m any occasions I w as actively 
seeking and questioning which theoretical perspective "box” I fell into. 
Although I was advised by m ost of the attending lecturers at Sheffield 
B usiness School to avoid the temptation to yield to a "box”, I found it 
difficult at first to accept their positioning. However, through further 
reading and self searching, the urge to place m yself in a box or to apply 
a straight-off label was eventually abandoned as I saw the wisdom  of 
Johnson and Duberley (2000) surm ising that a researcher rarely applies 
a specific label to them selves. Lincoln and Guba (1985), Johnson and
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Duberley (2000) go further to suggest that individuals adopt positions 
dependent on what they are researching and what they aim to argue at 
a particular point. The sequence they outline has appeal to me, it is a 
fit "for purpose approach,” not dissimilar to the TQM tenet espoused by 
Juran. However, H ussey and H ussey (1997) captures the issue, making 
it clearer for me, by positioning that the methodology chosen should be 
a reflection of the research paradigm.
Also illuminating the issue further, is the usefu lness portrayed in the 
quadrant presented by Johnson and Duberley (2000). Its usefu lness is 
established by its range of theoretical perspectives that are defined by 
the intersection of the ontological and epistemological choices made by 
the researcher. The figure below describes some of these approaches on  
a matrix of objectivist and subjectivist ontological and epistemological 















Figure 1: T heoretical p ersp ectives (Johnson and Duberley, 2000)
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P o s it iv ism
One of the main theoretical perspectives of scientific research is that of 
positivism. Positivism assum es that there is a knowable reality that 
exists independent of the research process. It further states that the 
social world, similar to the natural world, is governed by rules, which 
result in patterns. Accordingly, causal relationships between variables 
exist and can be identified, proven, and explained (Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2006). Furthermore, this truth is “value-neutral, ahistorical and 
cross-cultural” (Crotty, 1998), and thus is true at all tim es and in all 
places. This theoretical approach specifies that it is possible for the 
researcher to identify and understand an underlying truth and apply it 
across a number of situations. Accordingly, Hesse-Biber and Leavy 
(2006) describes this approach as the basic foundation of quantitative 
research approaches (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). Common positivist 
research methodologies include surveys and experiments (Crotty, 1998). 
This I did not consider appropriate for researching the corporate- 
governance phenom enon as it could not get to the actors’ subjectivity 
and internal logic.
In d u c tiv e  In te r p r e tiv ism
Inductive interpretivism draws a clear line between research in the 
natural sciences and the social sciences, noting that natural properties 
of substances are fundamentally different from hum an interaction. It is 
here that I found resonance with the positions of Willis, Jost and 
Nilakanta (2007). In this approach, the positivist view of a single 
underlying truth is explicitly rejected, as is the notion of discovery of 
that truth. Instead, knowledge intended to reflect on hum an  
interactions is comprised of fundamental truths, environmental 
influences (both direct and indirect) and perceptions and past 
experiences of the person in question (Willis, Jost and Nilakanta, 2007). 
This approach is fundamental to qualitative hum an research and is the
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basis of methodological approaches such as grounded theory, analytical 
induction, general inductive approaches and action research (Willis, 
Jost and Nilakanta, 2007). Khun (1970) adds further clarity by telling 
u s that that interpretivism is a research paradigm, an orientation, a 
system  of thinking similar to positivism and realism.
Further solidifying the decision of the chosen research methodology is 
the contemplation of the questions, previously outlined, as put forward 
by Crotty (1998); it is through this contemplation, that I was able to 
locate my theoretical perspective. This theoretical perspective refers to 
the philosophical stance, whether critical realism, critical theory, 
positivism or post modernism, that the researcher u ses  to allow 
resonance of a methodology. My understanding, therefore, is that the 
researcher’s view of the world shapes the research. Since interpretivism  
is used to investigate the research phenom enon in seeking to 
understand the actors’ views of reality in corporate governance, my 
research perspective therefore is considered to be interpretivist in an 
inductive fashion concerned with understanding or verstehen.
Coming through this journey I understand now that the essence of the 
theoretical perspective of the researcher can necessitate the sincere 
examination of what is understood by hum an knowledge, what it is 
made up of, what its essential characteristics are of that knowledge, 
and what the readership of the research views and a ssesse s  the 
research outcome to be and the reason why the readership should rely 
on it. The foregoing led me to a journeym an’s appreciation that these  
are essentially epistemological questions. I like the fact that in an  
alm ost logically sequenced manner, this leads to an understandable 
acceptance of Crotty’s (1998) proposition of there being four basic 
questions of any research process: What m ethods do we propose to use?  
What research methodology governs our choice and use of methods?  
What theoretical or philosophical perspective lies behind the research  
methodology in question? And what epistemology informs this
theoretical perspective? (Crotty, 1998). It is th rough  the rela tionsh ip  of 
these  four acting in tandem , th a t I be tter understood  epistemology and  
obtained endorsem ent for the methodology th a t I have chosen.
These rela tionsh ips are highlighted in the following diagram :
Epistem ology




Figure 2: E p istem o logy  to  M ethods A dap ted  from  C ro tty  (1998)
W ith C rotty’s help it becam e easier to u n d e rs tan d  how a  resea rch er can  
locate h is or her theoretical perspective and  epistemology by beginning 
with a research  idea and  m ethods th a t are applicable. I knew  clearly 
th a t the inform ants had  to be interviewed since I strongly believe th a t 
no sta tistica l sam pling could reasonably  or adequately  be u sed  in th is  
case to describe or explain how the Board C hairm en understood  
corporate governance and  viewed its practice. This th en  led reasonab ly  
to the feeling th a t inhered  in some so rt of inductive approach , an d  it is 
a t th is point th a t the sw eet spot w as located. The location of the sw eet 
spot is a  eu reka  m om ent, since having reached  to the poin t of know ing 
th a t it w as induction, the  realization th a t it would have to be in te rp re ted  
in the social or h u m an  context m ean t interpretivism ; finally, the anxiety 
of no t u n d e rs tan d in g  how it would come together gave way to sense  
m aking. The theoretical perspective len t itself to sense m aking  w hich 
m ade it easier to appreciate  the objectivist epistemology. How to 
conduct research  th a t seeks to u n d e rs ta n d  inform ants in the  a re a  of 
in te rest really began to m ake sense and  reaffirm ed th a t a n  inductive 
approach  w ithin an  in terpretative fram ew ork w as as applicable a s  any  
o ther resea rch e r’s justification  for a  different approach. Borrowing from
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Crotty (1998), the following diagram  show s the  relationship  in a  left-to- 
right fashion, betw een epistemology and  m ethods utilized:
Inherent in Philosophical
Theoretical Stance How We Strategy or Techniques or
Stance look at the World Plan of Action Procedures
Epistemology TheoreticalPerspective Methodology Methods
Objectivism -  
Neo Empiricism





Figure 3: (ad ap ted  from  C ro tty  (1998))
T h e  C h o s e n  R e s e a r c h  M e th o d o lo g y  -  G e n e ra l  I n d u c t iv e  
A p p ro a c h
As I s ta ted  earlier, I feel com fortable deriving knowledge from sense
experience, th u s  m aking it easier for me to accept th a t I can  be said  to
have an  em piricist epistemology. However, I believe th a t a  s tric t
em piricist approach  will not enable the u n d ers tan d in g  of lived
experiences of the  inform ants in the corporate governance process,
since they, as m uch  lite ra tu re  describes and  agrees, have an  in te rna l
logic of their own. The desire to u n d e rs ta n d  and  know, th rough  som e
sort of analytical induction, w hat the partic ipan ts know, feel, sense  and
in terpret, is param ount. My p re-u n d erstan d in g  and  personal
experiences of events in Trinidad an d  Tobago related  to m a tte rs  of
corporate governance in state-ow ned com panies suggest th a t there
m ight be dilem m as a t work. This does no t coalesce w ith a  deductive
approach  th a t there  is an  existing theory, ra th e r it strikes a  chord w ith
an  inductive approach  th a t generates p a tte rn s  or them es based  on
em pirical data ; I m u st a sk  basic questions: Are there  dilem m as? W hat
are they? The methodology th en  is employed to u n d e rs ta n d  the
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Chairman’s perception and interpretation of the corporate governance 
space. I believe, therefore, that the epistemologies and theoretical 
perspectives of a researcher provide a clear path to an applicable 
research methodology; in my case, I am seeking to get an  
understanding of how people make sense of corporate governance in the 
state-owned public company sector.
After careful consideration, and a strong visceral feel, my chosen  
research methodology is essentially general inductive approach; it is an 
approach that is rooted in analytical induction. A useful definition of 
analytical induction com es from Johnson who argues that it is “the 
intensive examination of a strategically selected number of cases to 
empirically establish the causes of a specific phenom enon” (Cassell and  
Symon, 2004). Essentially, analytical induction sets out to generate 
theories based on observation of the empirical world and as an 
approach is reliant on a detailed reading of raw data to identify 
concepts, them es or models that are then subjected to interpretation by 
the researcher. Consequently, the multiple readings and interpretation 
of the interview texts is the inductive component. According to Thomas 
(2006) analytical induction can be classified or labelled as a part of a 
general inductive approach. Very important for me was the description  
offered by Thomas (2006) who appropriately describes the general 
inductive approach as a user-friendly one with system atic procedures 
that can produce valid findings on a corpus of qualitative data. This for 
me held significant appeal because of its relative simplicity. This 
inductive-analysis approach utilizes detailed readings of interview data, 
the raw data, to draw out them es. This alm ost forensic reading of the 
interview data is then subjected to interpretation of the them es or 
concepts that come from the reading. Inductive, then, is about deriving 
meaning from data through the development of patterns. In this regard, 
there are three meaningful and useful purposes as outlined by Thomas 
(2006) of the general inductive approach:
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1. To condense extensive and varied raw text data into brief 
summary data format;
2. To establish clear links between the research objectives and the 
summary findings derived from the raw data and to ensure that 
these links are transparent and defensible, and
3. To develop patterns or them es about the underlying structure of 
experiences that is evident in the text.
Item #2 is a key and amenable one for me. The research questions set 
out to obtain the informants understanding and perception in the 
context of whether there are dilemmas of corporate governance in state- 
owned enterprises. The research findings have, as we shall see in 
Chapter Five, rewarded the approach. The general inductive strategy, 
therefore, relies on the reading and re-reading of raw interview data and 
interpretation of the reading of the data in the context of the research 
objectives. As Thomas (2006) points out, research objectives are not 
intended to set expectations for specific findings; rather, it is to provide 
the domain of relevance for the analysis. Categories are then sought 
from the raw data which are placed into a framework containing them es 
built by the researcher inherent in the analysis of the raw data. 
Findings emerge from the interpretations of the raw data through the 
use of categories, category descriptions, text associated with categories 
for linking meaning, links indicating relationships in a parent-child  
fashion towards commonality in m eaning between categories.
Thomas (2006) in the American Journal o f Evaluation  (p.241) 
dem onstrates via the following table how the major issu es within 
general inductive approach are addressed:
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Issue General Inductive Approach
Analytic strategies and 
questions
What are the core m eanings evident in the 
text, relevant to evaluation or research  
objectives?
Outcome of Analysis Patterns, them es or categories m ost relevant 
to research objectives identified
Presentation of Findings Description of m ost important patterns or 
them es
Essentially, then, I understand the general inductive approach, within 
the context of the proposed research area as a suitable strategy for data 
analysis which involves inductive reasoning to best represent the reality 
of the corporate governance dilemmas, which is the subject of this 
research. This is achieved through data-reduction processes that move 
from obtaining meaning based on interpretation applied to the data to 
develop them es. Approaches such as these have been described as 
inductive and analytical induction. Analytical induction u ses  an  
iterative process of data collection and analysis, in which the researcher 
collects data and analyses it either side by side or in several sequential 
steps. The research begins with data collection and analysis, which  
then lead to either a construction or a refinement of a hypothesis; 
subsequent rounds of research further focus the researcher on the 
given hypothesis until a final conclusion is arrived at (Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2006). The general inductive approach stops at patterns or 
them es while analytical induction moves further to theory building. The 
methodology, therefore, is based on the m ethods that lend them selves 
to undertaking credible research. I felt comfortable starting with the 
research idea and building on a pattern like Crotty’s (1998); I began to 





Figure 4: A rriv ing  a t a  M ethodology
The p a tte rn s  th a t have been surfaced a s  show n in C hap ter Five have 
been facilitated by the  analysis and  in terp reta tion  th a t cam e from the 
d a ta  and  no t from a  previously and  steadfastly  held model. As outlined 
in the in troduction  and  aim s, my h u n ch es were based  on anecdotal 
evidence.
M e th o d s  w i th in  th e  M e th o d o lo g y
My theoretical grounding in interpretivism  holds th a t the  existing
knowledge of the researcher is key to u n d ers tan d in g  the outcom es of
the research  and  th a t the  knowledge derived is no t sim ply discovered by
the researcher b u t is created  by the ac t of inquiry, also supported  by
Potter (2006). The m ethodology I utilized is essentially  the  general
inductive approach  described by (Thomas 2006), grounded in a  body of
data , in w hich theory is derived no t from analysis of o ther theoretical
situa tions b u t from the research; th is  will be u sed  to su p p o rt the
research  m ethod (Goulding, 2002). The research  covered ten  actors,
specifically, chairm en  of state-ow ned com panies involved in corporate
governance in the  public and  governm ent spheres, in accordance w ith
the purpose and  m ethodology chosen. In my view, the chairm en  are
held to be integral in the  governance process as they ac t a s  the  chief
servan t of the Board. Since the au tho rity  of the Board is s ingu lar in its
voice, the views of those who lead in th is  integral com ponent of
governance are m ore th an  im portant; they are vitally crucial,
indispensable. The in terpretative analysis is absolutely  re lian t on the
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viewpoints and statem ents of these informants which m akes the 
method of data collection important.
The primary data collection method I used was the interview, which was 
designed to elicit information regarding the purpose of the study. 
Interviews are suitable when the researcher wants to fully understand  
someone's im pressions or experiences, or learn more about their 
specific answers to questions. The advantages of the interview lie in the 
solicitation of a full range and depth of information, and in the 
development of a relationship with the interviewee which allows for 
flexibility. However, the researcher m ust be aware of the following 
pitfalls: it can take m uch more time to complete; data obtained can be 
hard to analyse and compare; it can be costly; and, importantly, it can  
cause the interviewer to bias the interviewee’s responses.
Pivotal to the successful research analysis and outcome, therefore, is 
the nature of questions to be asked during the interview. It stands as 
reasonable and necessary that these questions be clear, that is to say  
they m ust be understood to the researcher and to others. They m ust 
also, as part of their very fabric, be researchable questions and so 
should be capable of development into a research design, so that data  
may be collected in relation to them. This m eans that extremely 
abstract terms are unlikely to be appropriate. They should be logically 
linked. Unrelated research questions are unlikely to be acceptable, 
since the researcher should be developing an argument or narrative 
product. They, at the very least, should hold out the prospect of being 
able to make a contribution to knowledge -  however sm all -  to the 
phenomenon under study.
The interviews were constructed using techniques such as those  
proposed by McCracken (1988), in order to not only encom pass the 
immediate research problem, but also to identify cultural, social, and  
other experiential and perceptual bases of the interviewee (McCracken,
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1988). As suggested by Crotty (1998), these  interviews were recorded 
and  then  transcribed , the  transcrip tion  w as provided to the responden ts 
for verification. As supported  as well by Creswell (1998) I chose to 
record and  transcribe  interviews in order to provide an  increased  level of 
verifiability to the  research  and  to allow for the identification of key 
words, p h rases and  coding for later in terpretation .
Several questions were considered before arriving a t the  questions th a t 
were asked during  the first two interviews. The following diagram  
show s how the questions cam e to be asked  in add ressing  the  











What doers corporate 
governance mean to 
you?
What is the Significance 
of corporate 
governance?
Who are the key players 
of corporate
governance? 1
What is your 
responsibility in 
corporate governance?
How does your 
organization achieve 
corporate governance?




What d o es corporate  
governance m ean to you?
What are your aim s for 
corporate govern an ce?
How is corporate 
govern an ce perceived  in 
public-sector com panies?
What d o es accountability  
mean in the public-sector?
What do you understand  
risk m anagem ent to be?
What parts if the  
organisation are involved  
in risk m anagem ent?
How do you ach iev e  risk 
m anagem ent?
What are the im pedim ents 
to achieving corporate 
governance?
Broadly, the  questionnaire  w as designed to cap tu re  the following:
• U nderstand ing  of w hat corporate governance m eans
• Perception of how corporate governance operates in  the  sta te  
com panies Trinidad and  Tobago
• Im pedim ents to corporate governance
6 8
• The understanding and practice of risk management as part of 
the governance process
• Understanding and practice of accountability within the state- 
owned companies and how it works
The questions were open-ended, primarily to elicit from the informants 
an abundance of information; variations of the questions occurred after 
the first and sixth interview. The variation arose based on the need to 
seek additional detail on reflection of the responses provided after the 
first interview. As an example, and after the first interview, a key 
question was changed: informants were originally asked, “Is corporate 
governance an issue fo r the public sector? What are the effects upon 
organisational structure and p rocess?” Although useful responses were 
provided, the question was changed to ask, “How is corporate 
governance perceived in public-sector com panies?” The twin objectives 
of this change made the question direct and focused. Similarly, after 
the sixth interview, the question “What are your aim s fo r corporate 
governance in your organisation?” was changed to “What do you  
understand corporate governance to be?” Again, this is direct, 
capturing the interviewee’s understanding of the phenom enon. The 
questions were, therefore, structured to guide the conversation for 
coverage of the key areas. Even when participants strayed from the 
direct question, sufficient useful data was nevertheless obtained. The 
overall direction of the questions allowed for consistency or consistent 
views and perceptions for the subsequent analysis. The first three 
interviews were recorded via handwritten notes and then typed; while 
offering extremely valuable information it was considered insufficient. 
The switch to having the interviews recorded provided a greater and 
deeper set of data with which to work. The transcribed interviews were 
then decoded after and as a result of multiple and punctilious 
readings. The interviews were conducted in the participant’s workplace 
so as to have them in a comfortable and familiar environment, one that 
was non-threatening. To further strengthen the process, interviewees
69
were a ssu red  of anonym ity; it w as explained th a t only the researcher, 
the  second reviewer and  Sheffield B usiness School would know the 
identity  of each interviewee. This fact provided m uch  needed 
a ssu ran ce  for the  preservation of anonym ity.
D e v e lo p in g  t h e  I n t e r p r e t a t i v e  M o d e l M a tr ix
After m ultiple readings of the  interview lite ra tu re  and  the  decoding of it, 
I decided to create  a  m atrix, a  list of key word and  p h rases  a rranged  in 
groups on the  basis  of synonym ity and  sim ilarity of m eaning. From  th is  
linguistic organisation, I began to d iscern  the form ation of clear 
groupings, which, w hen described, analysed and  refined, becam e 
pa tte rn s . Developing a  m atrix  con tain ing  key words and  p h rases  u sed  
by interviewees to provide an  appropria te  m eans of decoding the  
interviews h a s  proved quite useful. These key words in con junction  
w ith allied p h rases  a ss is t in suggesting p a tte rn s , the  d im ensions of 
w hich are identified and  d iscussed .
The following diagram  provides a  view as  to how I utilized the  questions 








TInterview  (Semi Structured)




Figure 5: R esearch  fram ew ork
70
Similar to what Zikmund (2003) prescribes, I began the process of 
inductive analysis, first creating a matrix of phrases and keywords from 
the interview transcripts. Further reading and comparison of the 
respondents’ texts led me to group these into modes of thought; 
continued re-reading and analysis then led to forming of concepts in 
order to determine how the research is indicative of specific them es or 
patterns. I was then able to examine the output of the interviews and 
analysis process and determine what, if any, them es or existing 
understandings can be applied to this research area (Goulding 2002).
Consistent with the general inductive approach outlined by Thomas
(2006) the following diagram offers the refined view of the process 
utilised to capture the matrix of key phrases, key words and statem ents 
as well as the process utilized in arriving at the interpretations offered 
in Chapter Five. In summary, three key patterns were identified 
through the following process. The patterns derive are described as the 
pericentric, centrifugal and centripetal. Each of these patterns carries 
what I refer to as dim ensions which are indicated via sub-headings in 
the narrative to each pattern; they reflect d iscussions and issu es that 
arise from the text and the interpretation. A full description of these  
patterns is offered in Chapter Five.
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R ace  In Politics TrustDiscontinuity Accountability Risk M anagem ent
Discussion of each  pattern and its dimensions
M odes of thought assum ptions; key feelings;
Matrix of phrases, key words, key statem ents
R ead  and re-read notes
For exam ple:•  Political interference•  Basic two race  party system•  Political appointm ents•  Party hacks
According to Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) in some cases the 
researcher may not begin to look for a theoretical framework that might 
apply until after the first round of data collection and analysis. During 
the analysis process of analytic induction, as in grounded theory, the 
researcher will look for specific relationships and categories into which  
the outcom es of the research may be grouped, in order to allow for a 
holistic understanding of the research subject (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 
2006).
S am p le  S iz e , R ed u n d a n cy  an d  S a tu ra tio n
My analysis and interpretations were derived from the texts compiled 
from ten interviews with Chairmen of state-owned com panies in 
Trinidad and Tobago. An obvious question to an interested reader will 
necessarily ask whether ten is enough. The issue of what is an
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appropriate sample size when conducting qualitative research has been 
the subject of m uch debate by researchers. Much depends on the 
protagonist’s orientation. Sandelowski (2007) points to a m isconception  
in qualitative research that num bers are unimportant in ensuring the 
adequacy of a sampling strategy. I w as of the opinion, based on my 
epistemological stance, that too small a number cannot support a claim  
of theoretical saturation or informational redundancy. Sandelowski
(2007) addresses this discomfort by positing that judgem ent on the part 
of the researcher is key; adequacy of sample size is dependent on 
evaluating the quality of the information obtained, the research method  
utilised and the intended use. Others like Greenhalgh and Taylor 
(1997) tells u s that qualitative research is not standard and unconfined; 
the research should point to why the research was done and what it 
addresses? This is in harmony with what I had set out to accomplish: to 
explore and obtain a deeper understanding and to interpret. The 
reasoning, therefore, is inductive and the sampling method is 
theoretical; strength com es through reliability; the researcher m ust 
describe in detail where he is coming from so that reasonable 
interpretation may take place. (Greenhalgh and Taylor, 1997)
Sandelowski (2007) suggests, agreeably, that the real task is to find a 
system atic way of analysing the data to determine whether the results 
are sensible and if they matter. The strength of the qualitative 
research is its closeness to truth or validity. What is clear to me is 
aligned to what Johnson, Buehering, Cassel and Symon (2006) offers 
us; qualitative research is an umbrella term for a variety of non- 
statistical techniques. For those that accept methodological monoism , 
it m eans as Ross (1991) argues, (quoted in Johnson et al (2006)) certain 
knowledge can only be derived from natural science methodology. This, 
agreeably to me, ignores socially derived subjective perspectives. 
Despite my natural inclination to do so, I could not arrive at a 
comfortable position whereby statistical techniques could have provided
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me with the answers that I sought. The lived experiences were of 
utm ost importance.
Bearing in mind the opinion that judgem ent regarding sample size 
should prevail, the question still looms: how m uch is enough? What is 
an appropriate number of interviews? In attempting to answer these  
questions, I turned to Sandelowski (2001) who cautions u s to not 
become quagmired by the actual number itself. She provides u s with 
an appropriate anecdote by telling u s of one of her Doctoral students 
who had completed a seventeen month ethnographic study of a single 
patient record system  at one hospital with twenty (20) interviews; this 
yielded two hundred and fifty (250) pages of raw data. This, 
dem onstrates the am ount of data that can be produced from even n = l 
studies. Others, such as Guba and Lincoln (1994), in addressing the 
usefu lness of qualitative research, correctly notes that statistical 
reasoning by researchers on the data captured m ust distort, stifle and  
misrepresent the informants inter subjectivity rather than capture it; the 
research objective is therefore defeated.
Returning to the issue of the appropriate number, I believe, like Mason 
(2010), that qualitative researchers generally stay away from suggesting  
what is an appropriate sample size. The texts have convinced me that 
size does not matter, and like Charmaz (2006), the aims of the research  
is the driver if its design and sample size. Further support for this 
assertion comes from others; Ritchie, Lewis and Elam (2003) and  
Crouch and McKenzie (2006) who argue that sam ples for qualitative 
research are m uch smaller than those in quantitative studies. Their 
argument, and one that I have found favour with rests on the concept of 
diminishing returns. At first, when I thought that maybe twelve (12) 
interviews of a total of forty five (45) would be sufficient, I began to 
experience what I prefer to term as diminishing returns at the eight 
interview; after the eight interview the coding categories were not new, 
the ninth was marginally incremental no new categories or patterns and
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the tenth convinced me that theoretical saturation had been reached 
and I decided to stop. I decided that ten (10) interviews were 
appropriate. Glaser and Strauss (1967), the progenitors of grounded 
theory, tell u s that saturation occurs when the collection of additional 
data does not reveal further useful information of the phenom enon  
under investigation. This should be the guiding principle for 
determining sample size.
It is frustrating that there is no clear source to state exactly what is an 
appropriate number; Mason (2010), referring to Guest, Bruce and 
Johnson (2006), supports this position in searching for conclusive 
guidelines. However, an authoritative voice, Creswell (1998), suggest a 
number between live (5) and twenty-five (25); Morse (1994), 
recommends at least 6 for qualitative research employing the 
phenomenology genre. However, in putting this number issu e to rest, 
the m ost revealing example of an appropriate sample size com es from 
Guest et al (2006), who carried out a system atic analysis of their own 
data from a study of sixty (60) women. They examined codes developed 
from their sixty (60) interviews in an attempt to a ssess at which point 
their data were returning no new codes thereby signalling saturation. 
Their findings suggested that data saturation had occurred at a very 
early stage; of the thirty six (36) codes developed for their study, thirty- 
four (34) were developed after the first six (6) interviews; thirty-five (35) 
codes were developed after twelve (12) interviews; six (6) interviews 
yielded an incremental one (1) code. They concluded that for studies 
with a high level of homogeneity among the population, a sample of six  
(6) interviews may be sufficient to enable development of m eaningful 
them es, codes and useful interpretations. In conclusion, I am of the 
belief that there is sufficient support from the authors and proponents 
of qualitative research, to legitimise the framework, approach, m ethods 
utilised and to establish the number of interviews that in totality 
enables this research work to add to warranted knowledge.
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D a ta  D e p e n d a b ility  I s su e s
I believe, like Zikmund (2003), the general inductive approach does not
permit direct statistical validation as it would be within a quantitative
framework. However, there m ust be some attempt to validate and make
credible, the approach and the findings emanating from the data and to
make it available to other researchers in order to provide a better
understanding of how the research was conducted (Marshall and
Rossman, 2006). To assist with rigour, reliability and dependability,
Lincoln and Guba (1985) point to the necessity of an audit trail.
Johnson et al (2006) echoes similar advice through assessm ent criteria
when determining the value of qualitative managem ent research. Such
evaluation criteria according to Johnson et al (2006 p. 147) m ust
include "internally reflexive audit trails to determine credibility and
dependability.” Assurance for this was derived from the process I
utilised; recording of the interviews; transcription of the interviews with
editing its contents; submitting the transcripts to the informants for
their record, derivation of coding, reiteration of the process of
developing codes through multiple readings of each interview text;
identification of patterns, evidence of data redundancy from successive
interview texts and providing the codes, patterns and texts to an
independent researcher to assist in determining the validity of the
method to uncover the codes and patterns. Although Golafshani (2003
suggests, that a researcher should return to the informants and d iscu ss
the interpretation of the data with these participants following the
transcription and analysis of the data I did not think it necessary as
the interpretations were mine own and derived from the perceptions of
the research participants. Since the approach allowed for the
participants to receive the transcripts, it improves the reliability and
validity of the data in that it provided the respondents with the ability to
correct any of the related and recorded statem ents prior to its
interpretation. The recorded interviews are available to the University
in its electronic format as well as hard copies of the verbatim accounts
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that have been transcribed and used in the interpretation and analysis. 
These, I believe, are useful to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
qualitative data gathered within this research or what Thomas (2006) 
refers to as assessing trustworthiness. Important as well, is having 
another researcher also look at what has been derived from the 
interview texts. This procedure involved a capable researcher reading 
and examining the texts to corroborate the findings or interpretations 
that I derived from the interviews. Thomas (2006 p. 244) identifies what 
he refers to as a “check on clarity of categories” as part of the coding 
consistency checks, he posits that after the prime researcher has 
initially coded the data, a second researcher who is aware of the 
evaluation objectives, categories, description of these without the raw 
interview data. After perusing these the second coder w as given the 
interview texts that I had initially coded and he was asked to assign  
what he saw as relevant sections of the text to the categories that I had 
developed. A positive acknowledgement of the reasonableness of the 
interpretation forming the patterns and dim ensions of the texts was 
obtained from a competent researcher in the form of a tenured senior 
lecturer Dr. Roydon Salick. Dr. Salick’s lecturing career and
supervision of postgraduate theses (University of the West Indies, 
University of Manitoba, Canada and Dartmouth College, New
Hampshire, USA) augured well for the validity of his concurrence with 
the patterns, dim ensions and more importantly, the analytical process 
utilised.
P h ilo so p h ic a l O u tlo o k  an d  R e fle x io n
In my reflexion of the journey to find a resonating methodology I am  
reminded of my initial exposure to philosophical outlooks and
theoretical perspectives; these were at first daunting, perhaps no doubt 
because I was being introduced to the subject of philosophy. I, quite 
naturally, questioned its relevance to a Doctorate in B u siness
Administration. Pleasantly, however, within a short time, I saw  the
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wisdom of adopting a charitable embrace of the topic; a fairer 
understanding of its appropriateness and importance emerged. In 
Chapter Two, I indicated that I had developed an interest in 
understanding why corporate governance was the subject of many 
negative press reports within the state-owned company sector. When I 
decided that my research will address the issue of dilemmas, I naturally 
next thought as to how would I undertake this research? Agreeing with 
Creswell (1998) that a research framework is chosen dependent on and 
guided by the phenomenon under research, I strove to identify the 
theoretical perspective and methodology that resonated best with the 
aims of the research. However, this was not without angst and came 
after many bouts of reading m uch later on in the DBA programme. 
After examining a number of alternative perspectives and 
methodologies, I arrived at my research stance.
My readings took me through a number of research methodologies each  
being argued by its proponent for validity and justification for use. I 
looked at the boxes displayed by Creswell (1998), Johnson and 
Duberley (2000), all showing where a suitable research methodology 
could be located dependent on the researcher’s epistemology and 
ontology and where one was on a particular scale or model. There was 
no easy passage to finding the right box for me and so I believe that 
there is no easy retrofitting of a researcher’s perspective into existing 
boxes and models. Adding clarity was the fact that I obtained a crucial 
understanding through the illuminating work of Johnson and Clark 
(2006); in their Editors Introduction, mapping the research terrain, they  
described how philosophy impacts on research methodologies. They 
importantly point out that researchers cannot ju st in a haphazard or 
random manner pull a research method to satisfy a topic; rather, the 
research method m ust be guided by the research phenom enon and  
research questions. The applicability of appreciating the philosophical 
impact becomes evident as research m ethods carry philosophical
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baggage which affects what the researcher has under contemplation  
Johnson and Clark (2006).
At first pass, phenomenology as described by Creswell (1998), seem ed  
appropriate; the General Inductive Approach as described by Thomas 
(2006), also seem ed fitting, as did action research and grounded theory 
by Strauss and Corbin (1990). In the final analysis, the chosen  
methodology was influenced strongly by the research aim and my 
understanding of my epistemological stance in the context of the 
research aim and the approaches available. This understanding was 
crucial and made the choice of the general inductive approach or 
methodology m uch easier for me. Further, significant comfort for the 
use of ten (10) interviews to base my interpretation was derived from the 
work of Guest et al (2006) who in carried out a system atic analysis of 
their own data from a study of sixty (60) women and upon examination  
of the coding and them es derived concluded that six (6) interviews are 
perhaps appropriate if there is a high level of homogeneity in the 
population.
C o n c lu s io n
The proposed research has identified that there are dilemmas in 
corporate governance in the public sector in Trinidad and Tobago. The 
research is qualitative and involved the collection and analysis of texts; 
it has relied on the experiences of and practices of Chairmen who 
occupy a pivotal position in the discharge of corporate governance 
within the state-owned companies in Trinidad and Tobago. The 
research was informed by an interpretivist paradigm, employing a 
general inductive approach grounded in data derived from interview  
texts that allowed the development of meaningful patterns from the 
evidence base. Thus, the framework of the research com prises of 
analytical induction aligned to an objectivist epistemology within an  
interpretivist perspective. This qualitative research extended its
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findings to the whole population, th rough  insigh ts as to how individuals 
experience the phenom enon of corporate governance.
As Goulding (2002) outlines, while the general inductive approach  is no t 
a  quantitative  approach , it provides a  rigorous foundation for qualitative 
research  th a t creates a  specific s tru c tu re  to analyse the issu es  w ithin 
the research , w hich im proves the applicability of outcom es to the  
research  (Goulding, 2002). This s tru c tu re  both  reduces the influence of 
the personal views of the researcher and  provides a  clear and  
reproducible form at for the research  th a t  can  allow critical analysis of 
the research  by others. This m ethod is therefore consisten t w ith the  
pu rposes of the research  and  the field of study, and  p resen ts  a  valid 
option for the execution of the research  as proposed. The following 
diagram  moves from th a t p resen ted  earlier by Crotty (1998), w hich 
outlines for th is  researcher the four m ain questions in h eren t to any  
research  proposal.
Inherent in Philosophical
Theoretical Stance How We Strategy or Techniques or












Objectivism -  
Neo Empiricism
Epistemology
Figure 6: F ou r m ain  q u e s tio n s  in  R esea rch  P ro c ess
I believe th a t th is  chap ter h a s  provided a  clear rationale  for the  choice of 
the general inductive approach  as  an  appropria te  m ethodology for 
research ing  the  phenom enon of dilem m as of corporate governance in
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state-owned enterprises in Trinidad and Tobago. Importantly it 
identifies dilemmas and the chief causes as revealed by the 
interviewees. It is clear from the purpose of the research and the 
philosophical foundations of the researcher that the m ethods chosen  
clearly reflect the intended outcomes. Reassuringly, Crotty (1998) 
supports a m ost agreeable position whereby the order of what is 
considered is less important, what matters is the strength of the 
finished product.
Thus, the research approach that has been outlined is effective in 
uncovering the type of knowledge and understanding that I sought from 
the outset of my program, as well as in providing valuable insight for 
others within the area of corporate governance in state-owned  
companies within Trinidad and Tobago through the questions of: What 
is your understanding of corporate governance? What are your aim s of 
corporate governance? How is corporate governance perceived in the 
public sector companies? What are the institutions involved in the 
process of corporate governance? What is accountability in the public 
sector? What are the impediments to achieving corporate governance? 
What is risk management within corporate governance? The responses 
to these questions have provided a rich corpus of data.
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CHAPTER FOUR -  SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE-OWNED COMPANIES -  AN OVERVIEW
In tr o d u c tio n
This background chap ter exam ines how the G overnm ent of Trinidad 
and  Tobago or the S tate  cam e to have ow nership of state-ow ned 
com panies. B ecause th is  paper investigates the  existence of dilem m as, 
their cau ses and  proposed so lu tions w ithin Trinidad an d  Tobago, it is 
necessary  th a t it provide an  h istorical overview th a t su its  the  exigencies 
of th is thesis, th a t is, one th a t keeps as its cen tral focus the evolution of 
state-ow ned com panies. This provides a necessary  context w ithin 
w hich I aim  to show how slavery, inden tu re , and  colonialism  have 
im pacted on the b irth  and  developm ent of s ta te  en terp rises. Such  an  
overview becom es ever m ore u rg en t since, culturally , T rinidad an d  
Tobago is un ique  am ong C aribbean territories because of its racial and  
ethn ic  complexity. While it is unden iab le  th a t Trinidad and  Tobago is a 
p roduct of B ritish colonialism , slavery, inden tu re , and  capitalism , there  
is no need to begin a t the  beginning or a t the s ta rt of colonial conquest 
and  rule. While Spanish , F rench and  B ritish  colonialism  m akes sad  
and  b itter reading for T rinidadians, w hat is of prim ary in te res t here is 
the history  of the process of the evolution of the state-ow ned en te rp rises  
in Trinidad and  Tobago. Still, because so m any diverse th rea d s  m ake 
u p  the  h istorical and  social fabric of the nation , it is unw ise a n d  un fa ir 
to om it any; consequently , the chap ter, though  keeping its focus clear 
and  ever-present briefly in troduces the  inescapable s tra n d s  of the  
national weave. The sh o rt pieces aim  to provide a  m in im alist p ic tu re  of 
the is lan d ’s social and  economic history; m uch  is deliberately om itted, 
and  only th a t which is qu in tessen tia l to the p o rtra it is included.
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P o p u la tio n
According to 2010 estim ates, Trinidad and Tobago has a total 
population of 1.3 million with a median age of 33 years. East Indians 
or, more correctly, Indo-Trinidadians, form the major ethnic group by a 
slim margin (40.3%) followed by Afro-Trinidadians (37.5%) mixed 
(20.5%) and Chinese and “other” (comprised of Syrians, Lebanese, and 
Portuguese). The major religion is Roman Catholicism followed by 
Hinduism, Presbyterianism, Anglicanism, and Islam; the growing 
presence of the Orisha (Shouter) Baptists, and the Bobo Shanti attests 
to the complex creedal fabric of the island. Though the native tongue is 
an English-based creole with a lexicon that borrows freely from Chinese, 
French, Spanish, Amerindian dialects, Hindi, and English, the official 
language is Standard English. Based on the Central Statistical Office 
reports, Trinidad and Tobago enjoys a literacy rate of 98.6%, an  
excellent and enviable number as far as percentages go and when  
ranked against all countries.
Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from Britain, its last colonial 
master, in 1962. Despite gaining independence in 1962, m any of the old 
colonial ways remain, including issu es dealing with racism and ethnic 
disparities. The economy has fluctuated between thriving and 
experiencing a significant downturn in the 1980s. Today, not­
withstanding the global meltdown of 2009, Trinidad and Tobago 
remains one of the m ost prosperous Caribbean countries; m uch of this 
credit is owed to the fact that Trinidad has, based on its geography, 
access to energy-based resources. Despite its industrialization and  
developed-island status am ongst its Caribbean neighbors, Trinidad and 
Tobago continues to experience racial and ethnic problems; these  
problems have created controversy regarding state-owned enterprises.
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E co n o m y
As it stands, Trinidad and Tobago is an excellent investm ent site for 
international businesses and has one of the highest growth rates and  
per capita incom es in Latin America (Facts about Trinidad). Primary 
growth is due to investm ents in liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
petrochemicals and iron and steel. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago is 
the leading Caribbean producer of oil and gas and it also supplies 
manufactured goods as well as cem ent to the Caribbean region. The 
GDP for 2010 stands at about 21 billion US dollars. According to the 
CIA World Factbook, "oil and gas account for about 40% of GDP and 
80% of exports. National economic growth has been positive from 2000  
to 2008 with a negative growth rate in 2009 and projected flat growth 
for 2010.
B a ck g ro u n d  o f T rin id ad  and  T obago S o c ie ty
Since colonial times, slaves and indentured labourers have comprised 
the bulk of Trinidad and Tobago's productive working population. 
While emancipation of slavery was a channel for progress, the 
consequent changes engendered lasting hum an-rights conflicts 
specifically regarding the acquisition of labour by the plantation owners. 
Among the first providing labour for the plantations were the 
indigenous Amerindians; however, as an autochthonous body they were 
not as profitable as the colonial powers had hoped due to their extreme 
susceptibility to disease and inexperience in the plantation style of 
farming and agriculture. Whites also provided labour, but they were 
comprised mainly of Irish convicts who were inferior to English and  
Scottish labourers. However, obtaining white labourers became more 
difficult and as Williams (1944 p. 18) notes, "the need of the plantations 
outstripped the English convictions”. It was during this time circa early 
1800s that African slaves were introduced.
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According to Eric Williams, the author of Capitalism and Slavery  (1944), 
the first Premier and Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, slavery is 
one of the greatest contributors to the development of British 
capitalism. Williams asserts that “commercial capitalism of the 
eighteenth century was built up on slavery and monopoly, while the 
industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century destroyed slavery and  
monopoly” (xi). Economics, as Williams correctly describes, was at the 
root of slavery, British capitalism, the African slave trade, and 
emancipation and the triangular trade between England, North 
America, and the West Indies. This was crucial to the development of 
British industry and the subsequent Industrial Revolution (Williams). 
In the teeth of the prevailing thinking especially at Oxford, Williams 
daringly.argued that the im petus for the abolition of slavery was neither 
religious nor moral; it was economic.
Im p act o f S lavery  to  S o c ie ty  and  th e  E c o n o m y
The eighteenth-century colonial system  was based on monopoly and  
mercantilism. The system  changed, however, when it was discovered 
that the West Indian monopoly was hindering the progression of British  
capitalism. -It was during this period that the Caribbean underwent the 
greatest shift in dependency on the colonies and slavery. Prior to the 
discovery of the West Indian monopoly, British capitalism  ignored 
slavery and some defended it (Williams). When slavery no longer suited  
the needs of the British capitalists, they openly voiced their support of 
abolishing slavery. Essentially, here, economic and political powers 
influenced the direction of the Caribbean states' powers. By abolishing  
slavery, the British capitalists fared better economically.
After emancipation, a form of modernized slavery, as described by
several writers of history and sociology, was brought to the Caribbean,
particularly to Trinidad, British Guiana, and to a far lesser extent to
Jamaica, in 1843 in the form of indentured labour. The direct driver for
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this was the continued dependency of Caribbean countries on 
plantation economics and commodity production in the wake of 
emancipation. In order to make the plantations profitable once more, 
the plantocracy or plantation families had to obtain cheap and efficient 
labour, but the m ethods would have to be legal to avoid breaching 
policies associated with emancipation. As a result, the “new slave” was 
introduced. Indentured labour began arriving in the Caribbean through 
the colonial imports of overseas workers from Asia, specifically China 
and more importantly, India. Simply put, overseas recruiting was easy  
as the new labourers were seeking a change owing to a lack of 
opportunities, the impact of colonization, and increased population in 
their homeland. While economic reasons also played a role in the 
import of workers, some, especially the East Indians, agreed to. come to 
work in the Caribbean simply for the chance to make a new start 
(Haraksingh 2010). Therefore the indentured contract offered a form of 
escape from the squalid circumstances; bereft of opportunities in rural 
India, the indentured labourers saw a new beginning of promise in 
Trinidad and Tobago.
This sequence of events culminated, inevitably, at the aftermath of 
emancipation and indentureship in 1917 in the diversity of distinct 
social classes in present-day Trinidad and Tobago. As a result of 
slavery and the post-emancipation import of indentured workers, the 
social system  in Trinidad and Tobago was expanded into a three-tiered 
social structure, comprising the white upper class, the coloured middle 
class, and the bottom black class. By the m id-nineteenth century, 
however, Indian and Chinese workers comprised a fourth class  
(Brereton 1989). The tiered social structure experienced a number of 
shifts over the years including a shift of some of the upper white class  
to the middle class and of Indo-Caribbean and Sino-Caribbean 
individuals into the middle and upper social class (Brereton 1989). 
During the same period, the middle class experienced a significant
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increase as this tier shifted to also include Afro-Caribbean members. 
The shifting among the classes, however, helped improve the social 
experience of the middle class and increased prosperity for the long 
term (Brereton 1990). However, as Premdass (1996) points out, despite 
the four distinct social groups co-existing, there was not a common 
sense of citizenship and the inter-communal camaraderie m asks deep 
ethnic sectionalism. It is both insidious and agreeable that where a 
society does not have a shared belief, the political structures will 
inevitably be viewed with suspect interests and ethnic domination 
prevails in the elections process (Premdass, 1996).
It ought to be mentioned that the coming of the Canadian m issionaries 
to Trinidad ju st after the middle of the nineteen century helped to 
complicate the ethnic equation in the island and to make it unique 
among Caribbean territories. The m issionaries from the United Church 
of Canada came to evangelize and proselytize among the Hindu 
peasants contracted to work on the island’s many sugar-cane 
plantations. The Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church 
decades before the arrival of indentured labourers had opened its arms 
and sanctuary to the manumitted slaves. John Morton w as fluent in 
Hindi and spoke to the unlettered East Indians in their language about 
Christianity and the saving grace of Jesu s Christ. This made his work 
both easier and successful. An educated man, he saw the role of 
education in the conversion of the Hindus. With a mere handful of 
children, he started the CMI (Canadian Mission for Indians) in 1863 in 
Ierie Village. Morton and his colleagues were enormously successful: 
the Canadian Mission Church grew and so did the Canadian M ission for 
Indians schooling system. Speaking English and converting to 
Christianity opened doors for many adults and children: cane no longer 
had to be their destiny. The Canadian Mission school system  did not 
discriminate against those Indians who remained Hindu and Muslim; 
indeed for alm ost a century, the vast majority of Indo-Trinidadians of all
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faiths were educated by the Canadian Mission schools. Moreover, when  
the Hindu and Muslim schools first emerged in the 1950s, several of the 
first principals were retired Canadian Mission teachers. Many found 
jobs in the city, and many became teachers in CMI primary schools. 
The Canadian Mission started Naparima College in 1900 to cater to the 
needs of secondary education of the boys who graduated from their 
primary schools; a few years later Naparima Girls’ College was opened. 
The combination of a sound education based on Protestant religious 
values created an education system  that has for decades been in the 
vanguard of the island’s education. Today Presbyterian (the name was 
changed from Canadian Mission to Presbyterian in the 1960s) schools, 
both at the primary and secondary levels, outperform other 
denominational and Government schools. Ninety-nine percent of 
Presbyterians are Indo-Trinidadians, who have distinguished  
them selves in all walks of life.
To say that Trinidad and Tobago society has been shaped by those who 
were originally brought to the Caribbean as slaves or indentured  
workers is an understatement. It could therefore be claimed that the 
ethnic diversity that the immigrants brought with them is directly 
responsible for shaping the social and economic landscape of Trinidad 
and Tobago. In the end, the colonial powers that worked to keep  
slavery alive were ultimately unsuccessfu l in placing barriers on the 
new population. Because Trinidad and Tobago changed colonial hands 
many times, the social mixture of white m asters, descendants of slaves 
and indentured labourers makes it a unique nation.
P o lit ic a l P arty  F o rm a tio n  and  In flu e n c e
Historically, the Spanish and British colonial powers instilled
dependence on politics and government for resources and economic
opportunities (Robinson). It is a truism, therefore, to say that at the
hands of the colonial powers Trinidad and Tobago became utterly
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dependent on slave labour to sustain its economy. Even after 
independence in 1962, race and politics continued to be a major issue. 
About forty years before independence, in 1921, the British lead a 
comm ission with the intent of having the Legislative Council elected by 
the people; however, only property owners could vote. The imbalance 
among voters ensured an outcome favourable to the desired political 
rule favourable to the plantocracy. This persisted for several years and 
the first Adult Franchise election was held some 21 years later under 
the premise that only two more representatives were to be elected by the 
people of Trinidad and Tobago. The outcome of the new election, 
however, was a disaster because of "spoiled ballots” resulting from 
illiteracy and ignorance of the voting procedure. It would be another 
twelve years before Trinidad and Tobago got its first party government. 
The first political party the People’s National Movement (PNM), was 
formed under the leadership of Dr. Eric Williams in 1956. In 1959, Dr. 
Eric Williams became Premier, and Trinidad and Tobago got its first 
Cabinet Government with full internal self-government to follow two 
years later. Williams became the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and  
Tobago following independence in 1962; he retained the highest political 
office until his death in 1981 (US Department of State).
I believe that since then, politicians have been capitalizing on the 
implications of slavery and indentureship. Since their emergence, 
political parties in Trinidad and Tobago have been formed along Indian 
and African ethnic lines. The two dominant political parties today, the 
People’s National Movement (PNM) is predominantly Afro (Afro- 
Trinidadians) and the United National Congress (UNC) is comprised  
mainly of Indo (Indo-Trinidadians) constituents. Independence in 1962  
resulted in sustained political mobilization, and ethno-political 
mobilization has continued and increased over the years. During 
Williams’s time as Prime Minister, the structure of government and 
business merged in many industries, leading to many state-owned
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industries and companies. A significant precursor to the emergence of 
a catalyst of state ownership of companies in Trinidad and Tobago is 
the oil crisis of the 1970s.
Arab Oil E m bargo Im p a c ts  T rin id ad  and  T obago
The onset of the Arab oil embargo (1973-1974) was a major advantage 
for the Williams government still ruling since independence. As oil 
prices increased, the government became financially comfortable 
(Trumbore, 2002). Although there remained many concerns about 
political practices of the PNM, they were not expressed because the 
economy was awash with “petro-dollars” and doing extremely well 
leading to a national phrase ubiquitously heard “money is no problem”. 
Instead, voters continued to support Williams. Trinidad and Tobago's 
GDP continued to rise and so did those seeking to gain a part of the 
new financial “pie” (Meditz, 1987). However, by 1975, about 45 ,000  
people were involved in worker strikes and the impact of which w as felt 
during the 1976 national general election. There seem ed to be no single 
political movement that could embrace successfully the diverse 
ethnicities of the working class in Trinidad and Tobago. A number of 
unions were in force and African-dominated groups joined forces with 
East Indian-dominated unions. According to Meditz:
• The African-dominated OWTU joined the East Indian-dominated 
All Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers Trade Union 
(ATSE/FWTU), the Trinidadian Islandwide Cane Farmers' Union, 
and left-of-center intellectuals to form the United Labour Front 
(ULF).
• Positioning itself as the representative of the working class, the 
ULF called for land reform, nationalization of multinational firms, 
and worker participation in management; however, ethnic
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m istrust soon reared itself as the working-class Africans feared 
that East Indians would control any ULF-led government.
• The ULF was also hurt by the perception that the party was 
communist, a view that Williams exploited by promising to 
preserve individual landownership and capitalism.
• The response to Williams’s promises w as the PNM’s receiving 24 
of 36 seats in 1976. The two remaining seats were received by the 
DAC, a Tobagonian-based party.
• In 1980, the DAC proposed the Tobago House of Assembly Bill in 
an effort to lobby for regional autonomy for Tobago and the 
reinstatem ent of its legislative body. The DAC won two thirds of 
the seats. (Meditz)
Williams continued to increase his power: even the sm allest decisions 
were referred to him. During this time, Williams created the National 
Advisory Council (NAC) comprised of individuals chosen by Williams. 
The NAC, as it turns out, as a result of the Arab Oil embargo was 
responsible for setting the stage for the state-owned enterprises 
recognized today. Specifically, the NAC planned the national 
bureaucracy and also masterminded the increasing government 
participation in the economy (Meditz, 1987). As a result of the Arab oil 
embargo and the newly formed NAC per-capita income increased and 
unemployment decreased. The increased revenue was used  to further 
boost the economy, leading to increased state spending and the creation 
of more than 50 state-owned companies. At this juncture it is critical to 
understand how the State came to own these companies. The NAC w as 
referred to as Williams’s think-tank made up of academ ics, high 
powered representatives of the technocratic elite, and cabinet m inisters 
(MacDonald, 1987). The NAC, in effect, became the vehicle by which  
Williams was able to direct and control the nation’s economic 
development through state ownership of companies.
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As alluded to earlier, ownership by the Government of state-owned  
companies is historically linked to the petroleum-based initiatives and 
development that occurred in the late 1960s. At its root is the 1945  
Commission set up by the British known as the Moyne Commission 
which recommended that British West Indian economies remain 
agricultural-based (Holton, p. 131). A Colonial Office Committee, in 
1952, in examining the Trinidad and Tobago Colonial Government 
policy of “Industrialization by Invitation”; (a policy which used tax 
exemptions to encourage investm ents from the USA) endorsed previous 
British views that the economy should be agrarian based. This view  
was, however, diametrically opposed by a St. Lucian living in Trinidad 
and Tobago, Dr. W. Arthur Lewis, who opposed the findings of the 1952  
Commission (Lewis went on to win the Nobel Prize in Economics while 
at Princeton University). Dr. Lewis adopted the view that 
industrialization was the only long term solution to avoid serious 
unemployment which would arise from rapid population growth and low 
productivity. Not unexpectedly, the British Government opposed Dr. 
Lewis’s recommendations and continued to hold that the agricultural 
sector could be made efficient.
On September 24, 1956, the political party headed by Dr. Eric Williams, 
the People’s National Movement (PNM) won 13 of the 24 Legislative 
Council seats in Trinidad. With his ascension to Chief Minister, 
Williams adopted the model promulgated by Dr. Lewis which focused on 
overcoming problems of low productivity, low incomes, standard of 
living and employment. He ordered as part of his Party’s development 
program a “Pioneer Industry Plan” which to Williams w as to be the  
linchpin in overcoming the country’s underdevelopment. However, 
denial by the British for funding of this program scuttled W illiams’s 
plans and led to his seeking alternative funding in the form of US 
investm ent to cover the total of WI$ 275 million of the developm ent 
plan. The m echanism  for the funding, as we come to the genesis of how
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the state became involved in company ownership, was the oil industry 
in Trinidad. Oil and petroleum- based resources would be continually 
emphasized by Williams and his successors of the PNM as the key 
driver of Trinidad’s economic progress. However, Williams’s desire to 
develop Trinidad m eant that the foreign investment supplied to Trinidad 
came from the oligopolistic players dominating the oil and  
petrochemical sector since 1957, namely, Texaco, Shell and BP which, 
combined owned 98% of Trinidad and Tobago’s oil production and  
100% of its oil refining capacity (Holton, p. 144).
During the ensuing decade, the oil industry in Trinidad and Tobago 
would experience significant upheavals. A key change was the 
destination of exports which had which had changed, understandably, 
from Britain to the USA, given the resistance of the British to the w ishes 
of Williams for development of the country. As an example, oil and 
petroleum products exports moved from WI$ 392 million in 1959 to WI$ 
550 million in 1965 (Holton, 1994, p. 149). During this time, the 
exports to the USA moved from WI$ 83 million to WI$ 294 million over 
the same period. In its bid to keep and more so attract big nam es to 
Trinidad and Tobago the Government did not realize the long term  
benefits from the investm ents (Holton, 1994, p. 161) in the oil sector. 
That is to say, while foreign investm ents increased oil revenues was not 
proportionally represented in Government revenues as total oil revenues 
fell from 37% to 25% from 1957 to 1969 (Holton, 1994, p. 162). 
Contrary to Williams’s thoughts, the oil sector did not become the 
saviour engine in the manner he had hoped for and so the 
Government’s policy of “Industrialization by invitation” passed on little 
benefits to the country up to the period 1969. Subsequent labour 
movement calls for increased wages in the face of lower oil production 
and rising disenchantm ent by the oligopoly with Trinidad and Tobago’s 
government policies led to strikes by the Union. This had the effect of 
having the oil companies, and some would say that the oil com panies
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engineered this, requesting Government to intervene in the disputes. 
As Holton (1994) points out, Government did not accede to this and 
m ost probably saw its reliance on foreign capital as anathem a, 
quixotically as this reliance placed Government in a weakened position  
vis a vis the dem ands from the providers of the capital.
A key and pivotal complaint by the Trinidad and Tobago Government 
was the reluctance or apathy on the part of the multi-national oil and 
petrochemical companies to pass on knowledge and know-how of 
system s and technology to local managem ent (Holton, p. 176). This was 
seen, and justifiably so, by the Trinidad and Tobago Government, as 
perpetuating a reliance on foreign companies know how perhaps 
creating key-man dependencies. Thus when BP requested  
nationalization in 1969, unsurprisingly, only a handful of Trinidad and  
Tobago nationals were deemed capable of managing in a Government- 
owned oil company. As a further example, WR Grace, a m ulti-national 
company, owned 100% of the chemical fertilizer industry, consequently  
they wielded prodigious am ounts of power over the economy and by  
extension the Government (Holton, p. 177). By 1969, Williams again 
had the oil sector featured in the country's third five-year development 
plan as he went on to invite a new US corporation, Tesoro Petroleum  
Corporation of Texas, USA, to manage and operate BP’s newly 
nationalized assets. Government abandoned Dr. Lewis’s model and  
adopted a new model referred to as the Third Way, which w as the 
platform for the public-sector parlay into the development of Trinidad 
and Tobago. John O’Halloran, the then Minister of Petroleum and  
Mines, explained to the population that he chose Tesoro because of 
their experience in land-based oil recovery. This proved to be untrue as  
a bribe of two million US dollars paid to O’Halloran remains a scathing  
indictment of the Minister’s honesty and commitment to the national 
interest.
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The Third Way, as reported on by Holton (1994), was based on plans for 
a third type of development. This Third Way was essentially a middle 
path between the traditional nationalization and the capitalist 
corporation. It relied on a strategy based on the old British Fabian 
socialist doctrine of taking over the commanding heights of the economy 
(Lewis, 1996). It was aimed at state-sector participation with at least 
51% participation of the State in selected enterprises. Its primary aim  
was to place decision-making in the hands of nationals. This is 
essentially located in Williams’s belief that the private sector (Holton, 
p. 199) could not be fully relied upon to deliver the required economic 
growth and distribution of national income. Therefore, the government 
was to be the avenue to achieve uplift in the economy (Govt of TT 
Budget Speech 1972 -  Govt Printery 1972, p. 11). This belief was 
strengthened by the situation perpetuated by the oil companies: the 
local labour force could not assim ilate the technology of highly technical 
industries. (See Govt of TT White Paper #2 On Public Sector 
Participation In Industry Pos -  Govt Printery 1972). According to the 
White Paper of 1972, the Government was identified as the prime mover 
in the national economy to extend local control and maximize national 
development through foreign investment, as indicated in the following 
table:
Number of Companies participating
State ownership 1972 1974 1983 2010
100% state owned 4 12 34 44
Majority state owned 10 11 14 12
Minority owned 7 9 17 5
Totals 21 32 32 61
Figure 7: State Owned C om panies
In 1972, the government had ownership participation in 21 com panies. 
This participation increased with the advent of increased oil prices 
beginning at the end of 1973. Government’s thrust w as on the
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development of technical and managerial capabilities at the local level. 
In 1974, one of the wholly owned state companies in the form of 
TRINTOC was formed to take over the oilfields and refinery of Shell 
Trinidad. (E. Williams Address to the Nation 27 June 1974, press 
release # 327, 28 June 1974).
As laudable and progressive as the establishm ent of TRINTOC was, it 
unfortunately contributed to the widening of the gap between Indo- 
Trinidadians and non-Indo-Trinidadians. Lloyd Best, considered by 
many to be a m ost incisive West Indian economist, candidly and forcibly 
argues that:
"citizens of African and mixed descent were made to feel that 
the continuation of preferential access to resources, both 
material and symbolic was dependent on the preservation of 
PNM rule. The Afro-Trinidadian was demonstrably unwilling 
to share public resources and symbolic space with other 
ethnic groups, not only because they regarded them  to be 
their legitimate and prescriptive right by reason of their 
historical presence in the territory and the greater proximity 
of their culture and patterns of behaviour to the super  
ordinate colonial culture by which norms are referenced.”
This is a widely held and popular belief that is well substantiated and  
crystallized by Best, an Afro-Trinidadian who in his writings put 
national interests ahead of sectarian concerns. Today, one sees that 
the number of state owned com panies is alm ost the sam e as that of 
thirty years ago.
T rin id ad  an d  T obago a fter  W illiam s
After Williams’s death in 1981, the new election brought a new political 
party, the Organisation for National Reconstruction (ONR), headed by a
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former Minister PNM Minister, Hudson-Phillips. The party focused on 
government inefficiency and demanded m assive state capitalism  
decrease (Meditz, 1987). The attractiveness of the party was its initial 
attempt "to appeal to a cross-section of voters, including black and East 
Indian workers as well as all groups in the middle class” (Meditz, 1987). 
Other parties attempted to form a new party but they were unsuccessfu l 
and broke up over ethnic divisions. Despite the fact that only 30% of 
registered voters voted for the PNM, the PNM won the 1981 election, 
putting a reluctant George Chambers in charge of the new government. 
Indo-Trinidadians were incredulous when Kamalludin Mohammed, the 
m ost senior PNM Minister was passed over; many still believe that it 
was only because he was Indo-Trinidadian that he was bypassed. 
Williams had taught his followers well, the large Afro-base in the PNM 
could not conceive of m uch less accept an Indo-Trinidadian as leader or 
Prime Minister.
The praxis of ethnic politics within the party system  in Trinidad and 
Tobago is largely responsible for the political disparity that exists. 
Politics has long been linked to ethnic alignment, evident in the 
formation of PNM by Williams, an Afro-Trinidadian and of the UNC by 
Basdeo Panday, an Indo-Trinidadian. The twenty-three-year rule of the 
PNM ended in 1986 when the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR) captured 33 of 36 electoral seats in the country. The NAR, made 
up of the disaffected Afro-Trinidadian population, the Indo-led party, 
the United Labour Front (ULF), targeted both Afro-Trinidadians and 
Indo-Trinidadians in the run-up to the elections. However, following 
A.N.R. Robinson taking the position of Prime Minister, the NAR began to 
break down when the Indo-component, the ULF, withdrew in 1988. 
Basdeo Panday, leader of the ULF, went on and formed the new  
opposition with the United National Congress (UNC) (US Department of 
State).
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Ethnicity and politics in Trinidad and Tobago have long been involved in 
a strong but insidious marriage. In 1991, the “one love” or “rainbow” 
NAR lost control of the government to the Afro-based PNM with the 
Panday-led Indo-based UNC finishing second, subsequently replacing 
the NAR as chief opposition party. In constitutionally due elections in 
1995, both the PNM and UNC won 17 seats and the NAR won two seats. 
The Indo-based UNC joined forces with the Afro-based Tobagonian 
Party, the NAR, forming the new government, and Panday became the 
first Prime Minister of East Indian descent. When the UNC won the 
general elections in 1995, it m eant that, for the first time since the 
introduction of general elections (a period of 39 years) an Indo-based 
party had secured political ascendancy and that the nation had its first 
Indo-Trinidadian Prime Minister. This would have been a difficult time 
for Afro-Trinidadians, some of whom had for a change supported a non- 
Afro-Trinidadian party and many of whom feared the worst from an  
Indo-Trinidadian government. That fear increased when they realized 
that those who formerly were interested in professional stability and 
economic strength now had political power as well. It w as not a 
combination to be taken lightly or to be trusted. The country entered 
another potentially exciting and problematic phase in its ethnic 
evolution. For some it seemed the best of times, for others the worst of 
times. A change in the distribution of control had occurred. This adds 
to an already complex and arguably colourful introduction of how the 
major races came to be in Trinidad and Tobago.
Despite the UNC’s return to power in five years later in 2000, it fell in 
2001 “with the defection of three of its parliamentarians, and the 
subsequent elections resulted in an 18-18 split between the UNC and 
the PNM” (US Department of State). The tum ultuous tim es experienced 
by the UNC Government was largely attributed to the frequent 
allegations of corruption and attendant disaffection by a huge section of 
the population. The then President of the country, A.N.R. Robinson,
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previous leader of the NAR and previous Prime Minister, against the 
accepted practice of the Commonwealth of asking the incum bent to 
form the Government, appointed the leader of the PNM to form 
government in the 18-18 hung election. The Afro-Trinidadian President, 
appointed by Panday, in an attempt to rationalize his m om entous 
decision cited “moral and spiritual values”; his explanation is still 
regarded by many as egregious sophistry. In the 2002 elections, the 
predominantly Afro-based PNM formed the next government with a 20- 
lb  majority. The PNM won the 2007 elections but was defeated in April 
2010 by the coalition of mainly the UNC and COP (Congress of the 
People). Ironically, the reasons for the defeat of the PNM were entirely 
similar to the reasons when the UNC w as removed in 2002, significant 
allegations of corruption and arrogance in the affairs of the country. A 
further irony is that the success relied on the coalition of the UNC and 
COP, two pedominantly Indo-based parties. The victory of the coalition 
gave the nation its first woman prime minister, Mrs. Kamla Persad- 
Bissessar, an Indo-Trinidadian, who a year before had succeeded  
Basdeo Panday as leader of the UNC.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the ethnically mixed society does not respond  
well to the W estminster model of elections. Ethnic fractionalization is 
apparent in the political culture and ethnic-political mobilization 
underm ines social cohesion by excluding the losing party and its ethnic 
constituents. The disparities have led to increased public distrust and 
widespread allegations of corruption. These perceptions subsequently  
tainted the reputation of the majority ethnic group holding office. 
Segmented political participation has also led to allegations of 
corruption related to issu es of social exclusion. Instead of being viewed 
as a government for Trinidad and Tobago, governments are viewed as 
governments for a particular political party. There is little collaboration 
because of the isolation of opposition supporters from the decision­
making process.
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W hat d id  th e  n e w  p ow er m e a n  to  th e  ra ces?
As a general rule in Trinidad and Tobago, Afro-Trinidadians 
predominate in the bureaucracy, which is a direct result of Afro- 
Trinidadians being the numerically dominant population during the two 
decades following independence. Afro-Trinidadians became active in  
government and politics and the Afro-political block held power for the 
majority of the 30 years following independence, which saw the 
exclusion of other ethnicities. Furthermore, the predominant race 
involved in government and politics enjoyed more lucrative economic 
benefits.
Historically, power sharing has been a problem for Trinidad and 
Tobago, even after independence. Though shift has been from a 
government comprised mostly of Afro-Trinidadians to one of Indo- 
Trinidadian leaders, the quality of politics remains unchanged. 
Attempts at democracy have been met with struggles linked to those in 
power, those desiring power, and those simply wanting equality. 
According to Holton (1994, p.64) in 1965, Sir Arthur Lewis assigned  
democracy a two-fold definition: “The primary meaning is that all who 
are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in 
making that decision, either directly or through representatives. Its 
secondary meaning is that the will of the majority will prevail”. 
However, Lewis further explains that the definition is m utually exclusive 
whereby one or the other will prevail. Politics in Trinidad and Tobago 
has historically assum ed the winner-take-all approach. Lewis also 
contends that the exclusion of the losing group from the decision­
making process cannot be in the best interest of democracy.
While the new power and its related changes have improved the
government, the changes are far from complete. In fact, the racial and
ethnic disparities have only shifted. Today, “the state of Black Trinidad
and Tobago is not as good as it ought to be” (Cudjoe, n.d.).
100
state-owned companies -  an overview
C o n c lu s io n
The foregoing overview reveals several elem ents that may impact the 
state of corporate governance in the public sector in Trinidad and 
Tobago. Slavery, indenture, and British colonialism created the recipe 
for ethnic disparity and mistrust; when local politics was added to the 
mix, the result was a hodge-podge of problems ranging from rank 
discrimination to uneasy tolerance between the two ethnic groups. The 
formation of state-owned companies by Dr. Eric Williams simply m eant 
that his favourites would be placed in the positions of authority and 
power; he was an Afro-Trinidadian, who according to Selwyn Ryan, was 
not incapable of displaying racist tendencies against Indo-Trinidadians, 
whom he branded “the recalcitrant minority.” His twenty-five years in 
power saw hundreds of Afro-Trinidadians appointed to the Boards of 
state-owned companies; of course, there were expectedly a few token  
Indo-Trinidadians appointed to appease and hoodwink the population. 
The changes in government since 1956 sadly have not impacted 
significantly or positively on the m anagem ent of entities in the public 
sector; the ethnic disparity, the allegations of corruption, the constant 
calls for dism issals of state-board members continue to be seen and 
heard. This m orass will continue as long as politicians place sectarian  
concerns ahead of the national interest.
The aftermath of emancipation and indentureship lead to the diversity 
of distinct social classes. As a result of slavery, including the post­
emancipation import of indentured workers, the States’ social system  
was expanded into a three-tier social structure, comprised of the white 
upper class, the colored middle class, and the bottom black class. The 
shifting among the classes, however, helped improve the social 
experience of the middle class and increased prosperity for the long­
term (Brereton 1990). Despite the improvements, the impact slavery 
had on the middle and bottom classes were still felt in the form of
poverty, underdevelopment and imbalance in the trade of resources.
101
state-owned companies -  an overview
Historically economics and politics have shaped all facets of Trinidad 
and Tobago life and the same factors combined with racial issu es have 
sparked controversy and violence. Shortly after the achievem ent of 
independence, the formation of state-owned enterprises was catalysed  
by the petroleum initiative of the 1960s, which was a local response to 
the Arab Oil Crisis. As a general rule in Trinidad and Tobago, Afro- 
Trinidadians predominate in the bureaucracy, which is a direct result of 
Afro-Trinidadians as the numerically dominant population after 
independence. Although, the Afro-Trinidadians became active in 
government and politics and the Afro-political block held power for the 
majority of the 30 years following independence, the emergence and 
ascension of an Indo-Trinidadian party to government broke the image 
of exclusion of other ethnicities to the power of government and political 
office.
In summary, when one considers the facts of the country’s geo-political 
and socio-economic makeup; significant energy producer, literacy rate, 
according to UNICEF of 99%, non-violent history, peaceful co-existence 
of two (2) major races, relatively high level of GDP and per capita 
income, ranked at number 38 by the World Bank: the evidence suggests  
that the country p ossesses the necessary elem ents to achieve and 
demonstrate a leadership level of governance consistent with acceptable 
practices. A society possessing these fundam entals and enviable 
elem ents, surely, m ust be able to effect governance that keeps 
congruence of all its other claims of progression.
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CHAPTER FIVE -  INTERVIEWS -  INTERPRETATION
In tr o d u c tio n
In this key chapter I have offered analysis and interpretation based on 
the ten (10) interviews conducted and then transcribed, read and re­
read multiple times. The interview readings were then coded and  
subjected to interpretation. Importantly, and consistent with the 
research methodology, these interviews in their transcribed format have 
been examined by a second reviewer as part of the research process. 
The research has revealed patterns that offer a rich understanding of 
why dilemmas persist in the discharge of corporate governance. The 
research is sim ultaneously rewarding as it has revealed patterns that 
are uniquely described as pericentric, centripetal and centrifugal; these  
appropriately capture and describe the interpretations resident in the 
rich corpus of data.
The research methodology approach I employed is described as a 
general inductive approach, outlined in Chapter Three; the research is 
qualitative in nature and rests on an interpretivist theoretical 
perspective. The research method relies largely on interviews based on 
sem i-structured questions designed to obtain the participants’ 
understandings of corporate governance. Consistent with the 
phenom enon of dilemmas of corporate governance that I had set about 
to research as stated in the aim s in Chapter One, the interview  
questions were designed to capture the following:
• Understanding of what corporate governance m eans
• Perception of how corporate governance works in Trinidad and 
Tobago
• Impediments to corporate governance
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• The understanding of risk m anagement as part of the governance 
process
• Understanding of accountability within the state-owned  
companies and how it works
The questions were, therefore, structured to guide the interview for
maximum coverage of the key areas; even when participants strayed
from directly answering the question, they provided information that I
found useful. The overall thrust of the questions allowed for
consistency or consistent views and perceptions for the subsequent
analysis. The transcribed interviews were then decoded into a matrix,
explained in Chapter Three, which was studied over a twelve-month
period. As outlined in that chapter, a key feature of the research
process was the extraction or identification of key phrases, statem ents,
allied phrases and key words. The analysis of what the informants were
providing in the texts started to make sense only after several readings.
I read the first interview at least six tim es before I started to draw out
key words from the text. Then, I examined the second informant’s text
and looked for similarities and differences between both. This process
allowed me to place more phrases into the matrix thereby allowing the
early semblance of a pattern. The detailed reading of each interview
text, the extraction of words from the text, and the comparison took on
what appeared at first to be an endless cycle. However, it w as only
through the very act of immersion in this cycle of the reading of the data
that meaningful patterns and them es began to emerge. Although I am
not using the grounded theory approach as proposed by Glaser and
Strauss (1967) in some ways it appeared to feel like a constant
comparative. Locke (2001) posits that it is a pragmatic approach for
business research. Martin and Turner (1986) label this approach as a
system atic one allowing for the formation of theories while the research
is being done, a statem ent that I find particularly innocuous as it does
not provide a compelling reason to use or discard. More revealing is
Alvesson and Skolberg’s (2000) account of the methodology’s focus
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being on the uncovering of theory, w ith the non-accom panim ent of an  a  
priori. I consider the h u n ch  th a t I possessed  and  the anecdotal 
evidence th a t I relied on and  influenced my research  sufficient a priori. 
My decision to stay  the course w ith T hom as’s (2006) general inductive 
approach  w as also influenced by G oulding’s (2002) a sse rtions th a t 
grounded theory canno t be u sed  if p re-search  lite ra tu re  h a s  been done, 
a  ta sk  th a t I had  perform ed prior to th ink ing  th rough  the  m ethodology.
F igure 8: G enera l a p p ro a ch  to  T ex tu a l A nalysis
The research  experience h as  certainly affirmed the affinity I developed 
for the general inductive approach. In th is  regard, Thom as (2006) 
correctly identified the outcom e of the  research  analysis as p a tte rn s , 
them es or categories m ost relevant to the research  objectives. So, the 
p a tte rn s , them es, and  codes derive from the reading an d  re-read ing  of 
the interviews. Developing a  m atrix  contain ing  key w ords an d  p h rases  
u sed  by the inform ants provided an  appropria te  m eans of decoding the 
interview texts. The key w ords in conjunction  w ith allied p h ra se s  
helped to suggest and  reaffirm  p a tte rn s , the d im ensions of w hich are 
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G en eral In d u c tiv e  A p p roach  -  P r o c e s s  D iagram
The diagram below shows the process steps in the distillation of the 
interview tests. Several forensic headings of the texts were necessary to 









R ead and re-read 
notes
Interview texts
Matrix of phrases, 
key words, key 
sta tem ents
Patterns or m ode 
of thought 
assum ptions; key 
groupings
Dimensions to patterns 
Risk m anagem ent vacuum
Preliminary identification of 
key values
Political interference 
Basic two race party system  
Political appointm ents 
Party hacks
R e fer en ce  to  In te r v ie w e e s
The interviewee statem ents are used within the Chapter to support the 
interpretation that is derived. Where extracts of the interviewee notes
are used, the reader is guided to the interview by use of a reference to 
the Interviewee, e.g. /#7 -  Refers to Interview #7. This allows the reader 
to check the veracity, validity, and applicability of the interpretations 
offered by either examining the statem ent lifted from the informant’s 
text or the interview in its entirety.
The preservation of anonymity of the interviewees formed part of the 
research methodology and was declared to the interviewees prior to 
obtaining their agreement for being interviewed. However, I feel it 
necessary, without the risk of compromising the promise of anonymity, 
to convey to the reader basic and broad information that provides an 
indication of the interviewees positions, their organisations of everyday 
employ and the nature of the state-owned entities they served as non­
executive Chairpersons. The following table highlights the salient 
information; the first column indicates the interviewee number e.g. #7  
corresponding to the interviewee comments, the second colum n  
describes, broadly, the full-time position held by the interviewee in their 
executive capacity while the third column provides a deliberately vague 




Interviewee Position and 
Organisation of Regular 
Employment
Nature of State Owned 
Enterprise
#1 Senior Management Rank -  
International Financial 
Services Organisation
Provision of major medical 
services to citizens
#2 Vice President -  major Multi­
national Corporation
Provision of medical and 
regulatory services too citizens
#3 Founder and CEO of 
integrated Engineering and 
Maintenance Company






Interviewee Position and 
Organisation of Regular 
Employment
Nature of State Owned 
Enterprise
#4 Managing Director -  British 
and Trinidad Joint Venture 
Company to energy industry
Provision of Maintenance 
Services to National Security 
Organisations
#5 President -  major 
multinational corporation
Services and transportation in 
maritime industry




#7 Vice President -  multinational 
corporation -  natural 
resources
Provision of services to 
education sector
#8 Project Manager and 
Governance Office -  
Multinational Corporation
Provision of financial services to 
public
#9 Owner/Director -  Information 
Technology Company
Provision of construction and 
infrastructural services to all 
sectors of government
#10 Leader -  Government 
Organisation
Provision of services to citizens 
in utility sector
The interpretations I have offered and the consequential patterns that 
were derived are based on what these interviewees have stated in 
response to questions asked on their views of corporate governance, 
risk management and accountability.
A rriv ing th e  C ircle  o f G o v ern a n ce
The patterns that I refer to in later sections of this thesis and which  
form one of the three contributions was not at first evident; the concept 
of the circle w as not planned and emerges after m uch mulling over the  
contents on the interview texts while literally playing with a pencil and a
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sheet of paper w ith the  words "corporate governance” w ritten on the 
page. At one point I circled the w ords "corporate governance” and  after 
staring  a t it for several m inu tes, it saw it as a  circle w ith governance a t 
the centre as show n in the following diagram .
W ith th is lone circle and  on reflection of w hat w as being in terp reted  
from the interview tex ts as I read, re-read , analysed an d  in terp reted , it 
fu rther appeared  to me th a t there  w as a  directional flow of com m ents 
being m ade by the interviewees; a  m ovem ent away from the corporate 
governance a t the centre, show n in the next diagram .
Upon fu rther exam ination, doodling w ith the circle it occurred  to me 
th a t I could, borrowing from the engineering lexicon, nam e th is  
m ovem ent away from the desired centre a s  it appeared  to be a 
centrifugal m ovem ent; herein  we find the  centrifugal; aligned to the 





Moving from th e  C entre
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strik ing  feature of th is  discovery w as the application of the 
in te rp re ta tions of perception of the  inform ants; these appeared  to move 
tow ards the corporate governance centre, show n in the diagram  below.
CG
Centripetal 
Moving to the Centre
E nth u sed  by th is  discovery, I began exploring for a  word th a t  b est 
describes moving tow ards or seeking the  centre; here the  lexicon of 
geology provided the word centripetal.
At th is  point I had  the beginning of two p a tte rn s , I tho u g h t th a t  I h ad  
arrived a t a  con tribu tion  to describing how the practice of corporate  
governance and  its u n d ers tan d in g  related  to the corporate governance 
centre: the cognition and  the  perception. However, a t the  po in t of 
u n d ers tan d in g  the centripetal, seeking the centre, w hat also it em erged 
from the iterative readings and  in te rp re ta tions of the tex ts appeared  to 
be a barrie r to actually  achieving the  centre. This barrier w as located in 
the u se  of the p h rases “political”, “politics”, “it’s ju s t  the  politics”, 
“politician” and  words related to politics. This p a tte rn  I initially nam ed  
the political p a tte rn  b u t I soon realized th a t I needed a  com m on 
nom enclature  to align to the  two p a tte rn s  and  so, encouraged  
encouraged by the utility of the w ords centrifugal and  cen tripe ta l I 
sought the  m eaning of th a t w hich preven ts the a tta in m en t of the  centre; 
th u s  the nam ing of the th ird  pa ttern ; the pericentric w hich borrow s 
from the m edical lexicon and  describes som ething w hich p reven ts the
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attainm ent of the centre, pertaining to a pericenter, deposited around a 
centre (http://ww w.wordnikcom /words/pericentric - accessed October 
2 6 , 2012 ) .
The nomenclatural alignment was complete; the corporate governance 
circle, the centre; the centrifugal, that which moves away; the 
centripetal, that which moves towards the centre; the pericentric, that 
which prevents the attainment of the centre.
D eriv in g  th e  P a tte r n s  an d  D im e n s io n s
Patterns essentially arise from and represent the manner in which I 
have structured opinions and sentim ents after multiple readings of the 
informants’ texts. The forensic readings of the interview texts and 
multiple passes at interpretations eventually revealed three key 
patterns: the centrifugal, centripetal, and pericentric. The research is 
sim ultaneously rewarding as it has allowed me to appropriately and 
uniquely, using the metaphor of the circle, label the patterns as 
centrifugal, those comm ents and statem ents that move away from the 
corporate governance centre or away from the centric; centripetal, those  
comments and statem ents that move to the corporate governance centre 
and the pericentric, those comm ents that stifle and retard the 
organisation’s safe passage to the corporate governance centre. While 
the two other patterns, centrifugal and centripetal, indicate m ovement 
away from and towards the centre, the pericentric is stationary, inert 
but substantial, surrounding the centre. These metaphors allowed me 
to capture and describe the interpretations resident in the data.
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Figure  10: The C o rp o ra te  G overnance  P a t te rn s
F urther, these  p a tte rn s  com prise dim ensions of corporate governance, 
risk  m anagem ent, and  accountability. D im ensions rep resen t key issu es  
in heren t in the  p a tte rn s . They are the bite sizes pieces th a t allow for an  
expansion of the narrative of the p a tte rn  and  aids its u n d e rs tan d in g  in 
totality. So the  centrifugal, cen tripe tal and  pericentric all have 
d im ensions w hich have been analysed,
Key to u n d ers tan d in g  the use  of the ep ithets, centrifugal, cen tripetal, 
and  pericentric, is the  application of the  circle as a  m etapho r to 
circum scribe the  phenom enon of corporate governance. A b roader 
explanation of the  circle is required. I find the m etaphor of the  circle 
very usefu l and  instructive in conveying my analysis an d  in te rp re ta tion  
of the interview texts. The circle h a s  long been understood  by m any 
cu ltu res  as a  symbol of com pletion and  to tality  in a rt and  lite ra tu re; in  





Figure 11: T he C en tre  -  C o rp o ra te  G overnance  C ircle
These p a tte rn s  th a t I have labeled indicate the gam ut of responses from 
the perim etric or ou ter edge of the circle to the centric; they  estab lish  
the tw o-directional flow of com m ents; and  they highlight the  dynam ism  
of the interview m aterial.





Figure 12: Two D irec tio n a l Flow based  on  c o m m e n ts
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The tw o-directional flow, in tu rn , indicates th a t there are th ree  pa tterns: 
one, the  centrifugal, moving away from the centre:
Corporate 
G overnance  
C entnfugal 
Flow
Figure 13: T he C en trifuga l P a tte rn  
A nother, the centripetal, seeks the corporate governance centre;
F Corporate^  
G overnance  
Centripetal 
k Flow A
Figure 14: T he C e n tr ip e ta l P a tte rn
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and  the  th ird , the pericentric, su rro u n d s  the centre and  com prom ises 
the  adm in istra tion  or achievem ent of corporate governance.
Centrifugal
C entripetal
P l> -vr-tT  i l i f  I l i r -
Figure 15: T he P e r ic e n tr ic  P a tte rn
Those com m ents th a t provide an  acceptable definition of corporate 
governance m ay be called centric. W ithin the chasm  betw een the 
centric com m ents and  the ou ter or perim etric com m ents are  the  th ree  
p a tte rn s , w hich taken  together, fill ou t and  define the  circle of 
com m ents, observations, and  s ta tem en ts  th a t m ake u p  the  interview 
text.
I believe th a t it is necessary , to obviate fundam enta l m isin te rp re ta tion , 
to sta te  th a t the interview text is m ade u p  of two k inds of com m ents: 
those which I refer to as cognition and  perception. The s ta tem en ts  of 
cognition in term s of how I apply its m eaning indicate the  m an n e r in 
which and  the exten t to w hich the interviewee u n d e rs ta n d s  w hat 
corporate governance is and  how it ought to function in the day-to-day 
m anagem ent of state-ow ned entities. On the o ther h an d , the 
sta tem en ts  of perception reveal the  m anner in w hich the  interviewee 
u n d e rs tan d s  how o thers perceive the  phenom enon and  to w ha t ex ten t it 
exists and  how it is practised  in state-ow ned com panies. Generally,
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perception reveals an  array  of b iases and  em otions, ranging  from 
d isgust, to anger, to resignation tow ards the  practice of corporate 
governance in the life of the com pany and  especially tow ards the  
im pedim ents th a t m ilitate against its im plem entation. Cognition, on the 
contrary , is on a  fairly keel as it outlines w hat ought to be done; there  is 
an  obvious satisfaction  to be derived if the  interviewees can  im plem ent 
an  acceptable system  of corporate governance in the face of huge odds.
T he C en tr ifu ga l P a ttern
The tex tual analysis dem onstra tes th a t th is  is an  appropria te  pa ttern ; 
essentially, the com m ents th a t form th is  p a tte rn  are perim etric 





Figure 16: The C en trifuga l P a tte rn
Perim etric com m ents are those th a t take u s  to the  o u ter edge or 
periphery of the circle, the m ost disparaging com m ents are those th a t 
move fu rth est away from the corporate governance centre; the  centric  
com m ents, on the contrary , are those th a t hover over the  centre.
The centrifugal p a tte rn  is derived from the in te rp re ta tions of the 
com m ents th a t indicate a  dislocation of corporate governance w hich
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ought to be at the centre of the organisation. These are essentially 
negative comm ents that cause movement away from the centre. 
Examples of key words and negatively allied phrases used in this 
pattern include: "do not believe,” "red herring,” "it’s ju st words,” "do not 
see anything positive,” "society don’t care,” “do not understand,” "do not 
know what is happening,” “is not done,” “is not transparent.” Similarly 
negatively charged com m ents within the centrifugal context have been 
identified relating to questions asked on accountability and risk 
m anagement which are denoted in the table below via CG for corporate 
governance comm ents, ACCT. for Accountability com m ents and RM for 
risk m anagement comments.
Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee # 1 CG: Should be truthful about corporate governance, 
it is seen as checking on people, people do not see 
responsibility from sitting on the Board.
ACCT: Do not believe we have accountability in the 
country, created to get around Central Tenders 
Board, This became very political,
RM: Liquidity risk is not an issue as you can go back 
to the shareholder, cannot figure out why it has not 
been done, nothing happens m uch for risk 
m anagement when government gives you money
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Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee #2 CG: People do not understand what governance is, 
struggling to determine what is this governance, no 
common thing across the Board, it m eans many 
things to many people, reckless society m akes it 
difficult.
RM: Achieve Risk Management by praying, do not 
have the resources, do not know if it is happening.
ACCT: Accountability m eans different things to 
different people, not fully understood, no one takes 
responsibility and accountability.
Interviewee #3 RM: Company does not look at RM in its broadest 
sense, we had an insurable risk perspective, it is not 
done in a formal way, it’s done on an ad hoc basis, 
Minister only concerned with risk hitting him from a 
political perspective, company is not forced to be 
transparent.
CG: People look at it with a lot of suspicion, no Board 
in public sector was worthwhile, Directors only 
interested in them selves.
ACCT: The word is used loosely, relationship does 
not allow for accountability, Corporation Sole only 
did the standard thing, essentially had a good lunch  
until the next year.
Interviewee #4 ACCT: The Auditor General is responsible for 
auditing the organisation but they are not effective, 
Accountability is only achieved through audits.
RM: Risk is about pilferage and corruption, LA deals 
with risks, Manage relationships with the line 
Minister, don’t know how to describe this
CG: Is a nice word or phrase, people do not take it 
seriously
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Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee #5 CG: Serves as a reward m echanism, corporate 
governance is a bit of a red herring, corporate 
governance is seen like an audit, not enough good 
people to ensure that it is being implemented.
ACCT: If you are holding people accountable a lot of 
people would have been fired already, In the public 
service the consequence model is not efficiently 
applied.
RM: When I look at the people I will want checks and 
balances, it’s a patronage system,
Interviewee #6 CG: The 100% shareholder is not represented in any  
visible way, perception of corporate governance is 
influenced largely by the m ost sensational issu e  at 
any one point in time.
ACCT: We share the sam e accountability as any  
other director is a private company, we account for 
our funds to make sure that we are not involved in 
any kind of corruption, accountability m eans that I 
can account for my actions, A director in a public 
company is more accountable than a director in a 
private company.
RM: It is important in many aspects, Can’t say  
whether it’s effective or ineffective here, it is handled  
through the internal auditor, LA drives it.
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Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee #7 CG: It’s very lax, it depends on who is the chairman, 
no one . . . .  really looks deeply into these companies.
ACCT: I really don’t know the purpose of the PAEC. 
To ensure that the money was used for the purpose 
that it was intended.
RM: We did not have any risk m anagement process, I 
don’t think that it is existing, you could have one in 
place and it could be totally ineffective, it’s ju st a tick 
box approach, we appointed one person to be 
responsible for it, no issu es of fraud and  
irregularities, inability to get funding for year on 
year.
Interviewee #8 CG: Perceived as a transient nuisance, corporate 
does not have longevity to it, We had a one m an kind 
of thing, we had a Board and they focussed on 
certain kinds of things and not the organisation.
Interviewee #9 CG: Nobody takes that (corporate governance on), 
corporate governance is not important in our society, 
it’s a word that we use.
ACCT: The PAEC is the sam e thing. They are not 
positive in terms of corporate governance. I don’t 
think that they are helping you in your governance.
Interviewee #10 CG: Here to take care of them selves and family, 
that’s the reality, politicians do not understand the 
whole role of corporate governance, we have a lot to 
do in implementing corporate governance.
ACCT: You have to be careful with the decisions you  
make, we award big tenders here, million dollar 
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• Do not believe
• It’s just words
• Do not see anything positive
• Do not understand
• Do not know what is happening
• Society don't care
• Is not done
• Is not transparent____________
Dimensions
• Risk management vacuum
• The ownership of risk management
• Risk management -  narrow view
• Importance of risk management
• Corporate governance and fraud
• Accountability-definition
• Accountability is key
• Parties to accountability
C en tr ifu ga l C orporate  G overn an ce
The centrifugal pattern comprises those comm ents that express the 
view that corporate governance does exist but that it is either totally 
misunderstood, understood in a superficial sense, or wholly ignored. 
These comments reveal the diminution of the importance of the value of 
corporate governance in state-owned enterprises in Trinidad and 
Tobago. Further, these comments establish clearly that corporate 
governance does not enjoy the centric role it ought to in state-owned  
enterprises in Trinidad and Tobago; that it does not exist in an
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acceptable form; and that it ought to exist, because it is vital to the 
proper m anagement of an organisation. It is severely compromised and 
trivialized through ignorance,
“education o f people involved in the organisation is 
important” (7#6), “you are dealing w ith  people who  
don’t even understand w h at governance is” (I#4); 
misunderstanding, “it is m isunderstood” (J#3); and  
insouciance, “people appointed to the Board don’t 
understand or care” (I#9).
The centrifugal com m ents are best evidenced by “ it is m isunderstood” 
(7#2), “I am convinced that people appointed to the Board don’t 
understand or care”; further, it is reduced to a “red herring,” (I#5) 
“sim ply . . .  a p a p er process, ” “ju s t a nice word or phrase  people use, ” 
(I# 9) an entity arbitrarily and subjectively understood if “you have ten  
people you have ten different perceptions”(I# 6), and ultimately 
deprecated and rubbished as in “public service bureaucracy,” (I#5) 
invariably “influenced by the m ost sensational issue a t any point in 
time. ” (7# 7)
Furthest from the centre are the perimetric views: those com m ents that 
describe a vacuum  at the centre. Corporate governance, in this view, is  
alarmingly absent and replaced by perfunctory and grossly inefficient 
managem ent strategies that bear little resemblance to corporate 
governance. The m ost biting comments come from an interviewee who 
rightly believes that “ethics” ought to be the linchpin on which the wheel 
of corporate governance and of society m ust necessarily revolve:
“Corporate governance is not important in our society, in 
the s ta te  sector. I don’t see  it a s  being that relevant. It’s  
a word w e  use  . . . .  integrity and corporate governance 
are merely expressions that people u se .” (7#9)
1 2 3
It is worth mentioning that if taken out of context such remarks will be 
seen as a deprecation of corporate governance. But a modicum of 
cultural familiarity goes a long way towards preventing 
misinterpretation; this is a typically Trinidadian way of saying that 
corporate governance is essential but it is not taken seriously. A similar 
sentim ent, with recourse to metaphor, states that corporate governance 
is to be “sew n  in the fabric o f the organisation” (I#2) for sustainability; 
this is to the point since corporate governance is a sine qua non of 
proper m anagement of an organisation, as integral as threads are to a 
tapestry. However, for those at the helm there is neither understanding  
nor clarity of vision; no one appears to know how to effect corporate 
governance, there is no conveying of how it ought to be done:
“We are struggling to determine w h at is governance”.
“In reality corporate governance is not happening as I 
think about it”. (I# 3)
While recognizing the essential significance of corporate governance to 
the process of management, some unequivocally claim that corporate 
governance does not exist and, even if it does exist, it is weak and 
deficient:
“the country on the whole has fairly poor corporate 
governance.” (M3). “State companies, in m y view  do not 
have corporate governance” (I# 5)
Continuing in the same vein, another describes the ills committed by 
his predecessor, appointed by a previous political party. He quite 
clearly suggests that the previous Board w as not focused on the 
organisation, hinting at motives that are sinister and deriving from his 
words “w hatever reasons”:
“The last chairman w a s  XYZ and as you would imagine, 
a one man kind o f thing. We had a Board and I think
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that they focu sed  on certain kinds of things and not the 
organisation .” So I believe that the first thing you  
should do is pu t structures in and that's w hat w e  are 
doing. It w asn 't there because of w hatever  
reasons. "(I# 9)
Every participant understands the words “corporate” and “governance” 
individually and separately; few, however, offer an acceptable definition 
of corporate governance, despite it being a concept that has become a 
leading and necessary buzzword in the business world. “Governance,” 
though a word that first appears as far back as the fourteenth century, 
is difficult for m ost for whom “government” is the natural word; it 
appears to stand for what governors should do but not for how they 
behave. Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) remind u s that corporate 
governance is the authority structure of the organisation therefore the 
importance of those with corporate governance responsibility cannot be 
understated as this corporate governance affects the creation of wealth 
and directs the pockets that are in receipt of this wealth. More 
importantly, these authors point to the impact of corporate governance 
on the efficiency of the firm, stability of employment, supplier income, 
in essence, a broad stakeholder chain. The comm ents that are 
perimetric in nature in no uncertain m anner establish that the reality 
and truth of corporate governance in state-owned com panies in  
Trinidad and Tobago have been severely compromised: they are; “State  
companies do not have corporate governance,'' “. . . .in reality corporate 
governance is not happening'', *corporate governance is not important in 
our society,” “. . . . people don't even understand w h at governance is .” 
These comments undoubtedly m ask a welter of emotions: sadness, 
regret, indignation, anger, incredulity, and resignation.
1 2 5
R isk -M a n a g em en t V acu u m
Comprising a significant dimension of the centrifugal pattern are several 
responses on risk management. These behave m uch the same way as 
those on corporate governance and accountability: they offer a scale of 
views and im pressions that range from the very naive to the quite 
sophisticated. Interviewees offered varied versions of what risk 
management means: at one end of the scale we encounter the 
sentim ent that risk m anagement is not necessary if one can rely on the 
State to provide funds when necessary,
“things like liquidity m anagement is not an issue  
as you can go back to the state. ” (I# 1)
This perceived cushioning act by the State m eans that there will be less  
compulsion to practise effective risk m anagement as is evidenced in the 
following opinion:
“Therefore risk m anagement is not practiced, 
nothing happens when government g ives you  
m oney.” (I#3)
Certainly, such an ethos brings into play the concept of moral hazard. 
This term, according to Dembe and Boden (2002), originated in the 17th 
century and is associated with the insurance industry. Although the 
early use associated fraudulent practices on the part of the insured, it is 
used today to describe a party taking risks because it is insured. Put 
even simpler, it says a party insulated from risk will be less concerned 
about the negative consequences of the risk than they might otherwise 
be. If the organisation has a feeling of insurance then they have less  
inclination to safeguard the asset as opposed to if there w as no 
“insurance for its value.” The thinking is also consistent with the 
pattern in the 1990s that risk m anagement is about buying insurance; 
replacing this older paradigm is the concept of enterprise risk
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management, a process far more encom passing in its view of risks of 
the corporation and the system  for identification, mitigation, and 
monitoring. With sarcasm, cynicism, and perhaps despair, one 
interviewee states that it is because of prayers that risk management 
exists at all:
“We achieve risk m anagement by keep praying.
Som ebody has to be policing it. We do not have  
the resources to achieve risk management. We 
need to have the right m anagement team  that 
understands w h at has to be done ” (I#2)
Prayer may help, but the achievement of proper or effective risk 
management, largely depends on, to u se the words of another 
interviewee, "the right managem ent team that understands what has to 
be done.” Much is revealed in this despair; acknowledgement that it is 
not being done, there is none to do it and there is none in m anagem ent 
who understands it. The inevitable reality is that risk m anagement, 
despite its cruciality to corporate governance, will remain unattained. 
Adam Jolly (2003) points out in "Managing B usiness Riskf  that the 
events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that a m ost unlikely event 
occurred, it was improbable but not impossible. He goes further to 
highlight the basic tenets of a good risk m anagement programme citing 
risk identification, assessm ent of the consequences, analysis of 
remedies, cost effectiveness of remedies and monitoring of outcom es. 
Prayer was not listed as a preventative mechanism .
Managing risk is also seen as being on the right side of the Minister, as 
if to invoke the wrath of the Minister is evidence of not managing risk:
“We manage risks by having an inside door to 
the Line Minister fo r pro tection * (I# 4)
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The perception and belief that the Line Minister can act as a shield to 
protect an organisation from the real risks that it might be exposed to 
displays a very shallow and hollow understanding of the purpose of risk 
managem ent or at least the use of this strategy as a mitigant. One gets 
the sense here that the risk that is being managed is the risk of political 
fallout in the event that a significant risk issue emerges.
There is also the sense that because of the political nature of the 
Director’s appointment that the focus on risk m anagem ent also 
becomes a personal one:
aDirectors are concerned w ith  personal risk  
management, the company is risk averse because  
the individuals do not w an t to take risk. We 
understood and dealt w ith  risk m anagement as an  
insurable risk perspective  .” (I# 5)
The significance of these centrifugal com m ents lies in their capacity to 
describe an incredible and intolerable state of affairs: a process that is 
in reality indissoluble from the day-to-day management of any  
organisation that has become in effect a will-o’-the-wisp. What is 
frightening is the fact that these are neither isolated nor few-and-far- 
between comments; on the contrary they are persistent utterances from 
the m ost experienced and intelligent of the interviewees. These 
comm ents underscore the reality that state-owned entities are m anaged  
with the m erest modicum of corporate governance. The explanation of 
this frightening phenomenon, its birth and continued existence, no  
doubt begins with the nature of the society and the ethos that drives 
and energizes it. Where the work ethic is feeble and doddery, there is 
an inevitable shortfall in productivity, satisfaction, and pride; society  
perforce languishes in discontent and under-achievement. One 
interviewee, with the Trinidadian social context in mind, puts it this 
way:
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“Society also sh apes the kind o f corporate governance 
you can have—a reckless society m akes it difficult to 
have a certain kind o f governance.” (J#5)
Another endorses I#S’s strictures by being more specific,
“H owever the problem  is that in Trinidad . . . people  
are hired through nepotism and w hatever else  over 
time . . . .  this is Trinidad and this is the nature of 
things. ”(I# 6)
T h e O w n ersh ip  o f R isk  M a n a g em en t
In the specific sense, risk m anagement is not well understood in the
context of what it m eans for the corporate entity. One interviewee
defines risk m anagement as “having safe trucks, since they were the 
primary medium for transportation of highly flammable material.” 
While this is undeniable, the adoption of safe practices around the use  
of vehicles is but a m iniscule part of the equation of risk m anagem ent 
for this particular organisation; it is an elem ent that may feature in the 
overall ability of the organisation to manage financial and reputational 
risks.
There is a general sense that the owner of the function of risk 
m anagement is the internal auditor. While internal audit has a part to 
play, there is perceived to be an insufficient display of the role of the 
Board in the risk-management process:
“The internal Auditor has a p lan  that he comes up w ith  
after evaluating the risks, whether it is m ost effective is 
up fo r  question”. “The m atter o f risk management is 
handled through the Internal Auditor, the Internal 
Auditor is the one that drives it. ”(I# 6)
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Also present, is the feeling that the monitoring of risks and therefore the 
extent of mitigation is not well informed,
“We are supposed  to get the assurance that things 
are in p lace  . . . .  Things that you would not have  
done in the private sector you will now do in the 
public sector. ” (I# 1)
A feeling of defeat also emerges as there appear to be indifference and 
inaction to implement facets of risk management:
“While w e  have specific policies and w e  worked out 
procedures to get things done w e  do not have a 
declaration o f non-interest, w e recommended that it 
be done, but to date not done, cannot figure out 
w h y it has not been done .” (I#2)
Risk m anagement is seen as being achieved through the end result,
“Apart from  not having incidents assurances come 
from not being sued, no loss o f equipment. The less  
of that m eans that controls are working” (I# 4).
We m ust have a system  of risk managem ent that really works, one that
“identifies the true risks to doing business and setting up your own
action.” A system  in which “directors are concerned only w ith  personal
risk,” and in which the Line Minister is only concerned with “risk hitting
him from  a political perspective” cannot engender or encourage proper
thinking about risk management nor can it ensure the effective practice
of it. At the bottom of the response scale, there is the understanding
that risk management will put “m easures to check on things being in
p lace .” Such m easures ought to include, according to the views
expressed, “a sa fe ty  committee,” “an audit committee, a “risk officer,”
and a “risk register, ” an “Internal Auditor function,” all of which are
influenced in one way or another, by “consequence m anagement.” Until
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such m easures are put in place and until there is a deeper 
understanding of risk management, it will continue “on an ad-hoc 
basis,” becoming “totally ineffective—a tick-box approach” At the top of 
the scale, one interviewee sees risk m anagement as “the m ost important 
thing . . . the key to effective corporate governance. ”
R isk  M a n a g em en t -  Narrow  V iew
There is also a narrow view that risk management is about preventing 
corruption: “We see  risk as pilferage and corruption, and w e  have an 
internal auditor to deal w ith th is.” There is not the sense that the 
Directors or the Board have the responsibility for risk m anagem ent 
through the system s of internal control:
“So within XYZ w e are going to be doing a strategic  
plan and pa rt o f getting our organisation together and  
people and whatever, w e  are looking at putting in 
place som e sy s tem s and again, it is going to take  
som e time and together w ith all that w e  are going to 
be looking at risk management. That is one o f the 
areas w e  will be focusing on a lot because you don’t 
w an t something to happen and then sa y  it happened.
It is no point trying to fin d  out that a man took 15  
million dollars and you lock him up and you lose your  
15 million dollars. ” (I# 9)
The narrow view is reinforced yet again by reference to risk
m anagement as a shield to corruption. Simkins and Ramirez (2008)
show exactly the opposite view, a broader one, in their work on
enterprise risk management. They cite the Committee of Sponsoring
Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) definition of a
process affected by an entity’s Board and managem ent applied in
strategy setting across the enterprise to identify potential events that
may affect the enterprise and manage risks to be within its risk
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appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievem ent of 
objectives. The UK Anti Bribery Act (2010) described by Loughman and  
Sibeiy (2012) as one of the m ost significant anti-corruption legislative 
developments, operates with guidance based on six (6) principles, one of 
which is risk assessm ent; the process of identifying, analyzing and 
managing risks as critical. The importance of risk m anagem ent cannot 
be underscored.
Im p o rta n ce  o f R isk  M a n a g em en t
An important feature of risk management is that it allows the state- 
owned company to act in a way in which its reputation and the trust 
that is placed in the organisation are maintained and strengthened over 
time (Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008). Simply stated, risk  
managem ent is the process of identifying, assessing, and then making  
decisions about how to reduce or eliminate specific risks to an  
organisation. In order to successfully identify, assess, and reduce or 
eliminate risks within an organisation several basic tenets m ust be 
followed. One of the basic tenets of risk management is that it m ust  
involve the entire organisation (Simkins and Ramirez, 2008). Risk 
m anagement cannot simply involve a single department or portion of an  
organisation. Instead, the focus on reducing risks and improving the 
image of the organisation for stakeholders m ust truly involve the entire 
organisation and all of its operations.
Another important tenet of risk m anagement is that it m ust be an  
ongoing and continuous process. In order for risk m anagem ent to truly 
be successful, it cannot be som ething that is used once a major 
problem has been identified. Instead, risk m anagement is som ething  
that m ust constantly be in place within the organisation so that 
potential problems can be identified before they negatively impact 
stakeholders, and, in turn, negatively impact the reputation of the 
organisation. In addition, risk m anagem ent should be broadly focused,
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m eaning that potential risks should be considered from all areas of the 
organisation. If risks or potential risks related to m anagem ent or 
finances are only considered, then large num bers of other risks can be 
overlooked that can cause as m uch or more harm to the overall 
reputation of the organisation (Simkins and Ramirez, 2008).
In order for risk managem ent efforts to operate properly, they m ust 
become part of the larger culture of the organisation. Members of the 
organisation m ust know that all aspects of operations are always being 
evaluated and assessed  in order to determine risks that might arise; 
they also need to be informed that they are actually part of the process. 
If they discover risks or potential risks, then managers should be 
notified so that those risks can be evaluated and appropriate decisions 
made to reduce or eliminate them (Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva, 
2008). Risk m anagement and corporate governance are intimately 
connected because both focus on reducing risks and improving the way 
in which decisions are made and the minimization of the potential for 
illegal or unethical acts on the part of its leaders. Another useful 
perspective is where risk m anagement is seen to be concerned with 
reducing risks to the performance and reputation of the organisation 
and corporate governance is seen to be the reducing of unethical or 
illegal acts from occurring within the organisation. Corporate 
governance then is specifically focused on the actions of organisation 
members while risk m anagement is more broadly focused on all 
potential risks. When the two are used together, there is a greater 
opportunity to identify risks within the organisation and to reduce or 
eliminate them before problems occur that could harm the reputation of 
the organisation and its relationship with its stakeholders (Bebbington, 
Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008).
T hese interviewees in the main make three statements: one, that risk 
management is crucial to corporate governance; two, that risk 
m anagement does not exist in the way it ought to; and three, it has to
be mulled over, considered as both a concept and system , and put into 
place. For without a proper grasp of its true meaning and implications, 
the Board is not likely to know ju st what kind of system  to implement. 
Harper (2005) echoes the need for Boards taking the lead in ensuring  
that risk managem ent adopts elem ents of assessm ent, controls and 
monitoring. Shimpi (1999) correctly asserts that while risk is not 
avoidable it is manageable. Its m anagement comes through strategies 
of risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer or risk retention. What 
matters is coherent risk management. Without the proper system  of 
risk m anagement in place, an organisation will certainly pay a huge 
price for the corruption of it integrity: it will suffer losses of all kinds, 
not the least of which is that of reputation.
C orporate G ov ern a n ce  an d  Fraud
As with ethics, few broach the topic directly: “I know this fellow  who  
w anted  to talk to me about a contract ” (i#8) This is quite surprising in 
the face of regular outcries in the national press against corruption 
allegations known locally as “bobol” or “thiefing.” Participants readily 
admit that fraud will exist even if there is good governance, though good 
governance minimizes the probability and reduces the incidence of it. 
They recognize, too, that in the absence of good governance, fraud will 
flourish and assum e frightening proportions:
“It's a kind o f a direct relationship betw een the 
two, the governance and the risk and the fraud  
where one w orks w ith  the other. I think that it’s  a 
very dynam ic thing where one has to be on the 
ball. Now if  you don’t have good governance, you  
will have fraud. If you have good governance, 
w h at you call good governance, and you are not on 
the ball you will have fraud. But the fraud will be 
lessened if  you have good governance, risk
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management, sy s tem s and processes, they all 
have to be interwoven and work together. (I# 8)
Another interprets risk m anagement by focusing on theft, he sees it as  
the prevention of *pilferage and corruption of putting "systems in 
p lace” to manage and prevent the company from "losing half-million a 
month in product theft” (7#5). Another, I#6, had to agonize over 
"financial risks, ” the difficulty involved in
"getting funding for all the projects fo r  the whole 
multi-year versus single-year budgeting cycle.”
(me)
Another decided that they best way to handle the problem of risk 
management was to convene more meetings of the Board and to send  
"the investm ent report w eekly  to the B oard” (I# 8); this, according to him, 
has borne fruit, "we have now brought this key risk under control .” (I# 8) 
One interviewee questions the need for forensic audits, and contends 
that
"auditors aren’t reliable,” because "they go through 
and sa y  everything is all right. ” (I# 9)
He argues that managem ent ought "to look at red fla g s ,” and investigate 
the quite probable collusion between the outgoing Director and the 
incoming Director:
"Good risk management should a sk  w h at can 
happen if  Johnny is now Steven—w h at will Steven  
do that Johnny d idn ’t do. Or, if  they are good  
friends, w hat collusion can take p lace .” (I#9)
This skepticism, incidentally, comes from the interviewee who sees risk  
m anagement as the key to good corporate governance. Allegations of 
corruption stem from the likelihood of fraud (fraud is willful intent to
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deceive for some monetary or self gain); the frequency with which 
reports appear in the media strongly indicates that all is not well in 
state—owned entities. They are hotbeds for a variety of corrupt 
practices. In many, perhaps too many, greed—the lust for personal 
gain—is in the ascendancy. Effective governance to be sure cannot 
eradicate the noxious tendencies from man, but it can and will stifle 
their growth.
The recently installed Government in one year already has had 
num erous allegations against practices of two state-owned companies: 
National Petroleum and Petrotrin. This has occurred while the 
Government of the day investigates allegations of corruption of the 
Government of yesterday. In the state-owned entities of Trinidad and 
Tobago, corruption allegations have been instrum ental in causing the 
demise of governments losing power, the PNM in 1996, UNC in 2001, 
PNM in 1986, PNM in 2010. Invariably, significant state-owned  
companies have been intertwined in the malodorous allegations of graft, 
bid-rigging, contract awards, bribes, and nepotism. Fraud is as 
inimical to an organisation’s reputation as is boiling water to a frog in 
the "boiled frog” management analogy of how a frog when placed in a 
cold pan of water will slowly boil to death as the heat is turned up  
gradually. Daniel Quinn (2006) used this metaphor extensively to 
describe population growth, food surplus and history. In the sam e  
manner where the frog cannot sense the change in the environment and  
so slowly dies with the environment. So too does the organisation with 
fraud allegations occurring frequently. And the tone at the top emerges 
as an important feature. This, however, becomes difficult when the 
political tone is one that does not lend a crutch to the state-owned  
companies.
In looking for a simple definition of corruption I find usefu lness in the 
one offered by Sevensson (2005) "the m isuse of public office for private 
gain” with the m ost prevalent form of corruption being kickbacks in
government procurement. This in essence is malfeasance. Corruption 
germinates into an abundant harvest if fertilized by misgovernance and 
misgovernance will be present in the absence of the proper practice of 
corporate governance. I believe that corruption is the certain progeny of 
misgovernance. The descriptions of corruption in the national press in 
Trinidad and Tobago are as embarrassing as they are frequent. It is not 
easy for any Trinidadian to accept that Trinidad and Tobago is 
described as “a society of corruption” by TT Transparency Institute 
(TTTI) chairman Victor Hart after ranking 72 out of 180 countries in the 
annual Global Corruption Report of Transparency International, as 
reported in Trinidad’s N ew sday  of March 20, 2010 by Alexander Bruzal. 
Hart further attributed the apparent complacent attitude in the country 
to what he describes as the prevalence of the "little” and frequent 
everyday corruption that is necessary to seek out services with the 
state-owned utilities, and other public serving organisations such as the 
Ports, Town and Country, Planning, Licences Division, Custom s and 
Duties. This everyday routine form of engaged corruption serves to 
provide an acceptance of sorts for what Hart calls the "grand 
corruption”; the widespread occurrence defines a culture of acceptance 
which then acts as a catalyst to further accept the grander, bigger 
corrupt event alm ost as though the society although complaining is 
immunized by the act.
The connection between corruption and state-owned com panies seem s 
to be the availability of public goods, especially money. The availability 
of money and other resources increases the likelihood that politicians 
may seek to gain control over some of those resources for personal u ses. 
However, another connection seem s to exist between corruption and  
government politics. Lederman, Loayza and Soares, (2004) support the 
position that the connection between corruption and government is not 
ju st about the availability of resources that might be desired by 
individual politicians, but also about a consideration for the likelihood 
of being able to engage in corrupt acts without being punished for those
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acts. The history of punishm ent being meted out to individuals based  
on fraud and corruption allegations in Trinidad and Tobago is one that 
is dotted with very few cases. The last and m ost significant case  
brought to the courts involved the financiers of the UNC, in what many 
saw as a politically motivated charge by the PNM.
Quite apart from the ethical obligations expected from Directors to do 
the right thing, the institutional features of government are considered  
to be important in determining why corruption occurs, at least on a 
broad level. If Directors and m anagement fear that they are likely to be 
punished for their actions, then they are less likely to engage in corrupt 
activities. However, it is important to note that even in countries in 
which institutions have system s in place to prevent corruption and in 
which leaders who engage in such activities are punished, corruption 
still occurs (Lederman, Loayza and Soares, 2004).
It is important to understand that there are several types of corruption 
that occur within government and the public sector. The form of 
corruption that is typically considered in relation to governments is 
financial corruption involving the use of public monies for personal gain 
(Svensson, 2005). The m ost usual manifestation of financial corruption 
is in the form of bribery, which occurs when a politician or other public 
leader accepts money in exchange for favours from those providing a  
service or contract. Corruption in state-owned companies can also take 
the form of what is known as “rigidity.” Rigidity occurs when a leader is 
not willing to make changes in leadership behaviour or rules even 
though such changes would benefit stakeholders. In addition, 
callousness is also considered a form of corruption because the leader 
shows a lack of concern for the impact that his or her actions have on 
stakeholders. To curb the intemperance of those who go after the 
coffers, there m ust be significant sanctions to be applied against the 
offenders (Svensson, 2005).
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A ccountability  -  D efin ition
Each definition offered by interviewees contributes som ething different, 
however small, to the creation of a comprehensive verbal definition of 
accountability. Put together, these interview texts offer the following 
definition: Accountability is the proper discharge of the Board’s 
responsibility to all stakeholders characterized by the optimal 
m anagement and use of available resources and its obligation to 
maximize the hum an potential of its workers with a view to creating an 
environment of challenge, co-operation, and efficiency. Such a 
definition m ust tell u s  that there is nothing wrong, generally, in the 
thinking and theorizing about accountability; the problem lies in the 
implementation of it.
Impediments of many kinds retard, frustrate, and prevent 
implementation. What strikes u s throughout the interview texts is that 
theorizing and thinking will remain strong in the absence of 
implementation; this is a ray of light. There is a chasm  that divides 
those who are committed to implementation and those who appear too 
pusillanim ous and apathetic, those who are too indifferent to want to 
change the status quo.
A c c o u n ta b il ity ’s  A b sen ce
Accountability is a key tenet within the practice of corporate 
governance. It is cited by many of the authoritative corporate 
governance bodies such as the OECD, CACG, ICG, Cadbury, et al, as an  
indispensable pillar in the foundation of corporate governance. It is a 
word that is used frequently and has been described with a deceptive 
simplicity by the majority of interviewees. Naively, it can simply m ean  
the process of giving an account of an event or responsibility of som e 
asset or thing to which one is entrusted. In the corporate governance 
remit, however, the word takes on more complexity since accountability
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is a key feature to combat one of the trying areas of corporate 
governance, the Principal Agent problem. This problem revolves around 
relationships where the Principal delegates responsibility to the Agent 
for managing the resources of the corporation. Its importance is located 
in the fact that the Principal and Agent might have conflicting goals. To 
this end and to ensure that the Agent is kept in check, the Principal will 
have to incur monitoring costs described by Dragomir (n.d.) as costs  
necessary to reduce the potential harmful actions of the agent. A 
narrowing of the meaning of accountability occurs as some interviewees 
bring it closer to punishm ent for those who are accountable:
“The Integrity in Public Life Act does not prom ote 
accountability, but it's to keep you on the straight 
and narrow. ” (1# 9)
The term “accountability” is often used with an unclear meaning. The 
term is frequently used in companies and especially so in politics with 
broad m eanings that suggest everything from transparency on the part 
of leaders to encouraging responsibility and openness toward citizens. 
Bovens (2010) offers an uncomplicated way of defining accountability as 
the set of norms that ought to guide the behaviour of individuals. What 
is really suggested in this definition is that accountability is about 
acting in an acceptable manner in conformity with the larger norms of 
society. The importance of accountability, or behaving in a way that is 
in alignment with the larger norms of society, involves the need to have 
a set of guiding principles to instruct leaders how they should act in 
relation to subordinates. Solomon (2010) states that Directors have a 
duty to ensure the delivery of a framework for accountability. This 
accountability is essentially from the Directors to the owners. Carver 
and Oliver (2002) add further by stating that responsibility and  
accountability differ where responsibility is about hands-on obligation 
to create something of value, whereas accountability refers to an  
individuals or a group's obligation to see to the production of som ething
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of value. In this way, I believe that the Board leaders and leadership 
are accountable for delivery of infrastructure services and m anagem ent 
is responsible for delivering the service. When leaders are considered to 
have accountability it m eans that they are making decisions and taking 
actions that are in line with social norms. This m eans that leaders are 
taking actions that will positively benefit all people as opposed to taking 
actions that benefit only them selves. The importance of the m eaning of 
accountability is raised through the question asked by Political 
Scientist, Robert Behn (1991), “w hat do w e  mean when w e  sa y  w e  w an t 
to hold people accountable?” Behn posits that in understanding  
corporate governance, accountability is about the relationships between 
corporations and its officers and the social organisations among them. 
This implies that accountability is both within the immediate 
corporation and then em anates from the corporation to those who have 
entrusted the corporation. Dubnick and Fredrickson (2011) define it as 
“a relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for 
performance that involves some delegation of authority expected by 
some significant other.”
While it is encouraging that some informants can bring u s close to a 
proper understanding of accountability, we are taken aback by the 
insistence that it is seldom practiced and when encountered it is 
deficient. This appears to be a case of the spirit not being willing and 
the flesh weaker; indeed this adjustm ent of the famous maxim seem s to 
define so m uch of what is wrong with or lacking in corporate 
governance in state-owned enterprises, as made clear in these  
interviews. Many Trinidadians, to be sure, will readily confess that it 
also holds true for society at large. Notwithstanding these definitions, 
there is the widespread perception that accountability does not exist 
because it not enforced: “it should mean that the Board is accountable 
for performance o f the com pany” (I#4). It appears that accountability  
can be scuttled by the involvement of the Line Minister;
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“however, you become exposed through this 
accountability and the LM can then blame you if  an 
oil spill occurs. The LM then lets the company be 
accountable to the general p u b l i c ( I #  3) The 
relationship does not allow fo r  accountability *
This does not render a true or acceptable definition of what 
accountability is.
Valor (2005) points out that the real importance of accountability is in 
its authority to ensure that board members act in accordance with the 
needs of stakeholders. If leaders do not act with a higher level of 
accountability, then they are not likely to make decisions and take 
actions that will benefit their stakeholders. For political leaders and the 
leaders of state-owned companies, not being accountable m eans the 
potential to cause harm to all citizens, as it is the citizens who are the 
stakeholders of any decisions that are made by the State. In 
comparison, having a high level of accountability m eans that a leader is 
likely to behave in a way that will bring about positive outcom es for 
stakeholders. J#5 takes it further,
“ No, I do not think that w e  have i t  Because  
accountability is the next step. Corporate 
governance se ts  up the w a y  you will conduct your 
business and p u t it into practice. Accountability is  
the consequence o f either doing that right or 
wrong. ”
This points to an important question that goes to heart of the 
phenomenon: how can you have accountability if you don’t have 
governance? One begets the other, accountability is but one child of the 
corporate governance parent. This also gives rise to the perception that 
there are no consequences for non-accountability.
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Parties to A ccountability
The PAEC (Public Accounts Enterprises Committee) is set up to have 
state companies account to a Parliamentary body; unfortunately it is 
widely viewed as simply treating with those organisations that are mired 
in controversy. One Chairman reported that he was never called upon  
by the PAEC; with elation he offered,
“J w a s  not controversial, thank God. M aybe 
som ebody realized w e  were trying to run it w ith  
som e degree o f corporate governance” (I# 7). “So 
people look at it to score political points , to m ake  
som ebody look b a d ” (T# 1).
It appears that the real purpose of the PAEC is lost if it does not call 
enough of the organisations to account whether they are in controversy 
or not. Enough has been said that warrants a closer look at the PAEC. 
An examination of the purpose of the PAEC is therefore necessary. It is 
stated that the PAEC is a watchdog committee and according to 
information obtained from its website, the Constitution of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago establishes that the Public Accounts 
Enterprises Committee (PAEC) is charged with the responsibility of 
examining the audited accounts of all Enterprises that are owned or 
controlled by the State.
According to its website information, “The PAEC was established as a 
result of the growth of the public sector.” Since the early 1970s there 
has been an increase in the number of statutory corporations and state  
enterprises covering a wide range of industrial and other economic 
activities. Consequently, it was established that “since parliamentary 
control was too remote and not continuous, a m echanism  should be 
created for Parliament to keep an effective watch over public sector 
projects in which millions of taxpayers’ dollars had been invested.” This
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augurs well for those with the responsibility of accounting for the 
resources at its disposal but does so only through the accounts. But 
accounts do not necessarily show instances of fraud or of risk incidents. 
The website information goes further to state: "The PAEC exam ines the 
reports and accounts of the public undertakings and determines 
whether the affairs of these institutions are being managed in 
accordance with sound business principles and prudent commercial 
practices.” The work of both the PAC and PAEC is facilitated by the 
assistance of personnel from the Offices of the Comptroller of Accounts 
as well as the Auditor General whose audited reports of Government 
Ministries and Departments and public sector enterprises form the 
basis of the scrutiny exercised by these Committees.
In keeping with its 1995 manifesto promise to appoint Select 
Committees to monitor the operations and functioning of all Ministries, 
the Government introduced the Constitution (Amendment) Bill (1998) 
into the House of Representatives; it was subsequently passed by 
Parliament. This Bill amended the Constitution of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago by adding thereto a new section to enable the 
House of Representatives or the Senate to appoint Select Committees or 
Joint select Committees to investigate and report to Parliament on the 
powers and m ethods of functioning of, and criteria adopted by:
• Service Commissions in Trinidad and Tobago;
• Ministries and Departments of Government;
• Statutory Authorities; and
• Enterprises controlled by or on behalf of the state or in which  
public money is invested.
The government expressed the hope that "the passage of this Bill will 
give effect to the principles of accountability, transparency, openness  
and access to information held by public bodies generally.”
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So, since 1995, some 16 years ago the governors of the country 
contemplated a m echanism  to promote accountability and 
transparency, recognizing perhaps the sam e as the OECD and the 
CACG that the companion of accountability is transparency and that 
corporate governance would be a hollow log in their absence. Yet, 
despite the existence of the PAEC, there are stories that have appeared 
in the headlines bringing odium to the Directors and m anagem ent of 
several major state-owned entities. The nature of the alleged breaches 
includes many types of malfeasance: corruption, unilateral decision­
making, bid-rigging, among other equally calam itous corporate 
governance sins. The apparent ineffectuality of the PAEC m eans that 
the principles of accountability, transparency, and openness remain 
elusive. This m ust be agonizing for the public at large as the 
accountability for resources involves the funds that are part of the 
national patrimony.
This Interviewee’s words are to the point:
“I think they (the PAEC) became controversial 
when people (in the PAEC) perceived that 
som ebody is using their position to abuse  . . . .  If I 
w a s in opposition in the PAEC, I would have had  
UDECOTT and UTT before me all the time. You 
are ju s t spending too much money, you seem  to 
be spending it without the correct governance.
Who is signing off? Are these things going to the 
Board? How are you getting the approvals, Is the  
Chairman o f these companies becoming all 
pow erful?” (I# 5).
Another adds of the PAEC in questioning an elusive independence,
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*this became political, by and large very political 
betw een the two parties, the Chairperson is 
su pposed to be independent” (I# 1).
In an even more scathing commentary, I#9 bem oans what he perceives 
as the demise of one of the m ost important committees while I# 10 
dism isses its effectiveness for want of resources:
“There are two organisations that I think have 
fa iled  this country. One is the Integrity 
Commission. The Integrity Commission w ith  that 
project that w a s  done, the intention w a s  to go out 
there, even in schools, w ith  a big communication 
plan  that w a s  never implemented . . . .but that 
w a s the plan, to go out there and educate people.
In fa c t the motto o f the Integrity Commission w a s  
“do the right thing a lw a ys” but it ju s t d ied .” (I# 9)
“I think that the intention is there but they don't 
have the resources to really and truly implement 
the terms o f the Act and their roles and  
responsibilities” (I# 10)
Currently, the two organisations (among others) mentioned above are 
being investigated because of significant corruption allegations.
It is essential to understand that having accountability requires 
consequence management. In order for leaders of any type of
organisation to achieve accountability, they m ust be able to a ssess  the 
events that are occurring around them and the potential problems that 
might arise based on actions that might be taken. What is important in 
terms of the m anagement of consequences in order to achieve 
accountability is to recognize the specific consequences that might 
occur in relation to specific actions (Bovens, 2010).
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Accountability truly cannot exist without consideration and 
managem ent of consequences. Without efforts to consider 
consequences and to reduce negative outcom es to stakeholders while 
increasing positive outcom es, there is no way for leaders to know the 
actions that should be taken so that they can behave in accordance 
with social norms. The assum ption is that the social norm is to not 
harm stakeholders. If this is indeed true, then taking actions without 
consideration of consequences and how they can be reduced or even 
eliminated would mean not acting with accountability.
The understanding of corporate governance appears fuzzy by a 
surprisingly large number; where there are clearer views, they are 
punctuated by statem ents related to the absence of structures to 
achieve corporate governance. "Corporate” when attached to 
"governance” refers to the governing of the organisation; its origin seem s 
to be lost on m ost interviewees. The descriptions of corporate 
governance indicate how and what corporate governance should aim  
for; it mostly centres around how the business should be run. The 
views are not clear, refined or compelling as one would expect from 
those who sit in the Chair and have responsibility for the practice of 
corporate governance. It is a m isunderstood topic, yet at the sam e time, 
interviewees introduced varied aspects of corporate governance. There 
appears to be an unwilling or untruthful stance in the acceptance of the 
absence of a good understanding of corporate governance,
“w e are struggling to determine w h at is this 
governance” (I#2) “w e should be truthful about 
corporate governance, not ju s t talk about i t ” (J#l)
Such a statem ent as “talent is needed to get the job doneV (7#7) sounds  
like a wish as opposed to a feature which is actual. It is dilemmatic 
when previous statem ents linked to the selection of Directors are in 
turn linked to the political decisions of the politicians. We are then
forced to a sk  ourselves, "Who is the hack?” Such a  question  strongly 
suggests th a t there  are gaps in the ta len ts  of board m em bers; som e are 
b rought, o thers are desired. The s ta tem en t th a t it is “a nice-sounding  
p h ra se ” (I#9), lends itself to the in te rp re ta tion  th a t it is m ore sound  
th a n  sense. The absence of a  consequence model m eans th a t  the 
im plicit behaviour is one th a t becom es difficult to check and  is p e rh ap s 
also one th a t is undesirab le.
It is a t once illum inating an d  chilling to recognize th a t such  com m ents 
are the  w ords of p a s t and  p resen t chairm en who have overseen and  
continue to oversee the governance leadership  of state-ow ned 
com panies! Corporate governance in the centrifugal sense seem s to be 
variations of a  com m on them e.
C en tr ip e ta l P a ttern
The cen tripetal p a tte rn  diagram  com prises all the com m ents th a t  take  
u s  closer to the centre: those th a t define the phenom enon of corporate  
governance and  estab lish  the need for it in state-ow ned com panies.
C entrifugal
U e n tr ip e ta l
Figure 17: C e n tr ip e ta l p a t te rn
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Key words used within this pattern are positive allied phrases; 
“structure,” “framework rules,” “integrity,” “defining,” “system s,” 
“processes,” “governance,” “policies in place,” “ethics,” “behaviour,” 
“principles,” “transparency,” “compliance,” “is seen as,” “practised,” and  
“in place.”
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• System s in P lace
• Efficient
• Framework, Rules, System s
• Roles and Responsibilities
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Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee # 1 CG: To ensure that it operates in a framework of 
policies, with an understanding of roles and 
responsibilities, it aims to manage taxpayers 
funds, should be truthful about corporate 
governance, it is seen as checking on people
Interviewee #2 CG: Defining things that we value, what business  
principles we want to adhere to, what structure we 
put in place to ensure compliance, struggling to 
determine what is this governance
Interviewee #3 CG: Rules, process, system s to direct the affairs of 
the corporation
Interviewee #4 CG: It’s a commitment by group of leaders to 
ensure that role and function of institution is 
carried out effectively, is a nice word or phrase, 
don’t take it seriously
Interviewee #5 CG: A set of principles, processes, activities that 
ensures the business is conducted with proper 
integrity
Interviewee #6 CG: A segregation of duties between shareholders, 
BOD and CEO and executive m anagement, a high 
level of transparency
Interviewee #7 CG: How you go about managing the affairs of the 
company to ensure that you have proper system s 
in place, to ensure high degree of transparency 
and compliance, it’s very lax, it depends on who is 
the chiairman
Interviewee #8 CG: The Framework that guides the organisation  
in actualising the strategic plan of the company
Interviewee #9 CG: A system  or structure by which an  
organisation carries out its business in terms of its 
ethics
1 5 0
Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
RM: Risk management is key, proper risk 
management should look at the red flags, you  
m ust not steal, I am moving towards a fraud free 
institution, prevention is the way to go (in terms of 
fraud), you eliminate fraud only through the will to 
not do it, if you don’t have good governance you  
will have fraud
Interviewee #10 CG: Putting m easures in place, bringing 
accountability to the fore, operating in a business  
manner, accountability, transparency, leadership  
and policy direction
C en tr ip e ta l P a tte rn
At the other end of the equation and opposed to the centrifugal pattern 
is a series of comments that serve to take u s closer to the central 
understanding of this key concept. This centripetal pattern com prises 
views that fly to the centre of the m eaning of corporate governance; that 
is to say, that it adds to the stock of the importance of corporate 
governance. Luckily, there is this obverse of the coin of corporate 
governance, otherwise state-owned entities would be in a sorry state! 
This centripetal pattern clearly indicates a gestalt: it is a case where the 
sum  is greater than the parts; that is to say, no single definition can  
stand comprehensively alone. However when taken together, what 
emerges is not only an acceptable definition of corporate governance but 
also one that closely approximates the textbook definition. Expectedly, 
there is a range of responses from the peripheral to the central, from the 
generalized to the specific.
Unlike the centrifugal comments, those that are centripetal bring u s  
closer to an understanding that is more aligned to the understanding of
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corporate governance. Only one participant understands the origin of 
corporate governance in the interview, defining it as “a segregation o f  
shareholders, Directors and M anagement” (I# 6), that has its origins in 
the formation of the joint-stock company; and he sees it as “basically  
the roles and segregation o f duties betw een the shareholders the BOD 
and the CEO or executive m anagem ent” (I# 6). As authentic and 
historically true as this is, it does not carry u s far into the journey of 
understanding of what corporate governance is. Quite different is the 
definition that corporate governance is the managing “of the affairs o f  
the company to ensure that you have proper sys tem s and process in 
place to ensure a high degree o f compliance and transparency in how you  
do business and are accountable to the shareholders and stakeholders .” 
(I# 7) This is a significantly more positive step forward, but could have 
been made more accurate and more demanding by using the “highest 
degree” instead of “a high degree.” Close to this definition is that of the 
solitary interviewee who speaks of commitment: “It is a commitment by  a 
group of leaders that has (sic) a responsibility to ensure that the role o f  
institutions is carried out effectively.” (I#4) The mention of leaders’ 
commitment enhances the recognition of leadership in governance as 
being pivotal in carrying the m essage of the importance of governance 
through the tone at the top. Governance, after all, is not bottom-up but 
top-down. By way of contrast is the statem ent, “proper governance is 
stym ied by even the low est s ta f f9 (I# 1).
Closer to the centre is the definition that sees corporate governance as 
“rules, processes , sy stem s used  to direct the affairs o f the corporation. ” 
(I# 9). To this point, corporate governance is seen as inanim ate and 
perhaps lacking in real form. A step further, we encounter this 
definition, “corporate governance would be the fram ew ork that would  
actually guide the organisation, the Board o f Directors a s w ell a s  
Executive m anagement in actualizing the strategic p lan  or strategic view  
o f the company” (I# 8). The actualizing of strategic plans brings u s  closer 
to the m eaningfulness of corporate governance and takes u s forward
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but still not to the point. Reaching the centre best are the views offered 
by I#9 and I#2:
“A system  or structure by which an organisation  
carries out its business in terms of its ethics. ” “It 
incorporates ethics, behaviours and w h at type o f  
behaviours w e  really w an t in the organisation .”
(M2)
We recognize that we have arrived at the centre with the introduction of 
ethics, “the reality . . . .  o f actually doing the right thing, the good thing. ” 
(I# 9) The right thing and the good thing unarguably reside at the heart 
of good corporate governance; however, in the marathon of its
implementation lies the absolute need to understand what has to be
done and, of critical importance, to stay the course.
C o g n itio n  o f C orp orate  G o v ern a n ce
When taken together, what emerges is an acceptable view or definition 
of corporate governance. In a pragmatic sense, some of the responses 
indicate that m uch needs to be changed in social behaviour before 
proper corporate governance can be achieved:
“Society sh apes the kind o f governance you can 
have, a reckless society m akes it difficult to have  
a certain kind o f governance.” (M3) “You can be 
directed based  on the culture, from  the outside. ”
(1*9)
It can be said that a society’s corporate governance is perhaps a 
reflection of its overall level of maturity or sophistication. In a speech  
on responsible governance in April 2011 at the Trinidad Hilton, the 
Minister of Finance, Winston Dookeran, underscored the importance of 
corporate governance, using the metaphor of the supply/dem and
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principle: “The supply o f good governance is based  on the dem and of  
good governance .” The frustration is amply expressed in the contrasting 
comment on corporate governance:
“I come from  an organisation where there is too 
much governance perhaps and go to a s ta te  
organisation where governance is only
scratching the surface is frustrating.” (M3)
“You are dealing w ith people who do not 
understand governance and w h at it is” (M5).
Participants invariably demonstrate an understanding of the core 
purpose of corporate governance. The interviews offer the gam ut of 
responses to the fundamental question "what do you understand  
corporate governance to be?” At one end of the response scale there are 
claims that at best “corporate governance is “a nice sounding phrase” 
that describes something that ought to but does not exist in 
organisations; less despairingly are those responses that recognise that 
it does exist but it m eans different things to different people. Above 
these are those who understand corporate governance to be necessary  
to effective management, and therefore needs to be taken more 
seriously; however, their responses go no further than rules and  
regulations. Higher still, we read statem ents that speak of “processes” 
and “system s” that assist in the management of the affairs of the 
organisation. At the other end we encounter definitions that 
approximate those of textbooks: “the framework that would guide the 
organisation, the BOD as well as the Executive M anagement in 
actualising the strategic plan of the company.” While at the lower end, 
the responses cause u s real concern because of the lack of focus and  
substance, those at the upper end encourage u s to believe that 
corporate governance is real, vital, and ought to be understood, and in  
time will be understood. Hope resides in the deduction that if som e are
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well informed, most, if not all, in time, can and will have a meaningful 
grasp of the subject. In time, those who are called upon to practice it 
will be aware of its m ost important tenets and better disposed to 
actualising the process.
Some interviewees on the more realistic side talk to the “system s and 
processes that are necessary”; it is about
“having the proper sys tem s and p rocesses in 
place to ensure that there is a high degree of 
compliance and transparency in how you do 
business and that you are accountable to the 
shareholders and stakeholders .” (I# 8)
That it is defined as “ensuring that you give a good account fo r  the 
money and the resources” (I# 7) reflects the perception that
accountability is for money spent. In alm ost all instances of allegations 
involving a breakdown of corporate governance, corruption and graft are 
at the top. The understanding appears to range from the notional to the 
realistic, but appears to weigh more on the notional side. Corporate 
governance is seen as in place since “people have a responsibility to 
ensure things happen ” The use of “things” offers solid evidence of the 
vagueness of the participant’s notional understanding. Such a 
statem ent as ”It is about checking on people, people see  it a s checking on 
them ” (I#3) supports the type of transient thinking about the subject. 
Another urges that the
“board should be truthful about corporate 
governance, not ju s t sit and talk about i t /  and  
that “buy-in should come from  each Board 
member. ” (I# 1)
Without doubt he suggests that there may be a level of apathy that is  
endemic to the practice of corporate governance in state-owned
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companies. The lamentable state of the managem ent of these companies 
is “a result o f the inahility to meaningfully do something about the 
practice o f governance.”
A c c o u n ta b ility
Interviewees are m uch clearer about their understanding of 
accountability than of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, all the 
respondents beg the question in that they choose not to avoid using the 
word “accountable” to define its abstract noun. For example, one sees  
accountability as being “accountable to the public or to t a x p a y e r s two 
define it as being “accountable to the Line Minister” (I# 3); another views 
it as being “accountable to the shareholder” (I# 5) . . “and to the public fo r  
the w a y  in which uie spend their m oney” (I# 6); and adds that in the case  
of a public company “the accountability to the shareholder becom es more 
stringent” than in the private sector. Viewing accountability from a 
slightly different angle, others posit: “It should mean that the Board is  
accountable fo r the performance o f the company. ” (1# 6) “The company is  
also accountable to the communities, to the contracting community to 
sustain  its business, and accountable to stakeholders.” (7#3)
One with a naturalistic bent, defines accountability as “the consequence 
of either doing that which is right or wrong.”(I#9) The em phasis on 
“consequence” aligns his thinking with those interviewees who would 
insist on “a consequence m odel,” (I#3) which holds each person  
accountable for his actions. Taking it further, only one introduces an 
ethical dimension, arguing that there are two forms of accountability: 
one “is in terms o f carrying out your functions, performance, ” (I# 6) the 
other is “ensuring that the resources of the state are well managed, not 
only in terms of efficiency, but propriety.” He sees the end result of 
accountability as “at the end o f the day  . . .  to show  a profit, ”(I# 9) and 
exhorts u s to practice both forms of accountability: “if you do these
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things, you will show a profit.” Referring specifically to his Board, he 
adds:
*Our accountability goes in terms o f choosing the 
best resource, not only in terms o f quality, but also 
price and everything and ensuring that there is no 
w astage—tha t’s  our basic accountability to m ake  
sure our projects are well done. ” (I# 9)
He concludes by reminding u s of the importance of the hum an elem ent 
in all our deliberations: “Also to maintain a good relationship among our 
people . . .  to make sure that they are happy and they are working 
because they w an t to work. ”(M 9)
The one that comes closest to the mark equates accountability with 
“good stew ardsh ip , ” adding that it ensures that “the money and the 
manpower, real esta te  or w hatever is given to you, that it is u sed  fo r  the 
purpose fo r  which it w a s  designated . . . [that] it is totally transparent. ” 
(I# 7) One, while stating that accountability is “actually alm ost non­
existent” (M3) in the state-owned companies, stands out from the pack 
by proposing that there are “two levels” of accountability with an 
important distinction between a high-level accountability and a low- 
level accountability. Accountability to Corporation Sole which deals with  
“statutory accounts . . . [and] actuarial valuations” is far less crucial 
than the creation of a “performance culture,” constructed out of “real 
performance accountabilities ” Introducing the hum an elem ent in a 
different way, he establishes that the main focus of his contention is to 
“help the executive to improve, ” (M8) to create a cadre of individuals who 
will ensure that things would be “done properly and legally and within  
the right IR fram ework. ”(M 9)
As with corporate governance there is a gaping divide between the 
understanding of what accountability is and its practice. While one
1 5 7
interviewee subjectively sees it in terms of the information brought to 
the board to be used as the basis for decisions, two rightly define the 
term as the proper use of the resources given to you. The majority of 
respondents beg the question by assum ing that everyone knows the 
meaning of “to account fo r” and “accountable.” Take, for instance, this 
definition, “Accountability m eans that I can account fo r  my actions and I 
am accounting fo r my actions to som ebody”; this really gets u s nowhere. 
(J#6). However, more helpful is the comment that sees accountability as 
“ensuring that the resources o f the sta te  are well m anaged, not only in 
terms o f efficiency, but propriety.”(I#9) This is welcome but hardly 
surprising from the individual who emphasizes the pivotal role ethics 
plays in the life of the individual, of a company, of a society, of a nation. 
A fuller definition that cannot really be argued with is offered by I# 7; 
though begging the question at first, he goes on to redeem himself:
“To me it’s  all about giving account fo r  the 
resources that have been p laced  at your disposal.
To ensure that the money, and again it comes back  
to good stew ardship, that the money and the 
manpower, real esta te  or w hatever is given to you, 
that it’s  u sed  fo r the purpose fo r  which it w a s  
designated and you have proper support fo r all the 
decisions that you have made, it’s  totally 
transparent. ”
Though three interviewees state that accountability does not exist in 
state-owned entities in Trinidad and Tobago, and two claim that “it is 
not fu lly  understood in the public service [and] m eans different things to 
different people at different tim es,” (I#6) an acceptable com posite 
definition of accountability emerges, as everyone appears to know in 
varying degrees what it is and what role it plays in an organisation.
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E m erg en t D e fin it io n  o f  C orporate G overn an ce
A centric interpretation that derives from the combined understanding  
of these Chairmen of state-owned companies suggests that corporate 
governance is a process that m ust exist to protect and to give proper 
account to the interest of stakeholders. It m ust be bred within an 
environment of commitment by the leadership of the organisation, 
setting the appropriate tone for the conduct of business in a 
transparent and ethical manner. The demonstration of corporate 
governance m ust therefore occur in a framework of policies, procedures, 
system s and, behaviours that guide the organisation to actualizing the 
strategic plans of the company. After all, state-owned companies exist 
to fulfill a particular purpose, and while it is recognized (CACG B est 
Practices Guide, June 2002); that the political objectives of government 
may be at odds with the commercial interests of a state company, it 
cannot be ignored despite the purpose or the raison d’etre of the 
organisation is that its governance m ust be discharged in a m anner 
that is confident and lusty.
E th ic s  an d  M orality  in  C orporate  G overn an ce
Surprisingly very few participants broach, in a direct manner, the 
subject of the need for morality and ethics in the practice of corporate 
governance. One argues that “corporate governance has to do w ith  how  
you deal w ith  issu es o f integrity and morality (I# 7); and another takes it 
a bit further, “Corporate governance would be a system  or structure by  
which an organisation carries out its business in terms o f its ethics . . . .  
“once w e  have defined ethics then it would be the roles functions and  
system s that ensure that it is kept in p la ce” (I# 9). Although only two 
insist on the need for ethics and morality, it is implied in such  a 
statem ent as “my understanding o f CG is that institutions/organisations 
will p u t in place a se t o f principles, processes , activities that w ill ensure  
that the business is conducted w ith  proper integrity primarily; so  that all
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the decisions taken can w ithstand the tes t o f time that it w a s  the best 
decision taken at this poin t in tim e” (I# 5). Morality and ethics although 
different words are used alm ost synonym ously by the interviewees; they 
convey a sense of what is good, right, and proper. Morality appears to 
be ethics in action or practice.
Importantly, a code of ethics is a standard feature in the corporate 
governance edicts of m ost organisations. Mcnutt (2010), writing of 
"Corporate governance and Kant’s philosophy” in Manchester B usiness  
School Journal o f Ethics, argues that corporate governance is an 
obligation for its practitioners to act in an ethical manner and to take 
responsibility for actions in the discharge of their duties. 
Accountability, therefore, as a corporate governance feature m ust have 
ethical behaviour as its bedrock. He also contends that the absence of 
accountability is a hallmark feature of misgovernance. Interviewee #3  
locates the importance of ethics being sew n  in the fabric o f the 
organisation (I#3).
T h e P e r ic e n tr ic
We move from the centrifugal and centripetal patterns to the 
pericentric. Around the centre, standing in om inous guard and 
preventing the institution and attainment of proper corporate 
governance is a large and powerful pattern that is best referred to as 
pericentric. Examples of key words and allied phrases arising from this 
pattern include: "politics,” "political,” "it’s ju st politics,” "political 
interference,” “appointees,” “political system ,” "parties.” The following 
diagram best represents the pericentric and shows the barrier that 
prevents the centre from being reached.
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• Basic two race party system
• Political appointm ents
• Party hacks
Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee # 1 Political interference, political appointees, basic  
two race party system , political fallout, this 
political system
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Interview ee ID Exam ples of Key S ta tem en ts from Interview s
Interviewee #2 Wonder why people get selected to Boards, very 
political between two parties, Direction to Board 
comes from Minister
Interviewee #3 Political interference, governance should  
transcend politics, accountable to Minister
Interviewee #4 Company Act conflicts with directions given by 
Minister, the organisation becom es a tool of 
government or line Minister, all Directors are 
tainted with Party Hack brush, Party hacks do 
feel accountable to Board, Company is not forced 
to be transparent
Interviewee #5 Once Government changes there is a change in 
corporate governance dynamic, political decision, 
nepotism, favouritism, cronyism, company has 
political dimension, politics tend to rule right, 
simply because of the politics, it stem s from the 
politics, that’s ju st the nature of things, that’s the 
politics.
Interviewee #6 People go to a board meeting to get a  meal and 
leave, they have a nonchalant attitude, if you  
cross the line the structure starts to crumble,
Interviewee #7 Political interference, have to be strong, line 
minister wants things done, politically connected
Interviewee #8 Political Risks, One has to be politically astute, 
elections takes place every 5 years, restrictions 
from the corporate sole, state interference, I really 
don’t see the interference
Interviewee #9 That’s the way politics is in Trinidad, 
procurement is politics, then of course politics, 
it’s ju st politics, political issue
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In te rv iew ee  ID E xam ples of Key S ta te m e n ts  from  In te rv iew s
Interviewee #10 Affiliated to politicians, Have to follow the 
directives of political directorate, risk  your 
appo in tm ent being revoked, continue u n d e r 
du ress, you u n d e rs tan d  how it operates.
T he P e r ic e n tr ic  P a ttern
This is essentially  an  analytic com m entary  on how interview ees 
u n d e rs tan d  the m an n er in w hich politics m anifests itself in the  
operation of S tate  Boards.
Corporate 1 Governance
Figure  18: The P e ric e n tr ic  p a t te rn
It is essentially  the political pa ttern , b u t I have renam ed  it the  
“pericentric” p a tte rn  to bring it into nom encla tu ral a lignm ent w ith the  
centrifugal p a tte rn  and  the centripetal p a tte rn  th a t have the  circle a s  
their referent. As the  ep ithet indicates, the  pericentric  p a tte rn  
su rro u n d s the centre; in the context of my research  th is  p a tte rn  is a 
large, reca lc itran t presence th a t prevents the im plem entation  of 
corporate governance. The two key w ords u sed  to arrive a t the
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preicentric pattern, not surprisingly, are “politics” and “political”; the 
latter occurs far more frequently than the former. When politics occurs, 
it is used to signify an existing condition that impacts on corporate 
governance. Its meaning ranges from the practice of government as in 
“[corporate] governance should transcend politics,” to a recognizable 
governmental behaviour established over the years as in “tha t’s  the w a y  
politics is in T r i n i d a d ( I #  6) to a severe deprecation of the art of 
governing as in “procurement is politics. ” (i#9). Though its use may 
sound neutral as in such a phrase as “it's ju s t politics ” it never really is, 
for even here there is a sense of resignation in the acceptance of the 
status quo. Every usage of “politics” sheds a negative ray on how the 
party in power conducts its business and how that business influences 
and compromises corporate governance.
The word “political” is used in combination with a number of signifiers 
broadening and deepening its meaning. The use of particular nouns  
reveals a wide range of responses, ranging from resignation to outrage 
and despair. As with politics, the use of “political” appears to be neutral 
in such phrases as “political decision” “political dim ension” and 
“political issu e” where the adjective refers primarily to the activity of the 
government. Contrariwise, we sense the interviewees’ outrage and  
disappointment when we hear of “political interference”. They refer to 
the manner, covert and overt, in which politics obtrudes on corporate 
governance with the sole purpose of ensuring that “w h at the Line 
Minister w an ts the Line Minister gets". In a small countiy where there is 
no real ideological difference between the main two or three parties this 
is invariably perceived as a constant in government. Because Party 
invariably comes before nation, there is always with a change in 
Government a change of Board members; Boards therefore have “no 
longevity" and are seen as “transient nuisances” (I# 8) that are com posed  
and dismantled according to the whims of the Line Minister. Militating 
against the health and the integrity of the Board and the body politic is
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a condition that occurs when the Board member loses favour with the 
politician or line Minister:
“people are fired  not fo r poor performance. People 
are fired  for political fa ll out. (I# 9)
The insinuation is clear, performance is not the measure. Another 
carefully couches his belief that the politicians interfere in the running 
of the state-enterprise:
“The political directorate m ay w an t to go in a 
particular direction and that m ay not be in 
alignment w ith  w h at you see  fo r the organisation”
(I# 10)
Moreover, in the seemingly neutral phrase, “political system ,” we, as 
Trinidadians, grasp the despair the interviewers feel in the experience 
that the more things change the more they remain the sam e. The 
system  invariably becomes invasive and meddlesome.
D isc o n t in u ity
One interviewee hides his disappointment and outrage by nonchalantly  
stating the facts:
“when w e left because o f the change o f government 
and  so, I believe w e  were one o f the m ost compliant 
sta te  companies in the country ”. (I#7)
This statem ent defines and underscores one of the many negative 
dim ensions of the political pattern; these changes become more 
pronounced when political parties change. Unfortunately, a change of 
Political party results in a change of government which more often than  
not necessitates a change of Directors and also a change in governance 
models. While this practice is not by any m eans exclusive to Trinidad
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and Tobago, it is not a best practice, its negative impact is more keenly 
felt in such a small country; however, size in this regard does not mean  
that it is unavoidable. If the longevity of a Board wholly depends on the 
longevity of the ruling party, discontinuity becomes systemic:
“Well, elections take place every five  years and  
Boards will change, added  to that Board 
appointm ents to XX org, are fo r 2  years, so even  
within a cycle it is a shortened cycle .” “Corporate 
governance does not have longevity to i t  Boards 
are seen  as a transient nuisance .” (I# 8)
From 1986, a continuous unbroken period of the PNM party rule m eant 
that changes in company Directors were minimal. This did not 
necessarily mean an augmentation in quality of corporate governance, 
as many state-owned organisations, well into the mid 1980s, continued  
to be mired in allegations of corruption and inefficiency. After 1986, the 
political landscape changed repeatedly and dramatically; every lustrum  
brought with it a change in political parties: the NAR from 1986 to 
1991, the PNM from 1991 to 1995, the UNC from 1995 to 2001, the 
PNM from 2002 to 2010, the People’s Partnership from 2010 to the 
present; there were, incredibly, eight (8) national elections over the 
same period. Each change brought with it a change of Directors and, in 
some cases, the re-direction of the purpose and vision of the State 
Company, company objectives, and governance ethos. Within these  
entities, the lack of continuity, therefore, m eant that visions would have 
been stillborn or, at best, jaundiced and limited to the duration of the 
political party’s rule:
“There is a lw ays som e m easure o f continuity in the 
private sector in that they m ay rotate directors 
every three years or so. So there is a lw ays som e  
level o f continuity, every time a government 
changes in Trinidad, there is a total restarting o f
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that whole corporate governance, and a learning 
curve w ith respect to that corporate governance 
and different expectations, etc., so every five  years, 
once the government changes, there is a change in 
that corporate governance dynamic. -  The CEO 
then becom es an expendable measure. ” (I# 6)
Unfortunately, what the private companies enjoy is what is denied the 
state-owned entities. Clearly, the absence of a nationalistic or holistic 
system  of corporate governance, without doubt, is a primary driver of 
discontinuity. However, crucial consideration m ust be applied to the 
notion of the alignment of ideology of parties which ought logically to 
create continuity if the business of the nation is given priority. The 
business of the ruling party takes precedence over the bu siness of the 
nation. Within this narrow and harmful practice, self-interest will 
always be served and m ost likely will have as its companion constant 
rationale for the preservation of the party politics.
The precise point of the genesis of the Director change-over is difficult to 
determine; it has become an accepted practice, the norm, as it were. 
Certainly, the Companies Act or any of the legislation creating som e of 
the state-owned companies does not specifically address the changing  
of Directors when a new government is elected. A former Minister of
Finance in the 1989 NAR administration confesses that he is not sure
why Directors in State owned companies had to resign upon a change  
in government. Board directors who are retained are not trustworthy 
since it is widely held that they will not and cannot work in the interests 
of the incum bent party. Twinned with the issue of trust is that of the 
nature of the appointment:
“give the job (of Director) to the person who fu n ded  
you? That is not corporate governance ” “ Yes, I
could have decided that all these people need to go
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home. I could have money, be independent, do
various things w ith  it, but that is me. I am not too
sure who is the next Chairman, whether I would  
trust them to do the sam e thing, it’s  a  real 
conundrum.” (I#9)
A recent cause celebre provides evidence of this: the Sports Minister 
publicly chided the Minister of Energy accusing her of retaining
personnel from the previous ruling political party in an advisory
capacity; this, he admonished, m ust not to be tolerated, reminding her 
of the accepted practice (Trinidad Express, 28  June 2011).  To her 
credit, she did not yield to the pressure. Though different political 
parties will have different visions and goals, they err when they forget 
that the overarching role of the state-owned company is to help the 
state achieve the goals of its developmental agenda.
T ru st
Such a response as “any organisation taking over another se ek s  to p u t  
their own in p lace” (7#6) recognizes that trust is a desideratum  of 
effective corporate governance. At the heart of this is the issu e  of trust, 
as in the case of the corporate takeover, a party assum ing the reins of 
political power places trust in their own over the control of the states  
resources. This usually m anifests itself in the removal of the CEO of 
the company, a widely acknowledged fact in the history of state-owned  
companies in Trinidad and Tobago. “So every five  yea rs  once the  
government changes there is a change in the corporate governance  
dynamic, the CEO then becomes an expendable measure, because the 
CEO m ay not be a trusted individual, m ay not belong to the sam e political 
entity as it is a public company and it is politics.” (7#6). The removal of 
the CEO by the leaders at the Board level, because of party change  
cannot earn the level of trust that is necessary to allow an organisation  
to operate efficiently. Absent is the acknowledgement that the CEO is
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an essential thread of continuity. In order to be able to understand  
trust as it relates to leadership, it is important to have a definition of 
trust that fully encom passes the concept in terms of the actions and 
expectations of people toward leaders. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) note 
that based on an examination of several studies that have investigated  
the concept of trust, an appropriate definition of the concept of trust is  
a psychological state in which a person allows him self or herself to be 
vulnerable to another person based on the expectation of receiving some 
type of positive outcome or behaviour. The importance of this definition 
of trust is that it indicates that in order to have trust in another person, 
a level of vulnerability is required. Once a person has an expectation of 
some positive outcome or behaviour from another person, a level of 
vulnerability occurs in relation to the person from whom the outcom e or 
behaviour is expected. The importance of trust and leadership is 
exemplified when either an individual or a group of people, become 
vulnerable to a person who is in a position of power.
In the context of the research, the state-com pany CEO has to trust the 
good judgm ent of politicians, in appointing the Chairman and the 
Board, which represents the first tier of the leadership hierarchy. In 
turn the Chairman and the Board m ust trust the CEO to continually  
execute the affairs of the company consistent with the Board. The 
visibility of this trust between the leader, Board and organisational 
employees is vital because the employees are more willing to follow the 
rules and commands of the leader that they can trust so that the larger 
goals and objectives for the organisation can be achieved. In a 
prevailing culture where Board appointments are viewed as purely 
political, trust in politicians becomes a necessary bedfellow (Dirks and 
Ferrin, 2002).
The CEO’s position is an essential thread in the fabric of the corporate 
entity; his longevity is correlative with the quality and strength of the 
organisational fabric. If trust is absent or elusive an organisation will
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operate in fear and paranoia, two factors detrimental to an entity’s 
efficiency. Notwithstanding, the complexity of hum an emotions 
recognizes an ambivalence even to such positive values of trust and 
loyalty; in a state-owned company, this can be manifested in cronyism  
and nepotism, practices which indubitably have a negative impact on 
the public perception of the quality of appointees to Board and CEO 
positions. Where the appointments to Boards occur in a politically 
charged environment such as what obtains in Trinidad and Tobago, the 
trust issue dem ands a prioritized and mature view. From a political 
standpoint, trust in political leaders is vital because it results in the 
willingness of people from different cultural and demographic 
backgrounds to be willing to work together to achieve desired outcom es. 
However, once trust in the political appointee is lost, then what is 
known as “particularized trust” occurs, which is trust only in others 
who are similar in terms of background, race, party affiliation and 
culture (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). The movement from a 
generalized level of trust in a Board Chairman to a particularized level 
of trust m eans that any issu es that are raised or any actions that are 
taken are immediately viewed as being for the benefit of the members of 
that Chairman’s group.
Generally, particularized trust in politicians m akes it veiy difficult to 
achieve social equality and address larger problems in society 
appropriately (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). However, while this 
particularized trust may develop on an individual level, it has veiy  real 
consequences on a national level; rather than ensuring that the state- 
owned companies achieve the company objectives, the concern of 
political leaders and Board appointees in the form of the Chairman 
becomes one of taking care of the members of their group. They then  
become focused on achieving positive outcom es for the members of their 
political parties regardless of whether those outcom es are truly positive 
for all citizens, the true beneficiaries of the success that the state 
companies were established to achieve. The State as the benefactor
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m ust be willing to accommodate a change in the manner by which  
Boards are appointed.
It would seem  highly implausible that there is not a valid link between 
politics and trust. The link that exists is based on the specific focus of 
political leaders and the ways in which they are willing to work to 
achieve social equality for citizens. When a generalized level of trust is 
present, political leaders are more likely to want to work for the good of 
all citizens, and m ost citizens are willing to work with their political 
leaders to achieve this outcome. In contrast, when generalized trust 
deteriorates into particularized trust, political leaders become focused  
on the citizens that fit into their groups, and the members of their 
groups become m uch more focused on the needs of others who are like 
them as opposed to all citizens.
There is no built-in immunity to the practice of appointing “your kind” 
to a Board when political power has been achieved as politicians need to 
work to establish a generalized level of trust among citizens. The real 
importance of trust is that it brings people together and encourages 
them to want to work together to achieve larger goals and objectives. 
When trust is lost or completely absent, the larger needs of an 
organisation or even an entire country no longer occupy an important 
space. Instead, the individuals that have become distrustful become 
more focused on their own needs to the detriment of the needs of others 
or the needs of the entire organisation or country in question. Moreso, 
the loss of this trust m akes it highly difficult to regain a generalized 
level of trust in which key employees are willing to work with Boards.
P o lit ic a l A p p o in tm e n ts  and  th e  P arty  H a ck s
In state-owned companies in Trinidad and Tobago, if we are to judge 
from the interviews, cronyism is an all-too-common evil. This is not 
simply a matter of appointing a friend or a crony; this refers to the
practice the Americans define as “the appointment of political hangers- 
on to office without regard to their qualifications” (Merriam-Webster’s  
11th Collegiate Dictionary, 2010). That party supporters are appointed to 
Boards is as incontrovertible as it is widespread; both party workers 
and politicians understand the reciprocal arrangements. The placem ent 
of corporate governors on Boards to serve is, therefore, exposed to 
interpretations of favouritism and nepotism as Ministers recommend 
and place those whom they know or those who have worked to get them  
into power. Party workers placed as Directors not viewed as suitable for 
Boards, but yet placed on them, are labeled “Party Hacks.” The 
descriptions move from the explicit to the covert, but undeniably share 
the same direction.
“Every Board has a fe w  good people who will do 
the right thing, however, the party  hacks can 
ruin the organisation. Hacks, if  not fo r  the party  
will not be sitting on any Boards, they are there 
fo r rew ards” (M3)
“I w onder w h y som e people get selected to 
B oards” (M1)
The association of “party hacks” talks to the person who is appointed  
solely on a reward basis; he is one who blindly agrees with and  
supports his party. It creates an insidious quid-pro-quo situation, in 
which a successful candidate in an act of anticipated reciprocity 
disregards his better judgm ent and m akes appointm ents that more 
often than not do not redound to the credit of the Board and ultim ately 
the organisation’s goals. Harper (2005) agreeably stresses the 
importance of the need for Board members to clearly understand their 
duties and more importantly, their shared legal responsibility to look 
after the company’s best interests. To have the term “party hack” 
associated with Board appointees raises the spectre of
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inappropriateness and incompetence; a broad brush which tars all. The 
injustice to Board and Shareholder and national interest in this 
instance is clear, as the proper composition and requisite balance of the 
Board is severely compromised.
One participant in particular registers his outrage at the practice of 
selecting Board members, causing u s to wonder about the nature of the 
praxis:
“The country struggles w ith  attracting the correct 
talent to run these p laces properly. So if  you start 
from  that, you, therefore, get one or two directors 
that are very good, hut in the main the rest o f them  
are mediocre and there are the political appointees 
and p a rty  hacks. So a t the end o f the d a y  it 
becom es difficult fo r  the two or three who carry the 
weight o f the Board to implement everything  
because it’s  too much to do and you sort o f end up 
in a holding pattern  .” (I# 5)
The view that there is a burden to carry for those who are not capable 
further tarnishes and sullies the person who is viewed as a hack. The 
term is as unkind as it is uncharitable:
" . . .  because politicians choose a man to be 
Chairman or m embers o f a Board not necessarily to 
do a job on the sta te  enterprise and I think that it is  
quite normal, but merely to give someone a
position  the question is w h y  do you p u t them
there? A lot o f them, it’s  ju s t politics. I mean how  
the hell is XYZ the Chairman o f ABC? How the hell 
did he get there? (I# 9)
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While the hack, although a political appointee, is viewed as perhaps 
incapable of adding to the work of the Board there is a malevolent side 
to some political appointees who are viewed as strong
“If the Chairman is a very strong chairman and  
very close to the political directorate, corporate 
governance more or less goes through the window. ”
( B 7 )
The interviewees see “strong” as political strong and not as “governance 
strong’’. Indeed, the closer the appointee is to the senior members of 
the ruling party, the more latitude exists to display maverick behaviour.
“ You take on the role that you report to the head of 
sta te , fo r example the Prime Minister or som e other 
senior person, and you have close contact w ith  
them, it’s  alm ost like you can do w h at you w an t 
and get aw ay  w ith  it. ” (I# 7)
The view here is that being politically strong offers a kind of immunity 
to the need for probity of actions by the Chairman; in this manner, the 
Board is led by the maverick and their views of independence lost. 
During the PNM’s m ost recent rule 2001 to 2010, a certain Executive 
Chairman was perceived to be appointed by the Prime Minister, the 
Company, UDECOTT, operated from the num erous accounts in the 
press as though it was accountable to no one. The infam ous statem ent 
offered by the company’s then Chief Operating Officer “w e  m ake our 
rules and w e  break our rules” during a com m ission of inquiry, led by 
John Uff of the UK, into allegations of wrong doing attests to the 
seeming arrogance of a company that perceived itself as above the 
practice of proper corporate governance and accountability. Even in the 
face of the comments and the evidence being tendered at the 
Commission of Inquiry, articles in the Press at the time indicate that 
those apologizing for UDECOTT were perhaps motivated by naivety;
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they appeared to be exercising judicious disingenuousness, or 
defending on blind loyalty, defending the indefensible. Moreover, there 
is the view that all directors are suspect and unworthy: “. . . .1 remember
that I w a s  talking to X Y  (name called) one day  and he w a s  very
dism issive o f (sic) corporate governance . . .  .he thought no Board in the 
public sector w a s  worthwhile.” (I# 3)
One respondent confesses to feeling a sense of pride in serving an 
administration to which he was not affiliated politically. Such a 
confession reminds u s  of two realities: one, this happens veiy rarely; 
and two, it can be m utually beneficial:
“When I w en t into the s ta te  company, the Line 
Minister knew  I w a s  a very effective leader at 
my organisation, that is one o f the reasons w h y  
she asked  me. One of the good things about it 
too is that I w a s  appointed, nobody asked  me
who I supported in respect o f political affairs,
that w a s never a question. In fact, even up to
today I never supported the XYZ party. She (the 
Minister) sa w  a need fo r  someone who could 
turn it around and so she came to us and som e  
of the gu ys on the Board who w ere not politically 
affiliated. And that w a s  something that worked  
in our favour. ” (I# 7)
Although the association of the politician and the instructions to award 
contracts surfaces in the texts, absence of political interference creates 
a desirable atmosphere in which to work. With no instructions or 
dem ands from above, the respondent exercised freedom of judgment; 
this is the way it ought to be:
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There w a s  no political interference. Nobody told 
us who to give contracts to, who to employ, when  
to employ them and all these things. ” (I# 7)
A sense of pride and achievement attaches itself to the scarcely felt 
independence.
R ace in  P o lit ic s
Such a response as “It’s  a basic two-race party  system , ” even though it 
seem s a passing comment, has implications that go far beyond the mere 
words. It is a historical fact that Trinidad and Tobago is steeped in 
matters of race, an unavoidable legacy of centuries of colonial rule, 
slavery and indenture (discussed in Chapter Four). Africans were 
brought by the Spanish and English to work on the sugar plantations; 
after the abolition of slavery, the Africans understandably deserted the 
cane fields, and moved from the country into the urban and sem i-urban  
areas. Racism appeared as a natural progression and inevitable by­
product of the presence of the races and the circum stances of their 
introduction to Trinidad. Brereton (2002) informs u s of the pervading 
nature of the racist ideology introduced by the whites in Trinidad, the 
association of whiteness with superiority was internalized by the 
coloureds and blacks. Adding to the complexity of the racial m akeup  
was the introduction of a new set of "slaves” that were found in Indians 
According to Brereton (2002) these Indians had to also find a place in 
the existing race, class and caste system s. The Indians fooled by 
promises if indentureship, supplanted the Africans in the cane fields. In 
time, the manumitted African started looking down at h is Indian 
replacement, and breathed an air of superiority. Coming from quite 
disparate cultures, the Indians and Africans lived in separate worlds 
(Brereton 2002). The Indians, whose culture remained intact, no doubt 
felt superior to the Africans, whose cultural traditions had been  
systematically destroyed or abandoned. The African felt good about his
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freedom, but experienced a cultural emptiness. The ethnic divide 
became insuperable to the majority of Indians and Africans.
The image of the ethnic disparity was, therefore, woven into the social 
fabric; this grew darker and more menacing as the British withdrew into 
the background of local politics. A new phase in race relations began  
with the victory of the Afro-based People’s National Movement in 1956; 
the bugbear of race metamorphosed into a political weapon used by one 
party against the other. Modern politics, since the inception of general 
elections in 1956, pivots on the hopes, aspirations and achievem ents of 
the two largest com m unities of Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians. In its 
wake, the colonial power experienced a decline in its previously 
dominant political strength, the ability of the locals to vote had changed  
the political power balance. Therefore, it is accepted that from the 
1950s to post-independence, politics in Trinidad and Tobago h as  
operated along racial lines. It was not until 1986, with the break in the 
Afro hegemony that an Alliance was possible and for which there was 
much optimism for political unity, never before seen in Trinidad and 
Tobago, a unity, sadly, that has since eluded the general political 
constituency. Attesting to the complexity of the racial issu es in the 
society is the recent national furore over the statem ents of fact made by 
an Indo-Trinidadian chairman of the Police Service Commission over 
the “ethnic imbalance” in the upper echelons of the police service. 
Insistent calls from both the Government and the Opposition for his 
dism issal coerced the President of the country to revoke his 
appointment. Although it has been somewhat tamed, this racial 
monster still stalks the land; Linda Edwards (2005) writing in the 
Trinidad and Tobago News tells u s that East Indians and Africans 
comprise the majority of the population, but the unresolved race issu es  
and ignorance of history continue to separate them. Later still, in 2011, 
the menacing race factor persists as evidenced by a newspaper article, 
written by Andre Bagoo on Thursday, April 21, 2011, whose cover
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headline “PNM A gainst Ind ians” and  the inside headline "No Indian PNM 
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Figure 19: A rticle  NO INDIAN PNM MPS
"With the two major political parties in the country still 
largely split by an ethnic divide, the Government and  
Opposition sparred in Parliament yesterday  over the issue  
o f race, w ith  UNC chairman Jack  Warner [an Afro- 
Trinidadian] accusing the PNM o f a long history o f  
discrimination against persons o f E ast Indian descen t
The retention  of D irectors appointed by the previous or departing  
political party  is perceived to be risky a t best, d isastrous, a t w orst; they 
are seen as com ing from the "other side”; "PNM”, "UNC”, "NAR,” 
acronym s for the political parties, the People’s National M ovement, the  
United Congress, and  the  National Alliance for R econstruction , 
respectively, have come to be signifiers (moreso with PNM an d  UNC) of 
the race of the party  follower. A PNM is typically an  A fro-Trinidadian 
while a UNC is an  Indo-Trinidadian. Interestingly, a  NAR or COP (the 
C ongress of the People) is typically class-draw n from all e thn ic  g roups 
and  encom passes both  racial types dom inan t in Trinidad.
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A negatively charged fact and one of the primary impacts that race has  
on politics in multiracial nations is that citizens from each of the races 
that exist view them selves and the groups to which they belong 
differently. Racial identity and racial formation immediately creates 
social and demographic categories that can be used to divide people. In 
turn, its impact on politics is felt when these different groups make 
demands on politicians regarding the need for different resources and 
different policies; this may impact on how they are treated and how they 
are perceived within the society (King and Smith, 2005). Insidiously, 
people within the country may actually perceive members of other racial 
groups to be socially inferior. Race may be used to divide people in a 
negative way in order to attempt to allow one racial group to receive 
greater resources than another group from politicians. Cries of 
inequality and discrimination, are frequent and sensational when 
political parties exchange positions. As differences between racial 
groups are identified and become part of the larger culture of the 
country contributing to and defining its ethos, social interactions are 
likely to be changed. Members of different racial groups may actually 
attempt to isolate them selves from each other. From the standpoint of 
politics and governance racial motivation can impede the development 
of a country such as Trinidad and Tobago. The impediment to 
development that can occur is social and political altercations that 
dominate between the groups and the organisations that represent 
them (King and Smith, 2005). Rather than focusing on growth for the 
entire country, resources are diverted to focus on how different racial 
groups can compete against each other to win access to resources from 
the others. This also creates a situation in which members of different 
racial groups come to distrust one another. The issue for the politician 
in power then becomes one of how trust can be gained from different 
racial groups who may feel disenfranchised and who may feel that their 
needs are not being met.
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One of the ways in which to gain trust in a racial society is to actually 
bring people together. Through interpersonal relationships, members of 
different racial groups can begin to cross racial lines and to encourage 
others from different groups to work together to improve the entire 
society as opposed to focusing on creating differences between people. 
At the sam e time, another way in which to create trust in a racial 
society is to actually work to prevent segregation and isolation, even if it 
desired only by some (Cho and Rudolph, 2008). It would be easy for 
politicians to allow isolation and segregation among races to occur if 
that seem ed to be desired. However, this also increases the m istrust 
between these groups as interaction is further reduced. Instead, 
politicians m ust work to bring members of different racial groups 
together so that they interact with each other and come to feel that they 
are not greatly different from one another.
Sadly, the face of a Board is reflective of the predominant ethnicity of 
the ruling party. This will explain the argum ents and 
counterarguments of the imbalance of Board appointments dependent 
on the prevailing race of the party that holds power. Statistics reported 
in the N ew sday  (2011) by the Government’s Chief Whip regarding board 
appointments show that the previously ruling Afro-party, the PNM, 
appointed 508 non-Indians (79 percent) and only 138 Indians (21 
percent). In contrast, under the People’s Partnership, a predominantly 
Indo-party there are 508 non-Indian board appointees (47 percent) and 
579 Indians (53 percent). This allocation ratio mirrors fairly accurately 
the demographic count of the last cen sus (2004); even with the 
ascendancy of Indo-Trinidadians as the m ost num erous ethnic group, 
and with all the optimism of youth, the ciy  of racial imbalance rem ains 
the same.
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P o lit ic a l P ow er and  In te r fe r e n c e
"Political interference” occurs where and when politics intersect with 
corporate governance. The relation between the corporate governor and 
the politician is seen as deleterious to the discharge of the function of 
corporate governance; precious little is seen as positive. This 
interference is more officious by the politicians and it is generally 
viewed as inherently negative since it seeks to direct rather than advise. 
Out of a deep sense of frustration, I#5 states:
“There is a lot o f attem pt to micromanage and  
control which is p art of the conundrum w e spoke  
about, it does not allow a board to do w h at it is 
supposed  to do. ”
Its meaning is at once specific and non-specific. U nless there is 
strenuous objection, the politicians are in control and they have their 
way. Indeed, political interference is cited, alm ost ad nauseam , as both 
a harbinger and primary cause of failed corporate governance.
The m ost persistently recurring phrase that depicts the definitive 
dimension of the political pattern is “political interference, ” whose chief 
aspect is the interpretation of the Line Minister’s exercise of his putative 
authority. This interference comes after the appointments are made to 
the Boards who perhaps labour under the m isapprehension that they 
are independent. This is perceived as an unwelcome and unwholesom e  
incursion into the organisation’s process of corporate governance. A 
significant fact emanating from this intrusion is the pressure to award 
contracts:
“w hen w e  left, the form er Minister who never got 
involved or told you to do this or do that but as  
soon as the new  Minister came in, (I w on ’t sa y  
which one, w e had two) literally brought out a
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written document (not on the telephone or fa ce  to 
face) stating that preference should be given to 
these contractors in how w e  give out contracts 
and the contractors were from  his constituency.”
(1*7)
Such an intrusion undoubtedly tarnishes and underm ines the integrity 
of the corporate governance process and those involved. Further, 
independence cannot exist if the decisions are made by parties to the 
Board of the organisations or without the Board’s willing agreement. 
However, the common notion about the nature of power in politics is the 
ability for politicians to be able to make decisions that benefit a country 
in the long run. This appears to be lost on the politicians of the day. 
The perception that abounds is that power in politics is about having 
control over people and control over money and the way in which it is 
spent (Moe, 2006). The reality, however, is that the nature of power in 
politics does not begin with the resources that are available or the 
people that can be impacted with those resources. Instead, the nature 
of power in politics is about attempting to have control over the very 
bureaucracy especially the state-owned companies that report to 
specific ministries, in which politicians are members.
For politicians then, exercising political power is about attempting to 
control the bureaucracy while also trying to have control over the rules 
and requirements that have been put into place over time (Moe, 2006). 
This is at the heart of the interference; the need to control which is not 
an act steeped in discretion (Benz and Frey, 2007). As politicians 
attempt to gain larger am ounts of control over the bureaucracies that 
they gradually and consciously lose sight of discretion. Discretion is so 
important because politicians have the ability to gain a great deal of 
power over the bureaucracy, which m eans that they can gain a great 
deal of power and control over the way in which state com panies and 
even the larger government interacts with citizens and serves their
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needs. In order for politicians to use that control in a m anner that can  
provide the greatest benefits to citizens, they m ust be able to practice 
discretion with regards to determining when they may have taken too 
m uch power or when they are not working closely enough with others to 
achieve positive outcom es for stakeholders (Benz and Frey, 2007).
Another useful way of thinking about discretion is to think about how  
political power can be monitored and even controlled when necessary in 
order to prevent a single person or group of people from having too 
m uch control over the state organisations. Importantly, therefore is the 
need for checks and balances to not only work, but also to appear to 
work in the favour of the organisation. The concepts of discretion and 
checks and balances as they relate to the nature of power in politics are 
important because political power can negatively influence the 
behaviour of those who are to be leaders in the state companies. As the 
Minister exercises greater control over the state company, the level of 
input and involvement with subordinates, which in the political arena 
would include the Directors appointed by the party or caused by the 
Minister, can become highly skewed. The politician Minister may lose 
focus on positively impacting all stakeholders of the particular state 
company and may become more focused on positively impacting his or 
at least very narrow outcomes. As Moe (2006) argues, these politicians 
may become concerned about how they can use the state com pany to 
gain financial incentives for them selves, or how they can achieve greater 
levels of control and power in comparison to others and at the expenses  
of others. And so, the leaders within the state-owned company  
environment are directly setting the tone through their leadership  
actions and behaviour. Another way of thinking about the im pact that 
political power can have on leadership behaviour is that political leaders 
may begin to view them selves as being different from others or som ehow  
more important than the people whom they are supposed to represent, 
they then arrogate to them selves a level of authority that they ought not 
to possess. Even more, their intervention into the affairs of the state-
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owned company may be less about an attempt to achieve a greater and 
positive outcome, and more about achieving personal goals and 
objectives that might increase in importance and scale (Moe, 2006). 
This can continue to the point where the Minister in his capacity as 
politician and leader may entire lose any sense of working for the 
benefit of the state company and focus entirely on working for the 
benefit of him self and the narrow band that serves him.
The power held by the Minister is not to be treated dismissively; it is a 
toxic leadership weapon whose use is bound up with disingenuity and 
malevolence. Power affects leadership because the person with control, 
the Minister has a higher level of control in personal interactions with 
the Chairman. What is m eant by this is that if a Chairman or Board 
members go to a politician to lobby for a specific outcome, the politician 
immediately has control over the interaction because it is the politician 
who has likely achieved at least some control over the political 
bureaucracy. The political power held by a Minister influence and  
directs a kind of behaviour that is focused on achieving personal goals 
and objectives. In order to achieve personal goals and objectives, and  
so, consistent with the characteristic of a dilemma, the goals and 
objectives of the group that can allow for power to be maintained  
increases their own power (Benz and Frey, 2007). So we see, overall, 
the nature of political power is indeed about obtaining control over the 
state-owned company. However, in an effort to not only achieve control 
over the bureaucracy but also to maintain that level of control and even 
increase control, leaders are likely to engage in behaviours that are not 
in the best interest of all stakeholders. Instead, leaders are likely to 
engage in behaviours that benefit them selves, which m eans engaging in 
behaviours that benefit specific groups that can provide them  with the 
continued power and personal benefits that they desire.
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S u m m ary  to  P e r ic e n tr ic  P o lit ic a l P a tte rn
Such is the unwholesom e rapport between politics and corporate 
governance that it would perhaps take nothing short of a constitutional 
reform to change its ugly practice; it is a cancer eating away at the 
nation’s productivity and general well-being. The nature of local politics 
and the logistics of seeking political office have created a tacit 
understanding between financiers and campaign workers on the one 
hand and political candidates on the other. The winning of political 
office m eans the gradual repayment of debts owed to those who worked 
to ensure victory at the polls. Even the m ost energetic, loyal and honest 
worker harbours expectations of reciprocity. The Party faithful seldom  
question their suitability for political appointment on a Board nor do 
they consider how the award of a contract can so easily compromise the 
integrity of their representative. Rather they see it as their right, 
som ething that they have in good conscience worked for and som ething  
that their representative is obligated to offer. Such is the cost of 
winning; from a corporate governance perspective, it is at best, a  pyrrhic 
victory.
It appears that there is a  sense of helplessness, impotence, alm ost a  
resignation to accept that “sim ply because of the politics” (I# 6) the newly 
appointed Board starts off with distrust which is inevitably directed at 
m anagem ent’s chief servant, the CEO. The prevention of the change in 
CEO lies in the strength of the CEO to show that no change is 
necessary. However, if the politician is motivated enough to seek a 
change of the CEO then the Board accedes to this with the rationale of 
“it s tem s from  the politics , ” “tha t’s  ju s t the nature o f things” I#4. The 
undeniable and corrosive ripple effect is that poor politicians equate to 
poor directors which equate to poor Boards leading to poor performance 
and ultimately poor corporate governance.
1 8 5
W ho’s M in d in g  T h e S to re
I could not resist the inclusion of the following article which appeared in 
one of the national papers. The compulsion to use it lies in its capacity 
to display what might be so symptomatic of the absence of corporate 
governance. At a session of the Public Accounts Enterprise Committee 
(PAEC), and as reported in one of the daily newspapers, the CEO of one 
state-owned company responded to questions in 2011 on the 2009  
company accounts and in particular receivables that were significantly 
aged to the extent of $6 million. That prompted one of the Ministers at 
the session, Subhas Panday, to ask: “This is a company incorporated by 
law and you are taking verbal bookings?” Ali, the CEO, replied: “Yes, 
Sir.” Reading from an audited document prepared by the firm KPMG, 
Fazal Karim, a sitting Minister, aptly said several major issu es were 
identified in a m anagement letter. He listed them as:
• No system s in place to allow for the checking, viewing and 
authorizing of journals;
• The need for proper controls to be implemented to ensure the 
safekeeping of all supporting docum ents, including original 
invoices;
• The company does not have a fixed assets capitalization policy 
which articulates the criteria for the recognition of depreciable 
fixed assets for m aintenance of the fixed assets; and
• No procedures in place to trigger a system s check to ensure the 
insurance coverage of assets is increased as additions are m ade.”
The Minister, Fazal Karim, appropriately asked: “Who w a s minding this 
store?” Let this wisdom not be lost. These are the utterances that m ust 
battle against the m orass of indifference.
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“We lik e  it  s o ” -  S u m m ary  o f In te r p r e ta t io n s
The interpretation of the interview literature forcefully establishes that 
there all kinds of chronic problems in the managem ent of state-owned 
companies in Trinidad and Tobago. Changes in government invariably 
have m eant changes of board members; however, the intractable 
problems persist and fester with the passage of time. These dilemmas 
persist because of the modalities of the political process: state-owned  
companies were created by the PNM government led by Eric Williams, 
who without doubt personally appointed many board members, 
irrespective of credentials and suitability of the appointees. This 
pattern has remained in force and has become the norm, the praxis. 
State-owned companies, instead of being properly managed entities 
serving the best interests of all citizens and the state, have over the 
decades become institutions of self-interest, corruption, and 
malfeasance.
The interview text reveals the gaping chasm  that divides cognition and 
perception of corporate governance on the one side and its 
implementation on the other. In this incongruity rests the source and  
understanding of the dilemmas that continue to plague state-owned  
companies. There is no proper screening process used to select board 
members; furthermore there are no special credentials required of those  
appointed. This opens the door for a variety of improper practices: 
payback, nepotism, cronyism; the entire process, sadly, lies at the 
caprice of ministers. Friends, relatives, the party faithful, and party 
hacks all have equal eligibility. The interviews tell u s  that there are 
chairmen who know m uch too little about corporate governance as well 
as chairmen who satisfactorily understand the nature of the  
phenomenon. The text also reveals that the practice of corporate 
governance leaves m uch to be desired: if it exists at all it is 
malnourished, emaciated, and impotent. The twin com ponents of
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accountability  and  risk  m anagem ent take their su sten an ce  from the 
p a ren t corporate governance: they, too, therefore are infirm  and  weak.
Revealed insisten tly  and  indubitably  is the perception th a t politics for 
decades h a s  been the avowed enemy, the ram p an t ogre th a t stym ies the 
hopeful progress and  fruition of corporate governance in state-ow ned 
com panies in Trinidad and  Tobago. The dilem m as in corporate  
governance in state-ow ned com panies derive from the chasm  th a t 
separa tes cognition of the  phenom enon and  the in stitu tion  of it. It is 
ne ither the perception nor the cognition of the phenom enon b u t the  all- 
too-evident inability to im plem ent it. Since there  is the  aw areness, one 
would readily accept th a t there should  be practice of it. Alarmingly, 
however, the  parties represen ting  the u n d ers tan d in g  or cognition albeit 
acceptable a t the collective level, have alm ost all expressed  the absence  
of the  very th ing  th a t they u n d ers tan d . The dilem m a can  p e rh ap s  be 
explained as an  inability on the p a rt of the Governors to im plem ent the 
proper practice of governance. The underly ing  reason  h a s  to logically lie 
in the pericentric political pa ttern ; in the lack of political will and  lack of 
collective will. The sam eness of the  th ink ing  and  responses by the 
interviewees to the process and  m eaning of corporate governance is 






Figure 20 -  C om bined  P a t te rn s  
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The essential dilemma is that the m ost of the leaders of corporate 
governance know what it is, but are unable to implement meaningful 
corporate governance in state-owned enterprises; that corporate 
governance is denied its essential existence lies in what one participant 
predictively states “it’s  ju s t  the politics” (I#6). Since Trinidad and Tobago 
is the provenance of the calypso, it is not inappropriate to sum  up the 
cause of dilemmas in state-owned companies in the words of an 
unforgettable calypso by Dr. Francisco Slinger, aka the Mighty Sparrow, 
universally acknowledged as the greatest practitioner of the art form, 
“We Like It So”.
C o n c lu s io n
A retrospective look across the landscape of the interview literature 
reminds u s that there are three huge emergent patterns that reveal the 
nature and solidity of the dilemmas that have plagued and continue to 
plague state-owned enterprises in Trinidad and Tobago. Simply put, 
the overarching dilemma is that the political culture of the island  
compromises, discourages, and fuels the non-performance of corporate 
governors. Using the circle as a metaphor for the gamut of responses to 
the perception and cognition of the phenom enon of corporate 
governance, I have been able to discover, describe, and analyse three 
primary patterns: the centripetal which comprises those com m ents that 
move corporate governance towards the centre; diametrically opposed is 
the centrifugal, comm ents that cause the move away from the desired 
centre; and the political pattern, named the pericentric to maintain  
harmony with the metaphor of the circle. While the centrifugal and 
centripetal indicate the rising and falling tides of com m ents, the 
pericentric is stationary, looming threateningly over the centre and 
preventing its attainment. If it could be removed or circumnavigated, 
proper corporate governance will emerge slowly but steadily. As long as 
the stubborn political culture holds its ground and continues to dictate 
the pace, corporate governance m ust remain merely a fervent hope. The
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pericentric pattern, essentially the political pattern, is the source of the 
dilemmas; it is the chasm  between cognition and perception: generally 
speaking they know what it is, what it ought to be, what is necessary to 
get to the corporate governance circle’s centre; the centripetal pattern. 
What they see in practice moves away from the circle’s desired centre, 
the centrifugal pattern is the practice; the centre proves elusive, the 
pericentric; inpenetrable, forbidding, eutrophicating the centripetal.
The interview literature reveals that the political culture runs the show: 
it chooses the Boards and governors, directs them into expedient 
strategies, and is directly responsible for creating a huge chasm  
between board performance and public expectation. I believe there is 
no state enterprise in Trinidad and Tobago that can truthfully boast of 
regularly following the best ethical practice of corporate governance. A 
very recent example is provided by Clarence Rambharat, a frequent, 
prolific and scathing writer on governance matters, writing in the 
Trinidad Express, 6 /1 0 /2 0 1 2  in an article titled "Bigger than a 
Breadfruit”: Rambharat berates the Chairman of a  state-owned entity 
Lake Asphalt Company of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT) over a reported 
fiasco whereby the Chairman ordered the Company’s m anagem ent to 
halt the import of a particular product and instead direct its purchase 
from a company allegedly owned by a close relative of a senior 
government Minister. The Chairman’s response when questioned by 
the media on the allegations was shrouded in ambiguity; Rambharat 
suggests, appropriately the m isunderstanding of the Chairman of the 
role and responsibilities of the Board of a state-owned enterprise, in 
particular, the Chairman. When unqualified and unsuitable individuals 
are placed on state Boards, there can only be one result: certain 
incompetence and failure. When suitable, qualified individuals occupy 
board chairs, political interference renders them weak, servile, and 
merely complaisant. These dilemmas exist in the three main facets of 
corporate governance: the day-to-day business of governing,
accountability, and risk management. They have become chronic,
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widespread, and virulent: a cancer that continues to eat away at the 
veiy tissue of corporate governance. Left unchecked for m uch too long, 
it has become life-threatening: state-owned companies in Trinidad and  
Tobago are experiencing prolonged suffering that, if ignored and 
untreated, m ust eventually end in death.
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CHAPTER SIX -  'INFRA-FUNDAMENTAL' RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE W ITHIN THE STATE OW NED  
ENTERPRISE
In tr o d u c tio n
This is a short but important chapter which not only provides symmetry 
but also outlines the contribution, adds a mandatory concluding  
subm ission and completes the thesis. All that goes before in Chapter 
Five relay the results of the objectives of the research; through the 
questions and the research methodology described in Chapter Three, 
dilemmas have been revealed. A sixth Chapter was not originally 
envisaged, but as the DBA program of business research encourages 
practical contributions. The recognition of the necessity of this short 
Chapter arrived when I alm ost completed Chapter Five; so what? was 
the question that drove its start. Some might argue that the Chapter is 
simple. The recommendations are directly juxtaposed to the problems; 
its complexity lies in its recognition, acceptance and implementation. 
The issue areas before u s m ust be subject to serious and sincere 
thought if we are to attach importance to the words we utter about 
corporate governance; to prevent them from being subject to lofty but 
empty rhetoric by those who preside over its practice. At the end of 
Chapter Five, I drew reference to the moribund health of state-owned  
companies in Trinidad and Tobago and to two salient conclusions: one, 
that if left untreated the body politic of the entities will crawl painfully 
to an inescapable death; and two, that if treated properly, their health  
can be improved and restored. This final chapter, with the benefit of 
research and the resultant knowledge of the nature, progress, and the 
stage of the disease, offers timely treatment; its function is curative, and 
its call is urgent. The health of state-owned companies in Trinidad and  
Tobago impacts significantly on the overall health, integrity, and  
vibrancy of the island’s body politic; in turn, the island’s health im pacts
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significantly on the region’s health. Corporate Governance as the World 
Bank’s Caribbean Trade and Investment Report (2005) reminds us, 
holds the balance between economic and social goals and the alignment 
of the interests of individuals, corporations and society. It is therefore 
imperative to begin the restorative process that will afford our state 
enterprises the chance for vibrant life they naturally deserve; the will to 
survive can make all the difference between merely existing and living 
abundantly. My recommendations are not meant to be a panacea; 
rather, they are submitted in respectful humility but with expectation. I 
believe that if taken seriously, they can effect change in the discharge of 
corporate governance in state-owned entities in Trinidad and Tobago, 
and restore to them health, individual pride, and public approbation.
With this in mind, I have coined the word 'infra-fundamental’ to convey 
the absolute importance that m ust attach to the four large 
recommendations I have offered in this chapter. Infra m eans that 
which sits below or underneath something. Infra-fundamental 
recommendations are therefore the bedrock on which the fundam ental 
recommendations for corporate governance lie. The four primary 
recommendations offered in this chapter are:
1. The urgent need for the implementation a unified corporate 
governance code for the State owned companies.
2. The insistence on achieving as far as possible, Director 
independence.
3. The crucial role of education in promoting corporate governance.
4. The effective rationalization of the number and need for State- 
owned companies.
Not offering my recommendations which I believe to be fundam ental 
would leave a chasm  in my coverage of the subject and secondly, reduce 
the efficacy of my research. I make no claim to have all of the
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recommendations that are needed nor do I intend to offer an exegesis of 
those recommendations that I have put forward. The recommendations 
are offered with profound humility and hope and are intended to deliver 
an appreciation to the interested reader that m uch can be done with 
little. Reforming and enhancing the pillars of corporate governance in 
state-owned companies starts with a few small steps that invariably 
lead to a journey that is in no small part, is tortuous, but richly 
rewarding. Corporate governance is a complex but yet straightforward 
process; and Carver and Oliver (2002) describe it as a simple but 
profound system. The literature-review chapter points to the fact that 
too little published work exists about corporate governance within state- 
owned companies and at the sam e time it also shows the importance of 
corporate governance for any organisation that has either shareholders 
or stakeholders, public or private. The noteworthy corporate 
governance author, Mallin (2010), states that, regardless of geographic 
region, the common and essential characteristics of good governance 
are transparency, accountability, risk m anagement and ethical 
behaviour. Cadbury (1992) endorses this in his sem inal work. 
Appropriately, Gaines-Ross (2008) point out that growing public 
distrust should propel good corporate governance. Confirming Mallin’s 
(2010) statem ents are important inputs in the subject area from 
DiPiazza and Eccles (2002) who in the face of business failures wrote 
about re-building public trust. Central to their work is the promotion of 
a three-tier model corporate transparency. The model em bodies the 
three core concepts of transparency, accountability and integrity. The 
authors’ m ost arresting assertion to me is where they state that while 
rules and standards and frameworks are important they are limited as 
transparency and accountability can only be achieved by people 
committed to individual integrity.
The preceding chapter dem onstrates that there are key dilem m as within  
the discharge of corporate governance; alarmingly, it shows at the heart
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of the dilemmas lies the om inous pericentric political pattern. If we 
accept that the core of corporate governance is surrounded by this 
seemingly impenetrable barrier and formidable fortress then that 
should be the first port of call in examining appropriate 
recommendations. These recommendations in my opinion are not 
mutually exclusive; they are intertwined and dependent, one alone will 
not get u s to the desired level of governance, but each one is key. The 
recommendations are what I consider basic and fundamental; 
nonetheless, there is a kind of complexity that attaches to its 
acceptance and the willingness for its implementation. This m ust be 
done by the politicians. Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) correctly claim  
that corporate governance structures are fundamentally the result of 
political decisions. The development and institutionalization of a 
corporate governance code for state-owned companies in Trinidad and 
Tobago m ust therefore be insisted on by the political shareholder acting 
on behalf of and for the greater good for the true shareholders or 
stakeholders who are, in the context of a state-owned company, the 
general citizens. These citizens place their trust in the politicians who 
act as the shareholder, corporation sole, the singular acting on behalf of 
the majority; all citizens, therefore are real shareholders in this sense. I 
am reminded by Malcolm Gladwell (2009) that som etim es big changes 
follow from small events and that som etim es these changes can happen  
very quickly.
C orporate G ov ern a n ce  C ode an d  P r in c ip le s  for S ta te -O w n e d  
C o m p a n ies
In Chapter Two, I stated that there was no unified corporate-governance 
code in Trinidad and Tobago though there are pieces of legislation that 
perhaps at best coalesce to form a rudimentary corporate-governance 
system . A recent study conducted by Syntegra Change Architects 
reported in the Trinidad Guardian (November 27, 2011), reveals that
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only 25% of companies in the private sector practice some form of 
acceptable corporate governance; the true enormity of the situation is 
revealed when we consider, according to Shleifer (1998), that private 
sector is often thought to lead in the development of corporate 
governance system s. Because state ownership or the involvement of the 
state in owning companies will not go away anytime soon, the 
fashioning of a code of corporate governance becomes all the more 
necessary and urgent.
A corporate governance code m ust establish the importance of 
principles, processes, standards, and policies that regulate the 
administration, monitoring, and control of a company. This process 
properly executed guarantees equilibrium between the stakeholders and 
the governors of the organisation. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) argue 
that a corporate governance code is a set of standards that dictates how  
a company and its Board of Directors should behave regarding 
decisions to be made on the organisation’s behalf. This is a noticeable 
feature in large companies, especially those that dominate in the USA 
and Europe. Although Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) claim that 
Trinidad’s first governance code was created in 2006, the demonstrable 
fact is that Trinidad and Tobago does not have a corporate governance 
code. These respected individuals are no doubt referring to the 
guidelines presented in the Central Bank docum ents (2006); while these  
guidelines are a step in the right direction, its relevance is restricted to 
financial institutions; they cannot be interpreted to am ount to a 
corporate governance code. It is worth noting that the USA and UK 
within a fourteen-year period (1978-1992) have instituted no fewer than  
twenty five (25) governance codes and, as Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2009) further point out, these countries have the m ost governance 
codes of any countries. If governments are serious about Trinidad and 
Tobago attaining developed country status, the adoption of a corporate 
governance code is an imperative that m ust not be postponed.
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Typically, governance codes and principles include stipulations 
regarding acting in the best interest of the owners of a company. 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) rightly assert that within the authority 
structure of the organisation, corporate governance is central to the 
m ost important issu es of society. Another position offered by 
Wymeersch (2006) suggests that corporate-governance codes m ust 
establish a foundation that addresses the concerns and issu es that 
ought to be present in the mind of a company’s leader when decisions 
are made. In the case of the concern about stockholders, governance 
codes and principles such as those shaped by Cadbury and Hemple 
would direct that the members of the Boards of Directors ensure that 
any decisions that are made will not result in a decline of its stock value 
through loss of reputation or performance. The idea of principles within 
a corporate governance code, therefore, is a proposition that is 
foundational for a set of beliefs or actions (Wymeersch, 2006). A 
principle that states that members of a Board of Directors ought to act 
in the best interest of stockholders m ust be a foundation for the belief 
that a company’s executive leaders m ust work to serve the owners of 
the organisation and not them selves. A corporate governance code 
might also contain a principle that states that any allegations of 
unethical behaviour will be investigated. This principle provides a 
foundation for the belief that any allegations of unethical behaviour, 
regardless of the person that m akes the allegation, should be taken  
seriously and should be investigated until their validity is determined. 
A code therefore represents a set of principles providing a general model 
or overall direction for corporate governance. Rules and regulations 
then become actual m easures that force compliance to the codes and 
principles: the code prescribes; the rules and regulations or practices 
subscribe.
There are key characteristics of corporate governance codes that can  
make them more practicable and attractive. Again, Wymeersch (2006)
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points to one of the key characteristics of a strong corporate governance 
code that m akes it both useful and compelling: its concern for the 
protection of shareholders and stakeholders. Boards of Directors need  
to be reminded that they do not represent them selves in the actions 
that they make. They represent the government and stakeholders of the 
country and m ust understand that these state-owned com panies 
impact a large number of people: employees, custom ers and, in m ost 
cases, the general public. The members of Boards of Directors have to 
be directed to not only think about the shareholders, but also to think  
about how the decisions that they make may impact other stakeholders 
who are affected by the organisations that they lead. Carver and Oliver 
(2002) who in promoting their policy governance framework reinforces 
this correctly assert that governance advances can only be gained when  
there is a recognition that governance is an extension of ownership and  
not management.
I believe that a compelling and authoritative corporate governance code 
for state-owned enterprise is necessary to guide the proper institution of 
practices within the state-owned entities. The m ost recent edition of the  
State Performance Monitoring m anual 2011, endorsed by the Ministry 
of Finance, targets the improvement of a corporate governance 
framework for state-owned companies, essentially providing som ething  
more akin to standards and practices that are intended to assist in the 
improvement of the governance framework of the entities under  
government ownership or owned by corporation sole. A governance 
code then is one that is meaningful and has a fullness attached to it. 
Addressing the importance of codes, Wymeersch (2006) argues that 
companies that lack corporate governance codes or that have very weak  
corporate governance codes are often viewed with a lack of respect and 
trust on the part of the public. In some countries, com panies w ithout 
corporate governance codes are not allowed to have their stock listed on 
major stock exchanges. In this regard, a strong corporate governance
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code for Trinidad and Tobago’s state-owned companies is not ju st about 
attempting to win the respect of the general public; more importantly, it 
is about the ability to gain the respect of regulators and to be able to 
m uster the qualification to list on relevant stock exchanges.
It is commonly recognized that the countries with the strongest 
corporate governance codes and rules regarding the use  of corporate 
governance codes are those that have large publicly traded companies. 
Countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Germany have formal rules that require companies to issue corporate 
governance codes and to make them part of the decision-m aking  
process for executive leaders (Wymeersch, 2006). These countries also 
have rules that require that companies list their governance codes 
within the annual reports that are released to the shareholders and the 
public each year. This dem onstrates that regulators view corporate 
governance codes as a serious aspect of corporate leadership activities. 
Mallin (2010) provides u s with a positive example of the development 
and impact of codes; Hungary through its corporate governance code 
published in 2004, requires state companies to comply or explain as 
part of its disclosure requirement: The Hungarian Companies Act of 
2006 m akes it law for an annual report on corporate governance to be 
published and submitted at the company’s AGM. China, a country with 
state ownership not indifferent to the influence of politics and 
corruption, according to Edward Elgar (1999), has started a necessary  
and long term corporate governance arrangement that will no doubt go 
through a process of refinement. In January 2001, Mallin (2010) 
informs us, China issued a code of corporate governance; interestingly, 
the code is based on the OECD (1999) principles of corporate 
governance. Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) offer valuable advice by 
pointing to the broad-ranging impact of corporate governance on social 
mobility and stability: it directs incentives to invest in hum an capital, 
facilitates the creation and distribution of wealth, and intersects with
1 9 9
enterprise
education and social system s. It will be inimical to Trinidad and 
Tobago’s interest to ignore the development of a corporate governance 
code. Philip Marshall (2010), a frequent and locally renowned speaker 
on corporate governance, tells u s that a history of inaction leads to a 
kind of decay in corporate governance. The failure of corporate 
governance is also due to the attitude and personal qualities of 
Directors. A code without consequence is akin to the proverbial 
toothless bulldog.
C orporate  G o v ern a n ce  C ode an d  th e  L egal F ram ew ork
I believe that consequence m anagement m ust attach to the existence of 
a corporate governance code; and some way of annexing the corporate 
governance code to the existing laws in Trinidad and Tobago to allow for 
consequence management m ust therefore be found. For example, USA 
has implemented strong regulations related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
that allow for tougher penalties against company leaders who fail to act 
in the best interest of shareholders and who attempt to act unethically  
and illegally (Wymeersch 2006). In USA, corporate executives can be 
held personally liable for making materially false claim s in annual 
reports and in the financial statem ents that are released to the 
investing public. This provides incontrovertible and relevant evidence of 
the strength of corporate governance codes and the rules associated  
with the implementation and u se of corporate governance codes in the 
United States. Laws have been enacted that essentially require 
companies to not only create governance codes, but also to actually 
make them part of the decision-making process. Moreover, basic 
principles that are found in m ost corporate governance codes, such  as 
acting in the best interest of shareholders, have moved from being an  
ethical issue to being a legal issue. The elem ents of corporate 
governance codes have been written into law to ensure that those basic
200
enterprise
principles are followed and not simply included in a governance code 
and then ignored without any threat of punishm ent (Wymeersch, 2006).
As I have noted before, m uch of the discussion about corporate 
governance codes seem s to exist in relation to stockholders of private 
companies; therefore, the discussion about the benefits of governance 
codes is typically related to shareholders gaining confidence in the 
companies in which they invest. However, for state-owned com panies, 
there are no public shareholders as such to protect. Instead, where the 
government owns the enterprise, the code will exist to protect the key 
stakeholders who are the real shareholders in the corporate comparison 
and by extension the shareholders representative, the corporation sole.
One of the benefits of a governance code for a state-owned enterprise 
can be a reduction in the cost of capital (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). 
Even in a state-owned enterprise, capital m ust be used in an attem pt to 
generate specific outcomes. It may be argued that because a company  
is state-owned, its leaders might believe that the am ount of capital that 
is used or the outcom es that are achieved from the use of the capital is  
unimportant. However, Black, Jang and Kim, (2006) argue that with 
the implementation and use of a governance code, leaders of a state- 
owned enterprise can know that they are expected to make decisions in 
a way that will generate the highest returns and greatest efficiency from 
the capital that is used. Furthermore, governance codes can also 
benefit state-owned enterprises because executive leaders have a set of 
principles to follow so that they know that they are not acting only for 
them selves (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). As in a private company, 
state-owned enterprises operate to achieve specific outcom es, one of 
which is generally to achieve returns from the money that is used. In 
this regard, the leaders of state-owned enterprises need to know that 
they are expected to not m isuse or misappropriate funds. Even more,
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they need to know that they are being held to a specific standard 
regarding their actions.
I have alluded to the need to tie in the code to relevant legislation; in 
order for governance codes to be implemented in a successfu l m anner 
in state-owned enterprises, Trinidad and Tobago’s legal system  m ust 
include specific characteristics. One characteristic that m ust be 
present within a country’s legal system  is a set of rules and regulations 
that protect investors and market structure (Denis and McConnell, 
2001). Even if the only investor is the government of Trinidad and 
Tobago, rules m ust be in place that provide protection for the 
government by ensuring that company leaders face prosecution and 
punishm ent for engaging in the m ost commonly alleged misgovernance 
practices; for corruption, or corrupt practices and for generally not 
acting in the best interest of the enterprise m ust be present. The need  
for a corporate governance code is nullified in the absence of an 
appropriate legal frame-work; no consequence m anagem ent m eans 
lesser compulsion for adherence. Dennis and McConnell, (2001) point 
out that in order for countries to be able to implement strong 
governance codes to dictate the actions of the leaders of state-owned  
enterprises, changes m ust be made to the legal system  that provide for 
the ability to pursue executive leaders that do not respect the owners of 
the companies that they operate even if the owner is that state.
One does not have to go far for germane examples: USA and UK are two 
leading countries that have performed substantial work within their 
legal system s to necessitate the implementation of corporate governance 
codes. Though these two countries have enterprises that are owned or 
operated by their respective governments, m ost of their com panies are 
privately owned and operated. However, the key driver of the 
implemented rules and regulations lies in the accounting and ethical 
scandals and is not dissimilar to that of allegations surfacing in
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Trinidad and Tobago which describe directors and politicians as feeding 
“at the trough of the national coffers” through corruption within state- 
owned entities. The sum  result is that the perpetrators involved in 
accounting and ethical scandals of corporations in both USA and UK 
have to contend with laws that are designed to protect investors by 
ensuring that members of corporate Boards of directors act in the best 
interest of shareholders and owners and not in their own private best 
interests (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2007). What is demonstrated in the 
fact that the United States and the United Kingdom have taken 
additional steps to impose regulations regarding corporate governance 
codes is that both countries were able to work from existing legal 
system s that already provided strong protections for the rights of 
investors (Denis and McConnell, 2001). It is recognized that Trinidad 
and Tobago may not be as fortunate, but for countries that have larger 
numbers of state-owned enterprises and fewer legal protections for 
investors or stakeholders, implementing rules requiring corporate 
governance codes is, although difficult, quite necessary (Rajagopalan 
and Zhang, 2007). An important additional consideration is that of 
having a forceful whistle blower policy that state com panies m ust 
institute. However, its careful handling is urged. Devine and 
Maassarani (2011) refer to Dr. Jeffery Wigand in their book who 
describes whistle blowing within a range of extremes: the highest risk, 
highest stakes, m ost inspiring, m ost disillusioning experience. Two of 
the m ost high profile scandals in the USA bear out this sentiment; 
Enron’s Sharon Watkins and Worldcom’s Cynthia Cooper.
Although some interviewees referred to in Chapter Five, rubbished the 
Integrity Commission, the Integrity in Public Life Act (2003) places 
em phasis on the significance of integrity towards the prevention of 
unlawful and wrongful actions such as corruption while attempting to 
regulate the conduct of persons exercising public functions. The 
strength of the Commission ought to lie in its existential claim to be
2 0 3
enterprise
independent; the directors are independent directors who shall be free 
from the influence of any other party. What it does tell u s then is that 
during the period 2006 to 2012 we have seen the forced departure of 
four chairmen of the Integrity Commission, this m uch touted, august 
and independent body created to investigate matters related to 
malfeasance and misfeasance; all of these have departed in 
uncerem onious fashion for having violated some basic tenet of 
corporate governance. Further, when one adds to the mix the report 
released by Corruption Perception Index 2011, (Daily Express 
December 2, 2011), indicating that Trinidad and Tobago moved from 
being ranked 31 out of 91 countries in 2001 to the unenviable position  
of 91 out of 183 countries, it becomes evident even to the m ost ardent 
disbeliever that corruption is an issue that the country can ill afford to 
ignore.
D e m o n str a tin g  C o n se q u e n c e
Quite apart from having the legislative framework annexed to the 
corporate governance code, I believe that it is also necessary to have a 
system  that can bring the purveyors of corporate m isdeeds and  
misgovernance to swift justice in the shortest space of time. 
Anecdotally, although some alleged conspirators have been nam ed and  
thus shamed, I cannot recall one instance in Trinidad and Tobago when  
a named alleged perpetrator has actually been convicted and heavily 
fined or incarcerated. In USA, the system  works effectively and swiftly. 
It is instructive to note the US Justice system s run in a swift and  
certain manner in bringing cases against alleged m iscreants in the 
corporate world. In Trinidad and Tobago, a linchpin that is available in 
the legal arsenal is the Trinidad and Tobago Prevention of Corruption 
Act (1987) an act that compares favourably with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of the USA and the Anti Bribery Act of the United 
Kingdom. To reinforce the relevance of this Act I have developed the
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following table th a t com pares the po ten t Acts of the USA, U nited 
Kingdom and  Trinidad and  Tobago. To me, it speaks for itself.
C om para tive  D im en sio n s of US, UK and  T rin id ad  A cts
Who is being bribed Only bribes paid or 
offered to foreign 
public officials are 
prohibited
Prohibits bribes paid 
to any person, 
including private 
individuals, 
com panies and 
foreign public 
officials
Prohibits bribes in any 
matter in which the 
State or a public body 
is involved
Nature of offence Paying or offering to 
pay the bri be
Both the payment 
and/or recei pt of 
bribe
Both the payment 
and/or receipt of bribe
Fines and penalties Up to 5 years 
imprisonment and 
fines up to US$2  
million
Up to 10 years 
imprisonment and 
unlimited fines
TT$500,000 and/or up 
to 10 years 
imprisonment plus 
seizure of bribe money
Facilitating Payments Provides exception  
to expedite or 
secure the 








Not expressly covered, 
but D P P ’s  consent 
needed before any 
prosecution can be 
initiated
Jurisdiction U.S. com panies and 
citizens; foreign 
com panies listed on 
the U.S. Stock  
Exchange and any 
person acting while 
in the U.S.
UK nationals or 
ordinary residents; 
com panies that are 
established in the 
UK; com panies that 
conduct part of their 
business in the UK; 
foreign com panies 
employing UK 
citizens.
Any person en gaged  in 
a transaction in which 
the State or a public 
body is concerned
Books and records 
provisions
Requires that 
com panies “make 




accurately and fairly 
reflecting the 
transactions and 
dispositions of the 
a sse ts  of the issuer.”
Requires that 
com panies maintain 
appropriate 
accounting records 
that would reveal 
corruption
Judge on ex-parte 
application of senior 
police officer can  
authorize the 
inspection and copying 
of financial records, 
wherever located, of 




A quick and cursory examination of this exacting system  in the USA is 
perhaps necessary if only to convey the effect of a well-working system  
that brings consequences to bear on perpetrators of m alfeasance. In 
recent years, the United States has presented itself as one of the 
countries that are m ost highly effective in investigating, identifying and 
prosecuting corporate governance violators. Such notorious corporation 
leaders as those of Enron, WorldCom, Healthsouth, Stanford 
International Bank, Madoff, among others, have been named, sham ed, 
jailed, forced to repay and make restitution, and have had assets seized 
in varying degrees. In researching this, Henning (2008) suggests a 
compelling reason why the United States has been so successfu l at 
identifying and prosecuting violators of corporate fraud; it is because of 
the legal system  that exists within the United States regarding bu sin ess  
regulations and investor protections. The United States has developed 
a large number of laws and regulations that govern the actions of 
corporate leaders. Prosecutors in the United States have a variety of 
laws that they can use to pursue corporate leaders when violations of 
corporate governance occur. Over many decades, new and tougher laws 
have been implemented to complement existing laws that make it 
possible to pursue and convict corporate leaders for their actions. This 
I believe has served well in demanding a level of accountability from 
corporate leaders. The m essage that has been sent in the United States 
to corporate leaders is that even indirect involvement and knowledge of 
fraudulent actions and behaviours can result in lengthy prison 
sentences.
In commenting further on the applicability of sentencing guidelines in 
the USA, Henning (2008) argues that with new sentencing guidelines 
introduced through the m uch-touted Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 , the  
threat exists that corporate leaders will face longer prison sentences if 
they are convicted of corporate fraud. In changing sentencing  
guidelines, the m essage was sent that corporate fraud should not be
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considered an offence that is common or acceptable, and only deserving 
of a light prison sentence. I believe that this point is well worth 
remembering by those with the power to enact legislation in Trinidad 
and Tobago to ensure that the belief that "I can get away therefore I will 
push the envelope” is suppressed and extinguished as far as is 
practically possible. Again, Malcolm Gladwell (2009) in his popular 
book The Tipping Point, refers to such a situation as a geometric 
progression of a virus; if left unchecked, it will multiply like a virus 
through a population. In a country where non-compliance is fast 
becoming the norm, it is essential that Trinidad and Tobago insist on 
compliance and routinely permit transgressions.
D irec to r  E f fe c t iv e n e s s  an d  In d e p e n d e n c e
This treatment and interpretation of director independence and  
effectiveness within the state-owned enterprises I believe is elusive and  
slippery. Gaines-Ross (2008) rightly identifies that Directors have a 
special responsibility to their stakeholders especially to avoid decisions 
or behaviour that could be perceived as negligent. According to Shen  
and Jia (2005), an independent director is a person who is a member of 
a company's executive leadership who has no affiliation with the 
company other than in his or her capacity as a director. Therefore, the 
independent director is one who is able to make decisions based on the 
best interest of the company and its stakeholders. The pericentric 
political pattern, detailed in Chapter Five, dem onstrates that corporate 
governors are not perceived as independent. Instead, the deprecatory 
“party hacks”, and “appointed by the party” association seriously  
injures a director’s worth; few if any will wish to be described as a party 
hack. Interviewees have stated that their positions are jeopardized if 
they do not follow instructions or heed the directions of line m inisters. 
It stands to reason, therefore, that in the main, directors who are 
politically appointed may be pressured either directly or indirectly to
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make certain decisions that a truly independent director may not make. 
Shen and Jia (2005) point out that in any organisation with a high-level 
of state control, personal concerns can be stronger than concerns for 
other stakeholders. However, I believe that naivety cannot stand in the 
way of practicality and that there m ust be recognition that Trinidad and 
Tobago is, by global standards, a small country; this m eans that there 
is a small pool of board personnel from which to choose. Reassuringly 
however, Morck (2007) indicates that this problem is not ju st confined  
to corporations in small states, it is also present in larger countries with 
better established institutes of corporate governance; he further states 
that stricter rules of choosing independent directors are therefore 
needed. Notwithstanding Trinidad and Tobago’s size and the challenges 
to find appropriate individuals, all avenues m ust be pursued to ensure 
that there is director independence in state-owned companies. In 
discussing the importance of the effectiveness, Shen and Jia (2005) 
underscore the director’s role in the leadership and ethical tone of the 
company. Specifically relating to the position of the Chairman, he 
argues that an effective Chairman is fundamental to any Board with the 
quintessential attributes of knowledge, experience, ability to grasp 
complex concepts and to lead and build relationships. DiPiazza and 
Eccles (2002) views on the importance of transparency, accountability 
and integrity are telling. Shen and Jia (2005) rightly insist that good 
governance relies on high ethical standards of Directors or the 
principles governing business behaviour.
I believe that serious consideration m ust be given to creating a national 
pool of directors who by virtue of their qualifications, experience and  
training can be available for selection to provide the oversight of the 
state-owned entities regardless of political affiliation or race. This pool 
will comprise a core body of qualified, trained, experienced and 
interested candidates to serve on state-owned enterprises. This pre­
qualification of directors to be listed in this body will be available to the
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government to select from and they will be recommended to the party 
that appoints which is a core office of the corporation sole. The 
question I will pose to detractors of this recommendation is, if not, why 
not? Anne-Marie B issessar (2009) Professor of Behavioural Sciences at 
the University of the West Indies and a regular commentator in the 
national press, observes that Trinidad and Tobago, being a plural 
society with a long and difficult history, too often foregrounds “the 
political issu e ’ which dim inishes the stock of integrity in state-owned  
companies. She argues that the political system  in the country places 
an obstacle to ensuring integrity in the affairs of the corporation and  
the discharge of appropriate levels of corporate governance. Ideally, 
neither race, ethnicity, nor party affiliation m ust be taken into account. 
Simply put, the m ost qualified and suitable persons ought to be chosen  
to be board members.
Instead, one ethnic group prevails in each election and therefore we 
have either PNM Directors or UNC Directors, political party acronyms 
usually associating the Directors with race, in the main. An important 
feature of a board’s composition which relates to good governance is the 
one whereby the board is not only capable of exercising independent 
judgm ent but one which is also perceived as being capable of exercising 
independent judgment; acting in the best interest of the company at all 
times; this is the independence that is required. Bain (2008) agreeably 
and simply states that an effective chairman is fundam ental to any  
Board. This effectiveness relies on the characteristics of being 
knowledgeable and experienced, possessing the ability to conceptualize 
and grasp complex issues, lead with morality, provide em pathy and  
identify issu es and trends. The importance of this perceived 
independence that I refer to should be apparent to anyone reading 
Reginald Dumas, a well-respected former head of the Trinidad and  
Tobago Public Service, who tells u s  in a very frustrated m anner of his  
attempt beginning in 1992 to educate the public sector on the roles on
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of the board members. He advises that “being made a director of a 
State Enterprise should not be seen as part of the spoils of office”. He 
informs his readers of an important action crafted by the then Minister 
responsible for State Enterprises, Ken Gordon, in 1987, which resulted  
in the creation and issuance of guidelines of how Boards should  
operate, the responsibilities of chairman and other directors. This 
guideline was an indication that in 1987 all was not well. He asks 
somewhat rhetorically, “more than 20 years later, have things changed  
for the better?” The informants’ views and interpretations from the 
texts that I have offered confirm what Mr. Dum as is saying in 2011; 
political party affiliation and its indubitable companion, race, places on 
Boards persons who are unsuitable. Mr. Dum as’s words become more 
scathing and eloquent: “persons are thrust into positions for which they 
are conspicuously unfitted by intellect, experience and temperament. 
Square pegs abound, unable to negotiate the round holes before them .” 
The essence of Mr. D um as’s article is to beg the indulgence of the State 
to provide a m echanism  for obtaining a better crop of directors rather 
than the preponderance of party hacks that he sees as dominating. 
(Daily Express, 30 August 2011)
R a tio n a liz in g  S ta te  O w n ersh ip  o f  C o m p a n ies
Another recommendation pertains to the need to rethink the 
rationalization of state-owned entities. Clarence Rambharat, a Lawyer 
and University lecturer, questions the “raison d'etre” of state com panies 
and argues that there are too many state enterprises: “we do not need  
separate entities for seafood development, film and entertainment; and  
separate rural, urban and community development companies, PSAEL 
and so on” (Trinidad Express, 27 June 2011). The rationale for the 
formation of the number of state com panies really ought to occupy the 
minds of the politicians since they are the ones that have the power to 
create them. If the country is saddled with corporate governance
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problems the solution certainly is not too [sic] add to the stock of 
companies, rather a dwindling of the number is advisable. This can  
perhaps be argued by the politicians as counter to the objectives of the 
politics. Rather, incentives to the private sector to develop the likes of 
seafood, film, estate managem ent could be better managed from an 
efficiency and economic perspective. Or at least its feasibility should be 
explored.
It may be that the state's role has already been fulfilled for some of its 
owned entities; private enterprise can achieve the intended economic or 
developmental outcome. State ownership may be essential for social, 
economic or strategic interests at varying points in a country’s 
development; this tends to occur more-so in developing countries and 
particularly when an industry is in its developmental stage (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). Government’s importance, 
therefore, is to provide resources that allow the industry to be able to 
grow and mature; it forgoes profits if necessary to allow the industry to 
be established. For example, state ownership of banks is beneficial as it 
impacts the public good. The state’s ownership m akes it easier to 
establish rules by which loans are made to businesses so as to further 
help in the development of the entire country; in so doing, a state- 
owned organisation could operate for years unprofltably in aiming to 
establish an infrastructure which in the long run will serve as a 
platform to generate profits. In this way it allows for an enterprise to 
develop more rapidly than might otherwise occur. However, as Shleifer 
(1998) points out, the arguments for the heavy state ownership in 
companies started waning within the last 30 years as governments in 
market economies throughout the world have embarked on privatization 
programs; he argues, too, that the case for privatization becom es 
stronger when political patronage and corruption are predominant and 
u ses the term "imperfect government” to describe a system  which  
maximizes political goals of patronage and supplem ents politicians’
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incom es through bribes. Shleifer (1998) logically argues that the 
validity for private ownership is strengthened where there is a 
preponderance of corruption thereby making it easier for reforms.
Conversely, if the private sector was the primary avenue for this 
development to take place, its period might be of m uch longer years or 
maybe even decades since private companies consider the issu es of 
costs and returns or profits, in its profit maximizing mode; private 
companies are not set to cause the development of an industry or 
provision of a service the sam e way a government can, the need to 
establish an infrastructure for long-term growth is therefore more 
important than short-term revenues and profits. That said, it requires 
some maturity for those in charge to stand back and ask, can we 
remove ourselves from the ownership of the company and pass it to the 
private sector? Shleifer (1998) appropriately recognizes that 
governments, similar to what the interviewees have indicated, u se  the 
control of state companies to channel benefits, state firms are thus 
inefficient as managers have real incentives to reduce costs, inefficiency 
is the outcome of government’s deliberate policy to transfer resources to 
supporters. Apart from the reasons offered by Shleifer (1998), 
Rajagopalan and Zhang (2007) posit that when a state removes itself 
from the ownership of an enterprise, the company usually is presented  
with more opportunities or pressures to ensure that outcom es are 
achieved, that the company typically has to demonstrate more concern  
about its corporate governance practices and the usefu lness and value 
of its decision-making processes; this, in turn, can raise the profile and 
reputation of the company. The state’s privatization is also welcome by 
private sector as they can participate in an industry where the costs to 
start have already been reduced through the state’s involvement and 
ownership; it is thus easier for the private sector to step in and 
participate. The development and improvement of corporate governance 
practices are disincentivised where the state-owned com panies are
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guaranteed of financial resources regardless of performance. An 
important feature of the corporate-governance landscape is stamping  
out the blight of corruption. According to Kaufman and Siegelbum  
(1997), the prevalence of corruption typically strengthens the case for 
private ownership. For me, its appeal is registered in the fact that it is  
generally easier for reformers in a government to design a relatively 
corruption-free privatization program which relies on the effectiveness 
of a relatively small agency than to fight corruption from inside state 
companies. Kaufman and Siegelbum importantly tell u s  that several 
Latin American, eastern European and Russian countries have 
succeeded here.
T h e R ole  o f  E d u c a tio n
I make the following recommendation in the knowledge that, som etim es, 
what initially appears of little significance assum es great importance in 
the long run. I believe that introducing the subject of corporate 
governance at the secondary and tertiary level is very important towards 
the long-term aim of developing a society that is less apathetic to and  
ignorant of governance issues. Corporate governance not only provides 
a matrix for understanding how a company is directed and controlled, 
but also offers a wonderful opportunity for a discussion of morality and  
ethics, subjects too often omitted from syllabuses. While I have found  
that the terms “ethics” and “morality” are often used interchangeably 
when discussing corporate governance the terms ought to be 
distinguished. Morality is more of a general notion, it outlines the 
moral norms and standards accepted within a society, it is not specific 
to business but impinges on all aspects of hum an life (Applied 
Corporate Governance, 2011). Since ethics and morality are not 
specific to business, the teaching of corporate governance affords both  
student and teacher a wonderful opportunity to grasp its significance as  
a subject with a wide range of reference. What holds true for corporate
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governance holds true for all key areas of hum an behaviour; it shows u s  
whether the actions of a person are appropriate or inappropriate, 
whether it conforms to inherent social values and whether or not the 
greater good is served.
Hosmer (1995) points out that this determination of whether an action 
is appropriate or inappropriate is som ething that is socially 
constructed: people may determine whether som ething is moral based  
on religious ideals and traditions, which indicates that actions that are 
considered to be morally correct or incorrect are socially constructed. 
Ethics as differentiated by Hosmer (1995) refer to a broader study of 
behaviours and actions and about how the specific actions impact the 
lives of others, how decisions impact people in a social system  such as  
professional ethics. As such ethics can also be explained as the 
application of morality in a particular sphere and its usefu lness through 
educational dissem ination is to build a society of wholesom e and 
thoughtful members.
By having these two items feature as part of a corporate governance 
subject, preferably as mandatory for students of commerce students are 
likely to form the right moral opinions about conducting business. The 
perceived benefits of offering a course on corporate governance let's say  
for undergraduate students are many: it allows the understanding of 
the role of corporate governance for com panies in both private and 
public sectors, one is likely to understand and appreciate the
i
peculiarities of the corporate governance system s in different countries; 
it facilitates the understanding of the various dim ensions of corporate 
governance and the internal m echanism s in the organisation that exist 
to promote its practice, including the roles and influence of directors in 
the company's decision-making process; and it encourages and 
challenges the student to understand the role of the corporation and its 
corporate social responsibility. Over time this will have the effect of
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cementing notions of corporate rights and wrongs for all sectors. I 
believe, therefore, that educating secondary-level and tertiary-level 
students in the importance of corporate governance will go a long way 
in establishing a useful foundation on which to build deeper and more 
mature thinking about a defining management phenomenon. Such  
teaching and learning will impact significantly on the thinking and 
behaviour of the young in whose hands the future of the country rests. 
Such an approach was recently supported by Dr. Axel Kravatsky in 
commenting on the study conducted on corporate governance by his 
firm Syntegra Change Architects as reported in the Trinidad Guardian 
(November 2, 2011).
M atu rity  o f  S o c ie ty
I admit that it is virtually impossible to institute my recommendations 
in a society that has not attained the requisite maturity. An ubiquitous 
definition of maturity is “full development.” Whilst this might be better 
understood in terms of individual physical and emotional maturity, I 
believe it becomes more complex when extended to society or a country. 
My comm ents here do not constitute a recommendation, it is simply a 
commentary on the impact of the level of maturity of a society. From a 
broad perspective, research indicates that the maturity of a society is 
positively co-related to the level of corporate governance that exists 
within a country (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007). More specifically, 
the reason more mature countries generally have higher levels of 
corporate governance is that there are greater opportunities for growth. 
In countries in which higher levels of growth are possible, corporate 
governance is viewed as being more important in order to attract 
investors and to demonstrate that companies and organisations can be 
trusted as potential avenues for investment.
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Interestingly, countries with relaxed corporate governance rules and 
policies are often viewed as nations in which corruption exists (Wu, 
2005). The fact that corporate governance has not become 
institutionalized in the rules and policies of a country is often 
associated with higher levels of corruption. A view exists among 
investors and within the business community that countries are either 
taking actions to reduce unethical and illegal acts on the part of 
corporate leaders or are creating an environment in which illegal and 
unethical acts can easily occur with little threat of punishm ent (Wu, 
2005). According to Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), research  
indicates that it is the country-level characteristics that are significant 
predicators of the level of corporate governance policies that are in 
place. This is important because it indicates that the characteristics of 
firms are actually not as important as the larger characteristics of the 
legal and economic structure of countries that are related to the 
corporate governance policies that are in place. The primaiy difference 
that seem s to exist between countries with high ratings on the 
corruption index and countries with low ratings on the corruption index 
is the level of development. Countries that are more economically and 
politically developed and that have more stable economic and political 
system s are more likely to have strong corporate governance rules and a 
lower level of corruption as measured by the corruption index. In 
contrast, developing countries and those with less stable political and 
economic system s are likely to have a lower level of corporate 
governance policies and have a higher rating of corruption as m easured  
by the corruption index (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007).
It is possible to expand the d iscussion about the characteristics of 
differences between countries with high levels of corporate governance 
as compared to countries with lower levels of corporate governance in 
order to d iscuss essential differences between these countries and how  
they impact investors. One of the essential differences between
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countries with high levels of corporate governance as compared to 
countries with low levels of corporate governance is the relationship 
between leaders and stakeholder with regards to interests. In developed 
countries in which high levels of corporate governance exists, corporate 
leaders are more likely to have similar interests to the stakeholders. 
One of the reasons the corporate leaders and the stakeholders are likely 
to have shared interests is that of the level of involvement of investors 
and other stakeholders. Developed countries with low levels of 
corruption generally have laws that make it easy for stakeholders to 
become involved in corporate decision-making. In fact, som e countries 
require a certain level of involvement on the part of investors (Wu, 
2005). When investors are sought after only for the money that they  
can contribute to the operations of a company but are not permitted to 
be involved in decision-making or oversight, then the interests of the 
leaders can easily diverge from the interests of the stakeholders. In 
countries with relaxed laws that allow investors to be involved in 
corporate decision-making, corporate governance policies are generally 
stronger because it is known that investors will be involved and they 
will demand protections for the investm ents that they have made.
It is plain that high levels of corporate governance characterized by high 
levels of ethics and morality define the ideal. And low levels of 
corruption combined with higher levels of ethics and morality on the 
part of corporate leaders also effect high levels of corporate governance. 
A society that has higher levels of ethics and morality is not likely to 
experience a sudden decrease in ethics and morality and an increase in 
corporate corruption. Instead, a society in which its corporate leaders 
are ethical in their practices creates a matrix in which ethical and moral 
actions protect investors and the general public. However, in countries 
in which ethics and morality are not in place and in which high levels of 
corruption exist, changing the actions of corporate leaders and creating
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a change toward ethical and moral behaviour is difficult and requires a 
great deal of effort.
The impact from high levels of ethics and morality on both corporate 
directors and leaders and on society as a whole is without doubt a 
boon. A reduction in internal corruption and unethical behaviour on 
the part of the leaders in state-owned companies allows for these 
companies to operate more efficiently and effectively. Corporate 
governance is not an issue that can be ignored until economic 
development has been achieved; it is an issue that m ust be tackled in 
such a developing nation as Trinidad and Tobago; it will contribute 
tremendously to the development and maturity of the society.
C o n c lu s io n  to  C h ap ter  S ix
I make the foregoing recommendations knowing full well that there will 
be no wholesale or sudden implementations of any of them , as 
reasonable as they sound. What needs to occur before implementation 
is a cultural change. Our society m ust raise its cultural bars: it m ust 
demand greater productivity from its workers at all levels, it m ust 
require more stringent compliance to rules and regulations, and it 
ought to think always of the greater good. We need as an independent 
nation to grow up, to encourage in ourselves and in others a greater 
sense of maturity in all that we do.
The forensic reading of the interview literature provides for a decent and
logical conclusion that there is a great sense of apathy in the practice of
corporate governance. A useful and unavoidable question is what
causes apathy and what occurs when apathy to corporate governance
sets in an organisation. It is important to understand that a  high level
of involvement from stakeholders does not necessarily prevent apathy to
corporate governance. Instead, Fisch (2010) argues that even with
stakeholder involvement, the motivation may not exist to ensure that
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corporate governance policies are as strong as possible or provide the 
benefits that are desired. The reason for apathy and inaction among 
stakeholders can be related to a lack of knowledge about what actions 
ought to be taken with regards to corporate governance. For Fisch  
(2010), another well-placed reason for inaction on the part of 
stakeholders is that they are happy with their own personal outcom es 
in terms of the performance of the organisation. And they are sure to 
convince them selves that if things work in their favour and bring about 
political patronage thereby securing the chances of the political party 
remaining in power there is no need for a change. If corporate directors 
can behave in their own best interests, there is nothing to prevent 
stakeholders from doing the same. If the best interest of government or 
Corporation Sole is to not take any action for fear of harming political 
continuity, then no action may be taken. This may be true even if 
companies are not acting in the m ost ethical ways. Clarence Rambharat 
writing in Trinidad Express (June 27, 2011) aptly points out the 
blurring of roles of the Line Minister, company, management, board and  
chair to such an extent m akes it appear is if they act as one. This he 
suggests, lies in the vacuum  created by the Corporation Sole in not 
detailing the public’s expectations of the respective state enterprises 
and their Boards.
2 1 9
"WHERE NEXT" -  OVERALL CONCLUSION
Chapter 5 concluded with the dilemmas, identified and described 
through the interpretation of the texts. These dilemmas persist, thus, 
and as evidenced through the pericentric, are difficult to solve for, 
mainly due to its metaphoric impenetrable outer layer. The central and 
m ost vexing dilemma is layered in the pericentric. Simply put, the 
previously named 'political pattern’ and the politics is, unarguably, the 
proverbial millstone around the neck of corporate governance strangling 
its life, snuffing its existence. I believe that if government is not 
prepared to sincerely examine whether it is absolutely necessary to own 
the many state companies they do or whether these com panies could be 
allowed to develop fully and grow, then it is perhaps more important to 
own the company for other reasons, reasons that indubitably will 
perpetuate the problems associated with the pericentric political 
pattern. To avoid the political manipulation which com es with the state 
ownership, the state, in my opinion, should focus on assessing  those  
corporations that it can divest itself of, establish a m echanism  to have a 
pool of competent and qualified directors for selection, cause a 
corporate governance code to be established for the state-owned  
company sector and focus on a regulatory role. It becom es pellucid to 
me, if the political pericentric continues as the eutrophicating force, 
depriving the corporate governance process of its oxygen lifeblood. In 
these circum stances, then no life can be breathed into the centripetal, 
and so it will wither, to an inevitable miserable and wilted presence. 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2007) rightly identifies corporate-governance as 
being central to the m ost important issu es of society. This is echoed by 
others: DiPiazza and Eccles (2002); Mallin (2010); Cadbury (1992); 
OECD (1998).
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I am reasonably assured that this thesis has fulfilled two primary tasks: 
one, to identify and describe significantly the dilemmas that have 
characterized and continue to characterize the effective discharge of 
corporate governance; two, to offer recommendations for the solution of 
these dilemmas. Both tasks have been presented and executed to the 
best of my ability; in all sincerity, I do not know what more I could have 
done. Though there is always room for improvement, however small, I 
am satisfied that I have given it my best shot. These two tasks are in 
effect the raison d’etre of my academic undertaking, which provides two 
distinct kinds of pleasure: it offers me the chance to obtain the DBA, 
which, given all the time, expense, and effort it has cost me, will bring a 
tremendous sense of personal pride and satisfaction; coincidentally, 
and even more significantly, it offers me the opportunity to make a 
tangible contribution to the national welfare of my country. There is no 
doubt in my mind and the collective mind that the discharge of 
corporate governance in the public sector in Trinidad and Tobago 
continues to be severely compromised. I believe that we m ust improve 
this minefield of corporate governance through a shared political vision 
of its national good. Premdass (1996) correctly points out, that in a 
society that does not have a shared belief, the political structures will 
inevitably be viewed with suspect interests. The modern sociopolitical 
phase of the island’s evolution is characterized by an ethnic divide that 
has been manipulated by politicians and deepened by tribal politics. 
Not surprisingly, as the interview texts show, this bugbear, made more 
aggressive and minatory by politicians, has impacted heavily on the 
complexion, composition, and performance of state-owned entities and 
state Boards.
Of course, I am not so naive as to believe that my research m ust and  
will make a difference. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, a decisive step in 
the right direction; without this kind of research the process of reform 
cannot begin. I offer this research project as a beginning, in the
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knowledge that if properly assessed  it can be of value to both individual 
and country.
C o n tr ib u tio n
This DBA thesis has been consciously secured to the moorings of its 
Harvard origin as described by Howard Lyons (2012): it is the research  
of practice which allows me and others to understand the modalities 
and implications of the phenom enon of how corporate governance is 
understood and practiced in state owned companies; this is not about 
sounding erudite nor about building theories that wear a veil of 
academic respectability but have no practical applicability. It is 
necessary, therefore, to demonstrate the contributions that this 
academic piece can claim.
I believe that this DBA thesis is a serious, professional and credible 
investigation of corporate governance in state-owned com panies in 
Trinidad and Tobago. The contributions are threefold: methodological; 
academic, and practical. These deserve a fuller explanation. The 
methodological derives from the research methodology; an interpretivist 
work based on the texts of interviewees, the methodology brings a 
credible piece of research of the phenom enon and has established the 
sufficiency of the number of Chairmen interviewed. Further, this 
. methodology has argued for and has demonstrated the applicability and 
usefu lness of conducting qualitative research to reveal findings in 
keeping with the research aims; it exposes dilemmas through the 
diagrammatic patterns of the centrifugal, the pericentric and the 
centripetal. These unique diagrams forged from the interpretivist 
methodology applied to the texts of the interviewees, facilitates a better 
understanding to those who are interested in the phenom enon. It bears 
repeating that this is perhaps the first study of its kind, the first to 
investigate the modalities of corporate governance in state owned 
companies in Trinidad and Tobago. It therefore represents a long
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overdue and mandatory first step in what I hope becomes an ongoing 
task.
Inextricably bound to the methodological is the second, the academic 
whose contribution lies in the discovery, conceptualisation and naming 
of the pericentric, centrifugal and centripetal patterns, through the 
forensic analysis of the information provided by those who are integral 
to ensuring the practice of good corporate governance. Chapter Five 
establishes beyond a doubt that there are indeed dilemmas in the 
discharge of corporate governance in the island’s state-owned  
enterprises. The interview literature, the first of its kind, reveals the 
divide between cognition and perception, between what governors 
believe what corporate governance is and ought to be and what they  
perceive its practice to be. It offers, too, coming from and building 
upon the interview analysis, a unique and compelling representation of 
the state of corporate governance through the metaphor of the circle to 
transmit the views expressed by those occupying the chair, in a m anner 
that is relatively simple, the damning impenetrable barrier; the 
pericentric, the use of the centrifugal and centripetal to demonstrate the 
understanding of corporate governance while also showing m ovement 
away from its practice. The discovery and naming of the three key 
patterns -  centrifugal, centripetal, and pericentric provide an academic 
context within which to continue investigation and which can  
encourage new directions of research. There can be no denial of the 
existence of these patterns (evident from the interview texts) though  
another researcher may discover another set of patterns. What is 
important is that this research provides a basis and incentive for more 
searching, investigation and analysis. Consequently, this second  
contribution presents information, perceptions, analysis and findings 
from the interview literature. It shows, pellucidly, the m anner in which  
dilemmas exist; the chief dilemma, knowing what to do, but unable to 
do so. It is so m uch more than the random, generalized, and anecdotal 
comments heard in conversation and seen from time to time in the
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press by a very few writers and commentators. It lays bare the barrier 
to effective corporate governance as it presents a veritable wealth of 
unprecedented data. It can therefore lay claim to adding to warranted 
knowledge in the field, making an original contribution to the discharge 
of corporate governance specifically in state owned com panies in 
Trinidad and Tobago.
The third contribution, though the m ost tentative, is significant as it 
encourages and anticipates a tangible and bona-fide contribution to the 
practice of corporate governance in state owned companies. It is the 
progeny of the inter-weave of the first and second, it justifies the raison  
d'etre o f a DBA; it offers a practical contribution to the fie ld  o f businesss. 
Further, this contribution also includes a sifting of views that I consider  
to be the “infrafundamental” set -  that is to say, they can cause those in 
authority to battle the inaction and apathy to ensuring meaningful 
corporate governance. This, Fisch (2010), refers to as an understanding  
of what actions should take place. These recommendations, not 
necessarily in terms of sequence; but more so in terms of its recognition 
of its pivotal importance to the field adds to the practicality of 
addressing that which has emerged from the first and second  
contribution; how and where do we start, we cannot boil the ocean. 
Rather, we pick those which are m ost fundamental; the 
infrafundamental. If we do not examine these broad areas in term s of 
impact and the results that can accrue, then we, I believe, are aim less, 
rudderless, possessive of wishful thinking, consigned to comm enting  
but avoiding the difficult doing; we cannot expect different results if we 
keep doing the sam e thing.
Thankfully, however, some relief looms on the horizon with the progress 
being made by the Caribbean Institute of Corporate Governance. This 
organisation is in the process of mobilizing sponsors from the corporate 
sector to consult and engage with industry, including the state owned 
sector to develop a code of corporate governance for Trinidad and
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Tobago. As a newly accepted researcher in the field, I have offered my 
services which have been accepted, to be part of the drafting committee. 
I look forward to being an active contributor to the furtherance of good 
corporate governance within our society; I am aware that the challenge 
is not one to be underestimated; Ralph Maharaj, a previous 
Government Minister and a playwright writing a particularly trenchant 
and impressive article in the Trinidad Express of October 16, 2012, tell 
u s of a “Nation Trapped”. He is severely critical of the practice in 
Trinidad and Tobago where the seeds of transformation do not take hold 
because there is no collective will to make things right. He points to a 
shallow social conscience fed by primitive tribal politics. Progress is 
espoused, from the rot and ruin, through commitment and pursuit of a  
path based on the highest principles of personal and communal 
conduct. Maharaj recognses, what I have concluded in Chapter Four; 
when he surm ises that we have a highly educated workforce, many 
graduates, academic excellence and a flourishing middle class, the 
political will to enforce change is no longer subject to perfunctory 
statem ents. The nation has to go past its apparent approach of 
avoidance and arrogance in the matters of governance.
I am comforted by the belief that this research adds, practically to our 
understanding of what corporate governance has been and still is and 
what it ought to be. It provides information, analysis and 
recommendations to lead u s to better appreciate and assim ilate the 
conditions that can cause our corporate governance system  to be 
improved from its current floundering state. It invites readers and other 
researchers to a ssess the appropriateness of the metaphor and patterns 
as they seek to build on this research; it provides recomm endations in 
an organised, well argued manner. The completed research also invites 
others to progress with further research into other dim ensions of 
corporate governance: short term transaction costs, reputational loss 
and its impact.
2 2 5
T h e DBA J o u r n e y
The academic journey over the landscape of corporate governance in 
state-owned entities in Trinidad and Tobago is over. I have travelled a 
long way and have learned m uch along the route. I started with 
trepidation and faltering steps of a hunch, gathered stability and focus 
and attained the security and mom entum  to see me through to the end  
of the trail. The vantage point atop the plateau affords me a panoramic 
retrospective view: I see the different terrains I travelled, the plains of 
corporate governance, the more difficult sands of research methodology, 
the m isty reaches of the economic and political history, the shifting 
quicksands of the interview literature and the uphill climbs of analyzing 
the emergent patterns. Having ascended the plateau through stam ina  
and effort, I now take the time to rest and reflect in satisfaction. I know  
that this academic journey is over, but the road of practical 
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